The Immutability and Impassibility of God with Reference to the Doctrine of the Incarnation.

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THE IMMUTABILITY AND IMPASSIBILITY OF GOD WITH REFERENCE TO THE DOCTRINE OF THE INCARNATION

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ABSTRACT

This study basically treats two concerns. The first is the relation between the immutability of God and the Incarnation. How can God be and remain immutable and yet become man? The second is the passibility of God as man. Is there any real meaning in saying that as man God is born, suffers, and dies? These two concerns are studied historically and speculatively; i.e. through the study of how these two concerns were treated in different periods throughout the history of Christology, it was hoped that a viable and enriched theological answer to the problems under discussion would be forthcoming.

In Patristic Christology one finds a gradual realization among the Fathers that the immutability of God is not an impediment to the Incarnation, but a prolegomenon to it. The basic problem for them was to define the incarnational notion of 'become'. The incarnational act must not only uphold the immutability of God, but the ontological union and the full humanity as well. This was accomplished by Cyril of Alexandria with his personal/existential notion of the Incarnation. A further development was found in Aquinas. He placed the personal/existential notion of the Incarnation in the philosophical framework of a mixed relation. This gave greater depth and clarity as to how and why God can remain immutable in becoming man, and why he is truly passible as man. It is Aquinas who gives full positive value to God's immutability as it relates to the Incarnation. Kenotic Christology saw the immutability of God as a threat to the full humanity, but in the end it undermined its own belief. Kenotic Christology sacrificed not only the full divinity of Christ, but also the full humanity. While Process Christology solves the problem under discussion by making God mutable, it does so at the expense of abandoning rationality and Christianity. Contemporary Catholic Christology is well aware of the problems. While Rahner and Galot truly desire to maintain God's immutability, they find it difficult to reconcile it with God's actual dynamic presence in time and history as man. They fail to see that the immutability of God is the guarantee and prolegomenon to God's actual dynamic presence in time and history as man.

PREFACE

This study basically treats two concerns. The first concern is the relation between the immutability of God and the Incarnation. How can God be and remain immutable and yet become man? The second concern is the passibility of God as man. Is there any real meaning in saying that God is born, suffers, dies, loves as man? These two concerns are studied historically, i.e., how they were treated in different periods throughout the history of Christology. However, this is not purely an historical study. It is speculative as well for the author wished in and through the historical study to obtain and formulate a viable and enriched theological answer to the problems treated. Thus it was hoped that from and in this historical study a real and new development in Christological knowledge would be forthcoming both as to the nature of the questions treated and of the answers that must be given.

Because this study is of a historical/speculative nature what should be noted is that the answers proposed in this study are given in the historical context of when and how the questions were asked and answered in the different periods of the history of Christology. Because of this the questions studied here have only been answered gradually through the accumulation and collation of insights that have been obtained from different theologians in different historical periods. What should also be noted then is that the insights obtained and stressed in each chapter were obtained mainly at the time of researching and writing that chapter. There was no pre-conceived plan as to how this study would develop, nor then is there any reading into the past the developments that took place in the future. For example, the insights that were obtained in researching and stressed in writing the chapter on Aquinas were not known at the time when the chapter on Nestorius, Cyril, and Chalcedon was written. The author then not only tried to write an historical/speculative study of the problem of how God can remain immutable in becoming man, and how he is passible as man, but actually tried to live the history of the Christological speculation as well. The author's own speculative answers grew and developed in and with each historical period treated and are contained developmentally in each of the successive chapters.

While this study is of an historical nature, it is obvious, for reasons of space and time, that the whole history of Christology could not

be treated. Those periods, movements, and theologians which seemed the most relevant to the questions under discussion were chosen for examination. Thus the Introduction and first two chapters treat the Patristic Period. The Introduction will situate the problems and questions in early Christian thought. Chapter 1 will be concerned with the Trinitarian and Christological speculation surrounding the Council of Nicea, and Chapter 2 will treat the Nestorian and Monophysite controversies in conjunction with the Councils of Ephesus and Chalcedon. The third chapter will take a quick glance at Anselm and make a more thorough study of Aquinas' Christology. Introduced by way of Luther and Lutheran Christology, Kenoticism will be the main concern of Chapter 4. Chapter 5 will study Process Christology and Chapter 6 will discuss the Christology of a number of contemporary Catholic authors.

As the above reveals there are lacunae in this study. Some of the most striking are the post-Chalcedonian Christology surrounding the Monophysite Movement, the Medieval Franciscan Christology of such men as Bonaventure and Scotus, and the Neo-Orthodox Protestant Christology of Barth and Brunner. It is hoped that their absence does not critically harm this study.

It should be noted that the terms 'immutable' and 'impassible' retain, for the most part, their usual theological meaning in this study. For God to be immutable means that he does not change. The concepts of 'impassibility' and 'passibility' are somewhat broadened however. For God to be impassible in this study means not only that he does not experience suffering, pain, and sorrow, but also that he does not experience changing intellectual, psychological, and emotional states as men do. Likewise then for God to be passible as man would denote not only that he can suffer, etc., but also that he can experience human intellectual, psychological and emotional states.

There is one overriding presupposition in this study. It may best be called 'the principle of faith.' The author accepted from the very beginning that God as God is immutable and impassible and that he remained immutable in the act of becoming man, but that as man he was passible. This was accepted not because some theological answer as to how this could be the case was already formulated, but because this is what has been revealed and what faith has accepted as true. The purpose of this study

then was to propose how what has been revealed and accepted by faith can be theologically and philosophically grounded and understood.

INTRODUCTION

SITUATING THE QUESTIONS IN EARLY PATRISTIC CHRISTOLOGY

A. Biblical Basis

To introduce this study via biblical teaching is difficult. The difficulty is not so much that there is no biblical foundation for this study, but rather that the Bible, as such, does not explicitly raise or treat the problems studied here. The Bible, especially the New Testament, is kerygmatic in nature and thus its main purpose is to proclaim God's revelation and not to give a systematic, speculative, and theological examination of it. Moreover, since God's revelation takes place in a Semitic culture, the thought patterns and linguistic expression in which God's revelation is couched do not give rise to the concerns of this study. The Old Testament does not speak philosophically of God's immutability and of his relation to the world. The New Testament does not treat the question of how God can remain immutably himself and yet become man, nor does it speculate on how the human experiences of Christ bear upon his divine Sonship.

If one were to look for the biblical basis of this study, one would have to say that it arises out of the Old Testament's dual conception of God. First of all the Old Testament sees God as a 'living God' (Jd.8:18, 1 Kg.17:1), who is actively and personally present to his people. He is the God who leads the Israelites out of the land of Egypt (Ex.13:17), who saves them from thirst, famine, and sword (Dt.28:1, Ex.17:7 , 2 Sam.3:18). He is the God who is active in time and history as their Lord and Master (Dt.10:14-18). He is the God who chooses a people and unites them to himself (Gn.12). He is the faithful 'God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob' (Ex.3:6). He is the God who makes his presence and wishes known through the Judges, Kings, Priests, and especially the Prophets. He is the God who is near, who sees and listens to his people (Ex.2:23-25). He is the God who loves, judges and condemns (Am.3:2). For the Hebrew people God revealed himself as an active personal being in their midst.

However, it is through God's personal proximity and dynamic activity in the world among men that he reveals himself as other than the world and man. It is through his acts that he reveals himself to be God and

not man, 'the Holy One in your midst' (Hos.11:9, Cf. Am.4:2). While active and present in time and history he is above time and history as their Lord and King. He is Lord over all creation (Is.6:5, Ps.97:5, 45:3, Jds.3:11, Mi.4:13). He is the Creator God who from the beginning, before creation, existed (Gn.1:1), and as such he is 'the first and the last' (Is.41:4, 44:6). He is spirit (Is.31:3), the most high (Ps.47:2), the almighty (Ps.135), the all-powerful (Dt.4:32-40). Unlike man he does not come to be or pass away. He 'never changes' and his 'years are unending' (Ps.102:27). He is above all other gods, and he alone is truly God: 'Before me, no god was formed and there will be none after me; I, I, I am Yahweh, there is no other savior than I' (Is.43:10f). While God is with his people, he challenges them: '"To whom could you liken me and who could be my equal?" says the Holy One' (Is.40:24-25, Cf. 40:18). He resembles nothing in the created world (Ex.20:4, Dt.5:8). For the Hebrew people God's transcendence does not take away from his immanence, but gives meaning and value to his immanence. The God who is wholly other than they is the God who walks, talks, listens, weeps, judges, and loves.

It is this dual conception of God which is basically the biblical prologomenon to this study. God reveals himself in time and history as one who transcends time and history. He is present as the wholly other.[1]

With the coming of Christ this dual conception of God is radically made evident. With Christ God is no longer present and active through Judges, Kings and Prophets, but now the Word himself, who in the beginning was with God and is God, has become flesh and lives among men (Jn.1:1-14). The divine Logos himself is in time and history living as a man. While the Fathers will ask philosophical questions and use philosophical constructs and language, it is this radical and unprecedented presence of God himself as a man which challenges them.

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1. God in revealing his name as Yahweh brings out this dual understanding. He reveals and names himself as the wholly other and the unknowable. Cf. W. Eichrodt, Theology of the Old Testament, Vol. 1, (New York: Harper, 1962), pp. 179-187; J.C. Murray, The Problem of God, (New Haven: Yale University Press), pp. 5-30. For a good summary of the Old Testament notion of God see J.L. McKenzie, The Two-Edged Sword, (London: Geoffrey Chapman, 1967), pp. 286-294.

B. Early Patristic Development

For the Patristic theologians the immutability of God, as philosophically understood, is taken for granted. Pelikan notes that 'the early Christian picture of God was controlled by the self-evident axiom, accepted by all, of the absoluteness and impassibility of the divine nature.'[1] Thus, the early Christological controversies and debates were never concerned with the immutability and impassibility of God as such, but rather they centred around the reconciliation of God's immutability and impassibility with the new reality of Christ.

The theological development concerning the person of Christ raised the question of immutability and impassibility of three levels. The three levels arise out of John's statement 'The Word became flesh.' Each of the three words (except 'the') raised a distinct question concerning God's immutability and impassibility. The first level concerned God in himself and as such can be designated the Trinitarian question. If the Word is divine, how can he be from the Father without destroying the oneness of God and thus his immutable nature? Does belief in the divinity of the Son, that he is from the Father, imply that God in someway changes from one to two? The second level revolved around the notion of 'Become.' It is an incarnational concern. If the Word is God, does he change in becoming man? The third level centres on the manhood of the Son. If the divine Word is man, do his experiences as man effect a change in his divinity? The last two levels may be designated Christological.[2]

While the questions are on three levels, these levels are not separate or independent of one another since all find their point of departure and unity in the person of Christ. Thus the immutability and

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1. J. Pelikan, The Christian Tradition I: The Emergence of the Catholic Tradition (100-600), (Chicago: University Press, 1971), p. 229. Cf. R.M. Grant, The Early Christian Doctrine of God (Charlottesville University Press of Virginia, 1966), pp. 10, 13-15, 21, 111-114.
2. While this study is primarily concerned with the two Christological levels, the Trinitarian question will also be treated until Nicea and Athanasius. It was thought wise to treat the Trinitarian level until after the Arian controversy since God's immutability played such a major role in the controversy and the Church's subsequent teaching.

impassibility of God is not a question outside of or a sidelight to the major Trinitarian and Christological controversies, but rather a constitutive factor in the controversies themselves.

The first controversy involving the immutability and impassibility of God comes early with Docetism. As a Christological heresy it concerns God's immutability and impassibility on the two Christological levels. While it was condemned because it denied the real humanity of Christ, it was motivated to do so because of God's immutability and impassibility. For the Docetists God could not really be united to matter without becoming mutable and passible. To preserve God's immutability and impassibility they denied the physical and real humanity. God only appeared to be a man.

Part of their difficulty resided in their Manichean and Gnostic belief that matter was the principle of impurity and evil. Moreover, it was their zealous adherence to the Greek notion of God's immutable transcendence which scandalized them when confronted with the New Testament data of Christ's sufferings. For the Docetists, and for all who are overly influenced by Platonic thought, for God to be transcendent, and thus immutable and impassible, meant not only that God was wholly other than creation in the Biblical sense, but also wholly <u>apart</u> from man. Transcendence for the Greeks was not only a description of God in himself, but also a description of God's relation or lack of relation to man. This notion of transcendence usually expressed itself by allowing no direct relationship between God and man at all, but only indirectly through intermediaries. Thus one finds the Platonic concepts of Mind or Thought, Soul, and Demiurge.

Docetism then was not only a heresy in its own right, but also an integral component of all dualistic systems where what pertained to the transcendent God and what pertained to matter were seen not just as separate and distinct, but as radically opposed to any relationship. Thus one finds Docetic elements in Marcionism and Gnosticism.[1]

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1. Cf. J.N.D. Kelly, <u>Early Christian Doctrines</u> (London: Adam and Charles Black, 4th ed., 1968), pp. 140-142. Also see A. Grillmeier, <u>Christ in Christian Tradition</u> (London: Mowbray, 1965), pp. 103-122. Also see Pelikan, pp. 174-175.

Ignatius of Antioch is an example of a very early attack against those who 'deny God,' 'those sceptics,' who say 'that his sufferings were not genuine' or who deny 'that he ever bore a real human body.'[1] For Ignatius Christ 'was the son of Mary; he was verily and indeed born, and ate and drank; he was verily presecuted in the days of Pontius Pilate, and verily and indeed crucified, and gave up the ghost in the sight of all..... .'[2]

The full weight of Ignatius' defence, which would scandalize any good Docetist, comes to the fore when one realizes that the person who was really born and suffered was 'Jesus Christ our God.'[3] For Ignatius 'There is only one Physician--very flesh, yet Spirit too; Uncreated, and yet born;....At once impassible and torn by pain and suffering here below..... .'[4]

The strength of Ignatius' position lies in the fact that he expresses the faith of the Church with little ambiguity. It is indeed surprising that at such an early date one finds the full divinity and humanity predicated of the one person of Christ almost in Chalcedonian rigor. However, while one sees this clear development in Ignatius' Christology, there is a lack of theological argumention. While he attacks the Docetic teaching as false, he does not present any theological arguments as to why they are wrong. He in no way tries to answer the problem that they brought to the fore: how can God become man and undergo real human experiences while remaining immutable and impassible in his divinity? Ignatius could have attacked their understanding of matter and creation or their notion of God's transcendence. Or he could have speculated on the nature of the union between God and man in Christ.[5] For Ignatius it was enough to place the true faith concerning Christ over against that of the Docetists.

However, one should not be too critical of Ignatius' response, for as a heresy Docetism was precociously ahead of its time. The problem

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1. Ignatius of Antioch, Trall., 10 and Smyrn., 2 & 7. Trans. Maxwell Staniforth, Early Christian Writings, (Penguine Classics, 1968).
2. Trall., 9.
3. Eph., 18. Cf. Poly., 8; Rom., 6.
4. Eph., 7. Cf. Poly., 3. Besides Ignatius of Antioch, Polycarp of Smyrna and soon after Iraneus of Lyons also took the Docetists to task. Cf. Polycarp, Phil., 7. Iraneus, Adv. Haer., 3:16:9, 4:6:7.
5. Ignatius' arguments for the real humanity are solely soteriological. Cf. Eph., 18; Trall., 2 & 11; Phil., 9 & 11; Smyrn., 5 & 7.

problem of Docetism only comes when one holds for the full divinity of Christ. Thus the problem raised by the Docetists only comes fully to the fore in the aftermath of Nicea and the Arian controversy when it is taken up by Nestorious and Cyril.

With the demise of the Docetists, at least in the extreme form, the early Church turned its attention to the divinity of the Logos and his relation to the Father.[1] While the major problem was trying to preserve the oneness of God, the influence of and repercussions on Christology are readily apparent. This speculation is exemplified by the extreme forms of Monarchianism and by the responses of Tertullian and Origen to them.

Dynamic Monarchianism or Adoptionism is not so much concerned with the immutability and impassibility of God as they pertain to the Incarnation, but more to the oneness of God in himself. Christ as Son of God was not Son by nature but son by adoption for to be Son by nature would destroy the oneness of the monarchy, and thus indirectly make God mutable and changeable.

Paul of Samosata, for example, saw the Logos not as a subsistent divine person, but rather as that power and enlightenment given to Christ by which he became the adopted Son of God. Thus Paul saw the Logos and the Son as distinct. The Logos was God's impersonal power or grace given to the man Christ by which he is adopted as Son.[2] While Paul is mainly remembered for his heretical Christology, it was due in actual fact to his erroneous view concerning the oneness of God based on the absolute monarchy of the Greek Platonic One.

Paul argued that if the Logos was an <u>ousia</u> or person in his own right, it would demand that the Logos be <u>homoousion</u> with the Father. This in turn would demand, according to Paul, that if the oneness of God were to be preserved, there must be a third, antecedent and common <u>ousia</u> underlying both the Father and Son. As two copper coins share in the same common substance of copper, so the Father and Son share

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1. Docetic influences can incirectly be seen in such a man as Clement of Alexandria. With his stoic notion of <u>apateia</u> he is able to down play the sufferings and human experiences of Christ. The humanity of Christ is suffused and governed by the Logos protecting it from human passion and suffering. Cf. Kelly, pp. 133-134. Grillmeier, pp. 159-163.
2. For a fuller presentation of Paul of Samosata's thought see Kelly, pp. 117-119 and 158-160.

the same common substance of deity. While Paul himself did not bring his argument to the ad absurdum conclusion (Arius would), this understanding of substance would mean that the divine substance was divisible, material and thus changeable and corruptible.[1] Obviously such an understanding of the Logos being homoousion with the Father was not only repugnant to Paul, but also to the Fathers who condemned him. Thus while the Fathers at the Council of Antioch (268) maintained that the Logos was a divine ousia, he was not homoousion with the Father as Paul understood this. While the Origenist Fathers at Antioch could not explain the relation between the divine ousia of the Logos or Son and the divine ousia of the Father, they knew they did not mean Paul's materialistic understanding of it. It would take Nicae to clarify this.

Modalistic Monarchianism and its chief exemplification, Sabellianism, was mainly concerned, like Dynamic Monarchianism, with preserving the oneness of God. Unlike the Adoptionists however the Modalists or Sabellians also wished to maintain the full divinity of Christ. In order to do both they taught that while the Godhead is one, it expresses itself as Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. The Son and Spirit are not distinct from the Father, but modes or expressions of the one Godhead of the Father. While one could nominally speak of the Father, Son, and Spirit, one was really speaking of one and the same reality manifesting itself in different ways. In actual fact within the Godhead itself no such distinction could be made.[2]

Modalistic Monarchianism may seem to have maintained God's oneness and the divinity of Christ, but it did so at the expense of tradition and scripture. Theology may not as yet have clarified the distinction between the Father and Son, but to say that there was no distinction was unsound both from scripture and tradition as Hippolytus and Tertullian were quick to point out.[3]

What is important here, however, is that while the Modalists wished

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1. Cf. Athanasius, De. Syn., 45 & 51. Besides giving Paul's teaching Athanasius also shows how the Council of Antioch and Nicea are saying the same thing even though one condemns and one approves the word: homoousios. Cf. G.L. Prestige, God in Patristic Thought, (London: SPCK, 1952), pp. 201-209.
2. Cf. Kelly, pp. 119-123. Pelikan, pp. 176-180. Prestige, God in Patristic Thought, pp. 113-114. Prestige, Fathers and Heretics, (London: SPCK, 1968), pp. 77-80.
3. Cf. Pelikan, pp. 180-182.

to preserve the oneness of God, in effect they undermined their own belief. To hold that God reveals himself at one time as Father, another time as Son, and yet another time as Spirit is to imply that God changes with each successive mode of expression. By eliminating the distinction between the persons and making them nominal expressions of the one Godhead, the Modalists forced the Godhead to change in itself. For God now reveals himself not as he really is, as Father, Son, and Spirit, but according to the manner of expression assumed. Each new mode of expression demanded that the one God change to fit that new mode of expression. Tertullian shows the absurdity of this position when he says: 'He who raised up Christ and is also to raise up our mortal bodies will be as it were another raiser-up, if it is the case that the Christ who died is the Father.'[1] Ps.-Athanasius states the same with a little more theological precision when he says that if the Modalists are correct then 'the Divine Monad, indivisible as it is, must be compound, being severed into essence and accident.'[2] The one immutable God that the Modalistic Monarchians wished to defend ironically vanishes in the multiple metamorphic modes of expression. Nominal Trinitarianism demands alterable Unitarianism.

Modalistic Monarchianism likewise caused difficulty on the Christological level with what came to be called Patripassianism. Noetus and Praxeas held that since the Son is but a different expression of the Father, one could say with equal validity that the Father suffered and died etc.. Sabellius seems not to have wanted to go quite that far. However, the problem remains that because the divine names of the Godhead are notional, the human predicates attributed to Christ are attributed directly and undifferentiatedly to the Godhead itself. It was not uncommon to speak of God being born, suffering, etc., as Ignatius of Antioch exemplifies, but the orthodox usage of such language presupposed that one was referring to the Son of God as incarnated in Christ and not to the undifferentiated Godhead. Hippolytus and Tertullian could not

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1. Tertullian, Adv. Prax., 28. Trans. E. Evans, Tertullian's Treatise Against Praxeas, (London, SPCK, 1948).
2. Ps.-Athanasius, C.Ar., 4:2. Cf. 4:13 & 25. Unless otherwise stated all quotations of Athanasius and Ps.-Athanasius are taken from translation in Athanasius, Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, Vol. IV., ed. H. Wage and P. Schaff, (Oxford: Parker and Comp., 1892).

clearly state why it was that one could speak of the Son suffering and not the Father, since they are both God, but they were sure that to pretend that there was no difference was blasphemous. In a desperate tone Tertullian writes: 'Let this blasphemy be silent, let it be silent, Let it be enough to say that Christ the Son died, and this only because it is so written.'[1] With Athanasius a more reasoned answer would be given.

Coming to Tertullian one finds that God the Father is the one undivided and unoriginate Godhead. As such he is the source of the deity in the Son and Spirit who emanate from him. The Son and Spirit, while distinct, are not different substances from the Father since they share in the one substance of the Father from whom they derive. As Tertullian states: 'We believe in one only God, (and) that the one only God has also a Son, His Word, who has issued out of himself....which Son then sent,.... the Holy Spirit, the Paraclete, out of the Father.'[2] Thus Tertullian sees three persons in the one substance of God. While his notion of substance has a Stoic materialistic flavour about it, it nevertheless, albeit crudely, expresses the fact that the Son and Spirit equally partake of the divine essence of the Father.

However, while the Son and Spirit are fully divine for Tertullian, and thus a far cry from Plotinus, his use of the principle of emanation has a weakening and blemishing effect on the unity and equality of the persons within the Trinity. The source of the unity and the source of the deity is the Father. Since the Son and Spirit are divine by derivation, only the Father holds the primacy of position. They are numbered second and third not as enumerations, but as positions in a hierarchy.[3] Understanding the Trinity in such wise inevitably places a strain on the unity precisely because the unity is placed not within the Trinity of persons as such, but in the Father alone. Likewise, to see the Son and Spirit as divine by emanation and derivation from the Father seems to imply some sort of change in the Godhead of the Father. There is also a tendency, inherent in the principle of emanation which is not lacking in Tertullian, to see some sort of subordination in

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1. Tertullian, Adv. Prax., 29.
2. Ibid., p.2.
3. Cf. Grillmeier, p. 143.

those who emanate from the one. Origen exemplifies these problems even more clearly.

Greatly influenced by contemporary Platonic thought, Origen's Trinitarian theology bears witness to the one, unoriginate, transcendent Monad of God the Father. From all eternity the Father generates the Son who is God, but as derivative he is a God in second place or degree, a secondary God, a Deuteros Theos. Viewing the Trinity as such, Origen can speak very clearly and distinctly of three persons in the one God even to the point of being accused of Tritheism. This threeness, however, is a graded threeness, even more so than in Tertullian.

Origen's use of the Platonic notion of emanation places a great strain on his Trinitarianism. While it is the key-stone of Origen's understanding of the Trinity, it is also a two-edged sword. It serves as the basis both for the one, unoriginate and immutable nature of the Father as source of all divinity, and also for the derivative divinity of the Logos as a distinct person emanating from the Father. However, the more Origen stresses the fact that the Son is really God the more he weakens, by necessity, the unitive nature of the Father, and thus the oneness of God. The more he stresses the unitive nature of the Father and the derivative aspect of the Son the more he weakens the true divinity of the Son. At the critical point in Origen's Trinitarianism the sword of emanationism always turns against him. Prestige points out Origen's dilemma very clearly.

> 'On Origen's principle it was very difficult to avoid falling into one or other of two disastrous pitfalls. Either the effort to maintain the ultimate unity by magnifying the transcendence of the transmitting source, might lead to depreciation of the degree of authentic deity transmitted, and so to the denial of the other Persons were in any full sense God....Or else, if this tendency were resisted and a firm grasp retained of the equality of the three persons, no amount of assertion that the equality was transmitted could by itself save people from thinking of the three Persons as three separate Gods.....' 1

It should also be noticed that the principle of emanation influences Origen's understanding of God's transcendence. It is the same influence as that in the Docetists and Paul of Samosata. Only the Father for

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1. Prestige, Fathers and Heretics, pp. 86-87. Cf. Prestige, God in Patristic Thought, pp. 131-145. Kelly, pp. 128-132.

Origen is the totally transcendent One Godhead. Not only is he wholly other than man, but he also has no direct relation to man. Only the Logos, as God in second place, is able to form a relation to man. The Logos is the mediator between the one immutable transcendent Father and the multiplicity of corruptible creatures. In so understanding the role of the Logos, Origen hopes in some way to protect the immutable and impassible nature of God. However, he is only able to argue this way when stressing the secondary nature of the Logos' divinity. As soon as he asserts that the Logos is nevertheless God the problem remains, for as God the Logos himself is immutable and impassible.[1]

Turning to the Christological levels, Tertullian after arguing for the distinct personality of the Logos enquires:

> 'How the Word was made flesh, whether as transformed into flesh or as having clothed himself with flesh. Certainly as having clothed himself. God however must necessarily be believed to be immutable and untransformable, as being eternal. But change of form is a destruction of what was first: for everything that is transformed into something else ceases to be what it was and begins to be what is was not. But God neither ceases to be, nor can be anything else....For if the Word was made flesh as the result of a transformation or mutation of substance, Jesus will then be one substance (composed) of two, flesh and spirit, a kind of mixture, as electrum is (composed) of gold and silver: and he begins to be neither gold (that is, spirit) nor silver (that is, flesh), seeing that the one thing is changed by the other and a third thing is brought into being. In that case Jesus will not be God, for he has ceased to be the Word, since it has become flesh: neither will his manhood be flesh for it is not properly flesh, seeing it has been the Word. Thus out of both things there is neither: there is some third thing far other than both....We find him [Jesus] set forth as in every respect Son of God and Son of man, since (we find him) as both God and man, without doubt according to each substance as it is distinct in what itself is....we observe a double quality, not confused but combined, Jesus in One Person God and Man. 2

Three things must be noted in the above. Firstly, for Tertullian the Incarnation cannot be the transformation of God into man because God

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1. Origen believed that he could save his Trinitarian theology with the concept of Deuteros Theos by stressing both that the Son was God and God by derivation. However, the mind, when the principle of emanation breaks under the pressure, very easily turns 'second God' into 'first creature.' Origen may be very close to Nicea, but he is even closer to Arius.
2. Tertullian, Adv. Prax., 27.

is immutable and cannot cease to be by changing into something else. Secondly, if he were transformed into man, the effect would be that Christ is some tertium quid being neither God nor man, but a mixture and confusion of both. Thirdly, while the Son must remain immutably divine and the flesh full and real, yet Christ must be one. The one Christ must be God and man. This is precisely the problem. How can Christ be one and yet be both God and man. Tertullians says that the Son 'cloths' himself in flesh, that he is 'combined' with flesh, but that is more a restatement of the problem than an answer to it. Nevertheless Tertullian has advanced the true question even if he is not able to fully answer it.[1]

Because Tertullian sees the divinity and humanity of Christ as distinct he does not hesitate to uphold the full human experiences of Christ over against the impassibility of God.

> 'Thus the official record of both substances represents him as both man and God: on the one hand born, on the other not born: on the one hand fleshly, on the other spiritual: on the one hand weak, on the other exceeding strong: on the one hand dying, on the other living. That these two sets of attributes, the divine and the human, are each kept distinct from the other, is of course accounted for by the equal verity of each nature, both flesh and spirit being in full degree what they claim to be: the powers of the Spirit of God proved him God, the sufferings proved there was the flesh of man.' 2

However, the unity of the human and divine attributes is ambiguous for Tertullian due ultimately to the fact that he does not fully formulate the true incarnational union. His reaction to the communication of idioms

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1. It is difficult to ascertain what Tertullian understands by 'clothed' and 'joined', but Grillmeier believes that it is along the lines of the Stoic concept of mixtia 'i.e., the total mutual penetration of solid bodies which preserve their co-natural characteristics, and concretio (krasis), the complete mutual penetration of fluid bodies which preserve their corresponding properties.' (p. 155.) Thus Tertullian denies mixture in the sense of confusion and transformation, yet sees the union as an unconfused interpenetration of the two substances. While this conception is difficult to comprehend and while it has a monophysite flavour, what is important is the fact that Tertullian wishes to express both a substantial union without in anyway destroying or changing the immutable nature of God or the true nature of man.
2. Tertullian, De Carn. Chr., 5. Trans. E. Evans, Tertullian's Treatise on the Incarnation, (London: SPCK, 1956). Cf. De Pat., 3; C. Marc., 2.

exemplifies this.

> 'The Son of God was crucified: I am not ashamed--because it is shameful. The Son of God died: it is immediately credible--because it is silly. He was buried, and rose again: it is certain--because it is impossible.' 1

To hold the communication of idioms for such reasons may denote admirable faith, but hardly the best theology. The communication of idioms needs theological justification.

In writing against Celsus Origen was faced with the real question studied here. Celsus said:

> 'God is good and beautiful and happy....If then He comes down to men, he must undergo change, a change from good to bad, from beautiful to shameful, from happiness to misfortune....Who would choose a change like this? It is the nature only of a mortal being to undergo change and remoulding, whereas it is the nature of an immortal being to remain the same without alteration. Accordingly, God could not be capable of undergoing this change.'[2]

Origen responds that God cannot change and even though he comes down to earth he remains 'unchanged in essence.'[3] 'If the immortal divine Word assumes both a human body and a human soul, and by so doing appears to Celsus to be subject to change and remoulding, let him learn that the Word remains Word in essence. He suffers nothing of the experience of the body and soul.'[4]

The above may be true as far as what has been revealed and believed, but Origen has not said in the above how the Word can remain God and yet assume a human soul and body. Celsus persists that 'Either God really does change, as they say, into a mortal body; and it has already been said that this is an impossibility. Or he does not change, but makes those who see him think he does so, and leads them astray and tells lies.'[5] Celsus has reduced the Incarnation to an impossible either/or situation. God must either change into man or be a deceiver and a liar.

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1. De Carn. Chr., 5.
2. Origen, C. Cels., 4:14. Trans. H. Chadwick, Origen: Contra Celsum, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1953).
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid., 4:15.
5. Ibid., 4:18.

Origen's reply is interesting.

Because Origen understands that the Logos was united to a human soul from all eternity the change which takes place in becoming man is seen as a change in the soul and not in the Logos since it is the soul that it is united to a body.

> 'Concerning Jesus' soul, if anyone supposes that there was a change when it entered a body, we will ask what he means by a "change". If he means a change of essence, we do not grant this....But if he means that it undergoes something because it has been mixed with the body and because of the place into which it has come, then what difficulty is there if the Word out of great love to mankind brings down a Saviour to the human race?.' 1

Origen uses the human soul of Christ as the mediator and buffer of the incarnational act. It guarantees that the Logos becomes man and absorbs what ever change is involved in so becoming. However, this just pushes the question back. What sort of union is there between the Logos and the soul? While Origen wishes to maintain a real ontological union, one must admit that for Origen the union is purely mystical.[2] The Logos is united to the human soul in the deepest mystical union possible, and thus only differs in degree from the Logos' union with other men. One must conclude with Grillmeier that 'the fact is that the unity of the God-man is only meant to be an ontic unity, and is not really proved as such.'[3]

The lasting effect and contribution of Origen's use of the soul lies in the fact that it guarantees the real and full human experience of Christ, and yet, because of the soul, these experiences do not directly bear upon the divinity of the Logos.[4] Future theologians will develop and clarify this.

The point of development concerning God's immutability and impassibility in relation to the person of Christ can be summarized by the following.

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1. Ibid.
2. Cf. Ibid., 2:9; 5:34. However, Origen does not wish to say that the Logos and the humanity are 'two separate beings', 6:47.
3. Grillmeier, p. 169.
4. Cf. Origen, C. Cels., 7:13, 16, 17.

On the Trinitarian level the status of the Logos' divinity has come to a head and with it the whole question of the immutable nature of the one God. This point has been reached by upholding the true personal divinity of the Logos against the Adoptionists and Paul of Samosata, and by maintaining that the Logos is really distinct from the Father against the Modalists. Tertullian and Origen tried to bring some theological understanding and continuity to the problem through the principle of emanation, but the principle of emanation placed them, especially Origen, in a bind. It seems that either one must allow for a change or mutation in the one Godhead of the Father to account for the fact that the Son and Holy Spirit really shared in his divine nature. Or, one has to subordinate the Son and Spirit to the point that one in no real sense can call them divine.

This either/or situation developed because, up until now, the transcendent and immutable oneness of the Godhead was located in the Father alone. It was the Father who was the God, who was one, transcendent, and immutable. The Son and Spirit were not God in the absolute sense of the word, but only in so far as they received their divinity and were related to the one Godhead of the Father. What is needed is a realization that the Son and Spirit were divine not by derivation, but ontologically and metaphysically God in themselves. Until theologians realized that the one Godhead or deity is three related persons, they would continue to find that they were always in danger of destroying the oneness of God by change or alteration, or subordinating the Son and Spirit. The realization that must take place is well stated by Prestige.

> 'The truth is that God is one, not because one divine Person is more important than the others, whether as being their source or on any other grounds; nor because deity is something that can be transmitted entire from hand to hand, like a purse of gold, or from owner to owner, like a plot of land--deity means something that God is, rather than something that he has--but because all three Persons are distinct expressions of a single divine reality.' 1

This realization would come when the Fathers recognized that God's

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1. Prestige, Fathers and Heretics, p. 87.

revelation of himself as a Trinity of persons breaks the Greek Platonic principle of emanation. The principle may have been adequate to express Greek theodicy, but it was incompetent to handle the Christian revelation.

On the Christological levels concerning the immutability of God and his becoming man and the passibility of God as man the development is not quite as advanced as it is on the Trinitarian level. The full weight of the problem articulated by the Docetists and Celsus has not been fully felt or realized. Tertullian and Origen realized that for the Logos to become man did not mean that he changed into man. However, they were unable to satisfactorily state how the Logos could truly become and be man without change. As for the communication of idioms the distinction of natures proposed by Tertullian and Origen, and the use of the soul by Origen contributed to a proper understanding, but left a great deal to be desired by way of clarity and refinement.

The above is but a brief summary of what role the immutability and impassibility of God played in pre-Nicene speculation on the Trinity and the Incarnation. The above is not so much a study of the problem itself, but an introduction to it. The main purpose of the above is to show how the problem arose and developed, and what the initial responses to it were. It is only with the Arian controversy and Nicea's proclamation of the homoousion doctrine that the problem comes to full maturity. A mature answer, however, will be long in coming.

CHAPTER 1

NICEA'S HOMOOUSION: DEFINING GOD'S BEGETTING AND BECOMING

To fully understand and appreciate the implications of the homoousion doctrine of Nicea as it bears on the immutability and impassibility of God both in himself as a Trinity of persons, and as it pertains to his becoming man and experiences as man, this chapter will be divided into two parts. The first part will treat the immutability of God in himself or the Trinitarian question. It will concentrate on Arius' teaching concerning the Son as well as Nicea's and Athanasius' response. The second part will study the immutability and impassibility of the Logos on the Christological levels. Thus not only will Arius be treated, but also Apollinaris since Christologically they are similar. Athanasius will be studied as a contemporary response to them. This division is rather arbitrary, but for clarity of presentation it is thought wise to distinguish, but not separate, the Trinitarian and Christological questions.

A. The Trinitarian Question

1. Arius

The debate between the Church and Arius revolved around the status of the Logos or Son. Arius, in so many words, asked very clearly and precisely is the Logos, in himself, God or a creature? There could be no half-way position for Arius such as Origen's Deuteros Theos. In asking the question in this either/or form Arius had raised the question to a metaphysical or ontological level. He wanted a definition of the Logos, and not a description of what he is like in relation to the Father, or what function he performs apart from the Father. As an existing being, is the Logos ontologically God or not?[1]

There are basically two presuppositions to the answer Arius gave to his question. The first presupposition resides in his understanding of God as the wholly transcendent and absolutely unique source of all

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1. Cf. Murray, The Problem of God, pp. 38-44.

reality. 'We acknowledge One God, alone Ingenerate, alone everlasting, alone Unbegotten, alone True, alone having immortality,....unalterable and unchangeable.'[1] God for Arius was above all One, a 'Monad' without division or change.[2]

Arius' second presupposition arises from his Christology. The Logos for Arius was physically and naturally united to flesh, analogous to the union of body and soul. The Logos, taking the place of the human soul, becomes the vital and life-giving principle of the flesh.[3]

With these two presuppositions in mind logic forced Arius to proclaim: 'The Word....is called Word conceptually, and is not by nature and of truth Son of God, but is called Son, He too, by adoption, as a creature.'[4] There is no doubt in Arius' mind that the Logos was ontologically a creature. To be otherwise was impossible. For if the Logos was God, he would destroy both the oneness of God in himself and his transcendence and immutability in becoming man.

While this is Arius' basic position, it is important to look deeper into the reasons why the Logos is a creature, first in relation to Arius' understanding of God, and secondly (with Apollinaris) in relation to his understanding of the Incarnation.

Three adjectives best define Arius' doctrine of God. God is transcendent, unoriginate, and One. All are intrinsically inter-related with one another, but as expressing different attributes of God have a profound affect on the question of God's immutability and Arius' claim that the Logos is a creature.

Arius' notion of God's transcendence is a familiar one. God's transcendence is not that of the Old Testament where God remained in the midst of creation and history. Arius once more exemplifies the Greek Platonic understanding of transcendence which has been so prevalent in early development. Thus God is not only wholly other than man, but also wholly apart from man. God to remain God is allowed no contact with man or creation, but stands apart, aloof, and solitary in his transcendence. There exists a gulf between God's immutable oneness and the originate and changeable many of creation. To close that gulf

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1. In Athanasius, De. Syn., 16.
2. Ibid.
3. Cf. Grillmeier, pp. 183-192.
4. In Athanasius, De Sent. Dion., 23.

by any direct relationship would corrupt God's transcendent immutability.

This understanding of God's transcendence exemplifies itself very well in the role Arius gives to the Logos as mediator between God and the rest of creation. While Arius believes in creatio ex nihilo, God himself is responsible for creating only the Logos. The Logos creates all other beings. As Arius states: God is one who begot an Only-begotten Son before eternal time, through whom he made both the ages and the universe.' This is why Arius makes the somewhat incomprehensible statement that the Logos is the 'perfect creature of God, but not one of the creatures; offspring, but not as one of the things begotten....'[1] But why does the Logos create all other creatures? Arius feebly professes that this is due to the fact that 'other creatures could not endure to be wrought by the absolute Hand of the Unoriginate and therefore the Son alone was brought into being by the Father alone, and other things by the Son as an underworker and assistant.'[2] However, Athanasius rightly responds to Arius' claim by stating 'It is irreligious to suppose that He (God) disdained, as if a humble task, to form the creatures himself....for there is not pride in God.'[3] Arius' real concern was not to protect creation from God, but rather to protect God from creation. Because of Arius' Platonic notion of transcendence, the status of God's immutability is in direct proportion to his unrelatedness to creation.

The reason for God's aloof transcendence lies in Arius' favourite definition of God. God is the unoriginate or unbegotten, and as such is immutable and impassible. In contrast, creation, including the Logos, is originate and begotten, and as such as mutable and passible.

The Greek words agennetos and gennetos (unbegotten and begotten) and agenetos and genetos (unoriginated and originated) are similar not only in spelling, but also, up until Nicea and Athanasius, were considered to have relatively the same meaning and used interchangeably. This did not cause any problem in the beginning. All Christians, as well as Greek philosophers, would hold that God is unbegotten and unoriginate. However, once one concerns oneself with the ontological status

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1. In Athanasius De Syn., 16. See also De Dect., 7.
2. In Athanasius De. Decr., 8. Athanasius points out that if creatures as such are unable to bear direct creation by God then the Logos himself, since he is a creature, is likewise unable to bear direct creation by God. Thus Athanasius shows the reduxio ad absurdum of Arius' argument.
3. Ibid., 7. As will be seen the mediator role of the Logos is even more clearly seen in Arius' Christology.

of the Logos a problem does arise and a very grave one indeed.[1]

The whole of Christian tradition stemming from the New Testament held that the Logos was from the Father, sent by the Father. The New Testament stated that the Son is 'first born among many' (Rom. 8:29), and that 'the Father is greater' (Jn. 14:28). The Arian proof text states that 'the Lord created me' (Prov. 8:22). Besides that the very concept of 'Son' denotes some sort of dependent relationship to the Father. From this background emerged the ontological question of the Logos' status. Being from the Father, is the Logos or Son ontologically God?

For Arius there was only one way of understanding the mode of begetting, only one way of expressing how the Son is from the Father, and that is by creation. For Arius the Greek work gennetos and genetos expressed one and the same concept. To be begotten is to be created. God unoriginate and unbegotten creates the Son out of nothing, and thus as begotten the Son is a creature. Thus 'God was not always Father, but once afterwards He became a Father. The Son was not always for the Word of God himself was "made out of nothing" and "once He was not," and "He was not before his origination," but He as other "had an origin of creation."'[2] While the Son may have 'this prerogative over others, and therefore is called Only-begotten, because he alone was brought to be by God alone.'[3] Nevertheless as begotten he remains a creature and like all creatures 'there was a then (time) when He was not.'[4]

Because Arius understood God to be unequivocably unoriginate and unbegotten and all begetting to be creation, it logically follows that the Logos has to be a creature. Prestige states Arius' logic very well when he says 'Behind all expression of Arian thought lay the hard and glittering syllogism that God is impassible; Christ, being gennetos, was passible; therefore Christ is not God.'[5] Only God is immutable because only God is unoriginate.

But why did Arius conceive of all begetting as creating? Why is

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1. For an historical study of the meaning and use of these two words prior to Nicea see Prestige, God in Patristic Thought, pp. 37-52.
2. In Athanasius, C. Ar., 1:5.
3. In Athanasius, De. Decr., 7.
4. In Athanasius, C. Ar., 1:13.
5. Prestige, God in Patristic Thought, p. 156.

the only possible relation between the Father and Son that of Creator and creature? Throughout the whole patristic development the Fathers have tried to express another sort of relationship between the Father and Son in which both could be understood to be God. This was the whole motivation behind Tertullian's and Origen's emanationism, if not that of the Docetists and Modalists as well. Why did Arius not look for another form or mode of relationship? The answer lay in Arius' understanding of what it means for the transcendent, unoriginate God to be One.

For Arius God was a Monad, utterly, solitarily and absolutely One. As One not only was God unable to have any direct relationship with the many, the created world of change, without destroying his immutable oneness, but also God could have no duality or triplicity in himself without destroying that oneness. It was impossible, thought Arius, for the One God to be in himself three.

The Son has to be a creature for any other type of generation besides that of creation would decimate the immutable oneness of God. Only 'heretical and uninstructed men....speak of the Son as an emission, others as a projection, others as co-unbegotten.'[1] The Son is 'neither a part of God nor (formed) out of any substratum.'[2] 'He is not equal, no, nor one in essence with Him (God)....not intermingling with each other are their subsistences.'[3] The Son has to be creature and 'not as Valentius pronounced that the offspring of the Father was an issue; nor as Manichaeus taught that the offspring was a portion of the Father, one in essence; nor as Sabellius, dividing the Monad, speaks of a Son-and-Father; nor as Heiracas, of one torch from another, or as a lamp divided into two....'[4] Why are all of these positions heretical and uninstructed? To understand 'from God' to mean that the Son is 'a part of Him, one in essence or as an issue, then the Father is according to them compounded and divisible and alterable and material, and, as far as their belief goes, has the circumstances of a body, Who is the

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1. Arius' letter to Eusebius of Nicomedia in Theodoret, Church History, 1:5. Trans. Library of Christian Classics, Vol. III, Christology of the Later Fathers, ed. E.R. Hardy, (London: SCM, 1954), pp. 329-331.
2. Ibid.
3. In Athanasius, De. Syn., 15.
4. Ibid., 16.

Incorporial God.'[1] For Arius all types of generation and begetting other than that of creation destroy the oneness of God making him mutable and changeable like a material body. His arguments against any other form of generation, as stated above, basically fall into three sorts.

If God begets his Son by sharing with him his divine substance, either as a whole or as a part, then there is a division in the divine substance from one to two and thus a change. Using the same argument as Paul of Samosata, Arius believes that to say that the Logos is a divine ousia is to say that he is homoousion with the Father, which means, for him, that the divine substance is divided, changed, and compounded. Neither could the argument be salvaged by speaking of a common third substance seen as a substratum which both the Father and the Son shared since this too would still demand that the divine substance be divided and mutable.

Another alternative is to say that the Son exists from all eternity with the Father and thus has no beginning and is 'co-unbegotten.' However, this too is absurd since one would either have two unbegottens and thus two Gods, or the Son would be an 'unbegotten - begotten' which is a contradiction in terms.

A third alternative revolves around the principle of emanation. It is somewhat surprising that Arius finds fault with this principle since he is influenced so much by Greek Platonic thought. His rejection of it may be due to Aristotelian influence.[2] Whatever the reason it is to his credit to have seen and understood what Tertullian and Origen did not see even though the weakness was present in Plotinus and the Gnostics. The fault of the principle of emanation is that, if logically followed through, one must admit that God changes. His divine substance, what he is in himself, emanates and effuses from him, and thus there is a change in God himself. To say that the Logos is divine by emanation or derivation from the One Godhead is to render change in that Godhead from whom the Logos emanates since he shares by derivation what God is.

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1. Ibid.
2. For discussions of whether Arius was influenced by Aristotle or Plato cf: T.E. Pollard, 'The Origins of Arianism,' Journal of Theological Studies, N.S.9, (1958), pp. 103-111. Also, M. Wiles 'In Defence of Arius,' J.T.S. N.S.13, (1962), pp. 339-347. Also, G.C. Stead, 'The Platonism of Arius,' J.T.S. N.S.15, (1964), pp. 16-31. Also, Ephrem Boularand, L'Hérésie D'Arius et Le "Foi" De Nicée, Premiere Part: L'Hérésie D'Arius, (Paris: Editions Letouzey et Ané, 1972), pp. 104-105 and 118-122.

Arius may have been influenced by Origen's subordinationism, but he realized that Origen's principle of emanation could not bear the strain of explaining the one immutable Godhead of the Father and the derivative divinity of the Son. One or the other had to go. The failure of the emanationist principle forced Arius to choose the former.[1]

For Arius then all attempts at trying to explain the divinity of the Son failed precisely because they rendered the transcendent, un-originate, one Godhead of the Father mutable, changeable and divisible. The only adequate mode of generation left was that of creation. For God to remain God the Logos had to be a creature.

In all fairness one must admit that Arius' arguments are correct as he understood them and as they were promulgated, for the most part, by his predecessors. Neither Tertullian nor Origen, for example, would have agreed with his final conclusions, but he did find the inherent weakness in their theological presentation. Neither wished to imply that God was mutable nor that the Son was a creature, yet their principle of emanation led to either one or the other once one asked, as Arius did, whether the Logos is ontologically God or not.

2. Nicea and Athanasius

The challenge of Arius was met head on, but not without some difficulty. The problem resides not in any doubt as to whether Arius was right or wrong. Alexander of Alexandria and Athanasius were sure that both Scripture and tradition refuted Arius, 'for who ever heard such assertions before?'[2] Rather the problem that confronted the Church was primarily conceptual and linguistic. How does one say that the Son is God absolutely, that the Logos is God as the Father is God, without falling into one of the many heresies which Arius believed necessarily

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1. M. Wiles believes that Arius was trying to say the same thing as Origen. Thus the Deuteros Theos of Origen would be the same as Arius' notion of the Logos as a 'creature but not one of the creatures.' They may have been trying to say the same thing, which is doubtful, but they surely did not say the same thing. Wiles seems to forget that Origen had the Logos ontologically on the side of God and Arius had the Logos ontologically on the side of creation. This is a very great difference indeed; one that Wiles does not seem to recognise. 'In Defence of Arius,' J.T.S., N.S. 13, (1962), pp. 243-245.
2. Alexander of Alexandria, Depositio Arii, 3, in Athanasius, Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, Vol. IV.

followed from such an assertion? To answer the challenge of Arius on the Trinitarian level the Church had to answer two questions simultaneously. First, how does one express the full divinity of the Son, and secondly, how does one express this without destroying the oneness of God through some sort of change or division? At one and the same time they had to say that the Son was God and that God was one.

It fell to the Council of Nicea (325) to define the Church's belief and to condemn the errors of Arius. The conservative members of the Council wished to refute Arius by the sole means of using Scripture since this was the traditional way of expressing true doctrine and refuting error. However, the majority of the Fathers soon realized that this would not do. Arius and his cohorts were all too willing to recite Scripture while at the same time giving to it their own meaning.[1]

The positive response that Nicea gave was that the Son is 'from the ousia of the Father....begotten not made, homoousios with the Father.' Negatively it condemned the Arians' pet phrases:

> 'As for those who say: "there was a time when he did not exist," and "He was made from nothing, or from another hypostasis or essence, alleging that the Son of God is mutable or subject to change--such persons the Catholic and Apostolic Church condemns."'[2]

Arius is unable to manoeuvre around this profession of faith, for

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1. Cf. Athanasius, De. Decr. 20. The reason the Arians were able to do this was due to the fact that the Trinitarian and Christological doctrine of the New Testament is expressed in functional and relational concepts. Once one rises above the functional and relational to the ontological one is able to interpret the meaning of the functional and relational by means of the ontological. Thus once the Arians had decided that the Logos was ontologically a creature, they could agree with and interpret any functional and relational statement concerning the Logos, such as the Creed proposed by Eusebius of Caesarea, within their ontological framework. The whispering and winking among the Arians at Nicea upon hearing the status of Logos stated in terms such as 'Like,' 'always,' 'from him (the Father),' 'in him (the Father),' as narrated by Athanasius, were the whispers and winks of ontological minds interpreting functional and relational concepts. In order to overcome this difficulty Nicea was forced to answer Arius on the same level. His ontological question demanded an ontological answer.
2. Enchiridion Symbolorum, Denzinger-Schönmetzer (Freiburg: Herder 35 ed., 1973), 125. Trans. The Church Teaches, ed. J.F. Clarkson et alii, (St. Louis: Herder, 1955), 2.

the Council unequivocally stated that the Logos is absolutely and ontologically God--as the Father _is_ God, so the Son _is_ God. Contrary to Arius, the Council answered that the Logos is in himself _homoousios_ with the Father, that in himself he _is_ what the Father _is_--of the same _ousia_. Thus 'the word God connotes precisely the same truth when you speak of God the Father as it does when you speak of God the Son.'[1]

Likewise, while Arius made no distinction between begotten and made, Nicea does. Thus, as Athanasius points out, if the Arians mean is calling God unoriginate that he always was and not created 'then they must constantly be told that the Son as well as the Father must in this sense be called unoriginate. For He is neither in the number of this originated, nor a work, but has ever been with the Father....' However, if the Arians mean by unoriginated that something exists without being begotten or without a father, 'we shall tell them that the unoriginate in this sense is only one, namely the Father....'[2] Thus for Nicea while one can speak of both the Father and Son as unoriginated in the sense of not having a beginning or being created or made, one can only call the Father unoriginated in the sense of not being generated or begotten. Since both are God, both are unoriginated and uncreated. However only the Father is unbegotten in the sense of having no relational dependence, and the Logos is begotten for he is eternally related to the Father as Son. In short, the Father, as unbegotten, is logically prior to the Son, as begotten, but not ontologically prior to the Son since both are God and thus uncreated.

Nevertheless two interrelated questions arise out of Nicea's profession of faith which bear directly on God's immutability in himself. To say that the 'Son is begotten and not made' upholds the true divinity of the Son, but does not 'begotten' still imply that some change takes place within the Godhead itself? Likewise, to say that the Son is of the same _ousia_ as the Father mean that they share in the same 'stuff common to several individuals of a class, or does it connote an individual as such.'[3] If the Council meant the former, did it not divide the substance of God into two? Or if it meant the latter, did it not fall

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1. Prestige, _Fathers and Heretics_, p. 89.
2. Athanasius, _C. Ar._, 1:31. Cf. _De. Decr._, 29 & 30.
3. Kelly, p. 234.

into Sabellianism? Either way the immutability of God would be destroyed, and Arius would be vindicated. The questions are interrelated for to understand the full meaning of the word 'begotten,' other than in its negative connotations of denying that the Logos is created, it is necessary to see it within the context of the unity and oneness of God as expressed by the homoousion doctrine. It is only within the context of the unity of God that one can understand how the Son can be 'begotten,' and yet not bring division and change within God.

The question arises at the onset whether the Fathers at Nicea understood ousia and homoousios as meaning that the Father and Son shared in one common 'stuff' as several individuals or whether they understood it to connote the fact that the Father and Son are one reality. Up until Nicea homoousios was usually understood in the first sense as witnessed by Paul of Samosata's and Arius' claim that thus understood it demanded division and change in God.[1] It would seem that for most of the Fathers at Nicea, with the probable exception of the Roman delegates such as Ossius of Cordoba, as well as Athanasius, understood it in the first generic sense that the Logos was of the same common stuff as the Father. This does not mean that they wished to sanction division or change in God. Their primary concern at Nicea was to uphold the absolute divinity of the Son. The question concerning the unity of God was not a conscious concern. This fact is witnessed by Eusebeus of Caesarius. In his letter to his diocese explaining the Council's decree he only stresses the fact that the Son is fully divine and never touches upon the question of the unity between the Father and Son.[2] Thus while a majority of the Fathers maintained, against Arius, that the Son was God as the Father is God by saying that he was begotten and not made and homoousios with the Father, they did not in any conscious way understand this to mean that Father and Son were one and the same reality. In fairness them to both the majority of Council Fathers and to Arius one must say that the Fathers adequately condemned Arius for denying that the Son was God, but did not consciously answer Arius as to how one could say this without dividing and changing God. It is left to Athanasius as the defender of the

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1. Cf. Prestige, God in Patristic Thought, pp. 197-209.
2. Cf. Epistola Eusebii, In Athanasius, Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, Vol. IV, pp. 74-76. See also Prestige, God in Patristic Thought, pp. 212-214.

homoousion doctrine to bring out its full implications, and thus to refute Arius' charge that such a doctrine implied change and division.

The Arians denied that the Son 'is the proper offspring of the Father's substance on the ground that this must imply parts and divisions,' but to think thus for Athanasius, 'is to have material thoughts about what is immaterial.'[1] For God the Father to beget his Son is not the same as for human fathers to beget children. According to Athanasius 'the divine generation must not be compared to the nature of men, nor the Son considered to be part of God, nor the generation to imply any passion whatever; God is not as man....for He is not composed of parts, but being impassible and simple, He is impassibly and indivisibly Father of the Son.'[2] To be Son then means that he is not only like the Father, 'but also inseparable from the essence of the Father, and He and the Father are one....the Word is ever in the Father and the Father in the Word....'[3] To say then, as Nicea stated, that the Son is homoousios with the Father, not only means that they are both God, but also that they are one God. Homoousios confirms both the full divinity of the Son, and the unity of God since 'the Son, being an offspring from the substance, is one by substance, Himself and the Father that begot Him.'[4]

Thus the Godhead does not reside in the Father alone, and from whom the Son is given a share, but God is in himself Father and Son (and Holy Spirit). If the Son were God by participation in the Godhead of the Father :

> 'then indeed call him Like-in-essence [homoiousios], but thus spoken of He is (not) in nature God....Therefore if this be out of place, He must be, not by participation, but in nature and truth Son....and being by nature, and not by sharing.[5] He would properly be called, not homoiousios but homoousios.'

Arius failed to realize that to be begotten of the Father is not by division or change, for God in his essence and substance is the Father begetting his Son. 'The Son is begotten not from without but from the Father.'[6] The Son 'is proper to and identical with the substance of God,

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1. Athanasius, C. Ar., 1:15.
2. Ibid., 1:28.
3. Athanasius De. Decr., 20.
4. Athanasius De Syn., 48.
5. Ibid., 53.
6. Athanasius C. Ar., 2:33.

and an offspring from it by nature....(and) by this fact homoousios with Him that begot it.'[1]

While the majority of the Nicene Fathers may only have understood explicitly that homoousios guaranteed the full divinity of the Logos, implicitly they also guaranteed the oneness of God. To say that the Logos is homoousios with the Father is to relocate the principle of unity. No longer does unity and oneness of God reside in the Father as Godhead, but rather in the fact that the one God is a trinity of related persons.[2] Homoousios declares that the Father and Son are equally God in an absolute sense, and also that they are the same being. Thus Athanasius in fully explicating Nicea broke the erroneous presupposition that caused so much strain in Origen's teaching and which Arius exploited to his own advantage. That presupposition was that the Godhead resided in the Father alone and the Son and Spirit were divine only in relation to the one Godhead of the Father. This position presupposed the validity of the Platonic principle of emanation which demanded that the Father be the point of reference both to account for why the Son and Spirit were divine as well as for why there was only one God. With Nicea and Athanasius no longer is the Logos God in a derivative or subordinate sense because he emanated out from the Father, nor was the immutable oneness centred in the Father as Godhead. Athanasius concurs with those who say that 'there is one Godhead, and that it has one nature, and not that there is one nature of the Father, from which that of the Son and of the Holy Spirit are distinct.'[3] With Nicea and Athanasius the Logos is God and God is one because the Father and Son are not only equally God, but also one and the same God. To be begotten, then, does not mean participative emanation from the Godhead, but rather a complete eternal generation within God himself. Within the one immutable nature of God, God the Father eternally begets God the Son.

All of Arius' arguments against the divinity of the Logos on the grounds that it would in some way destroy the immutable oneness of God are no longer applicable. This is due precisely to the fact that the

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1. Athanasius, Ad. Afros., 8.
2. Athanasius extends the word homoousion to apply to the Holy Spirit as well. See Ad Serap., 1:27.
3. Athanasius, Ad Antioch., 6.

Platonic principle of emanation is no longer operative. It has been superceded by the insight that the Father/Son relationship is part and parcel of what God is in himself. 'In truth, the process has to be imagined not as the transmission of disintegrating stuff away from a fixed point, but as the timeless and unceasing passage of a personal being through a circular course which ends where it began and begins again where it ended.'[1] There is no hint of division or change for the immutable and indivisible God is Father, Son, and Holy Spirit.

However, the Arian controversy did not subside with the realization that to call the Son God one means not only that he is ontologically God as the Father is God, but also that they are one and the same reality. In fact the semi-Arian controversy was precisely over this realization. If the Father and Son are the same reality, is not this Sabellianism? How do you distinguish the Persons? Would it not be better to say that the Son is Homoiousios with the Father, thus a perfect likeness but not one and the same reality?

The basic answer to these questions has already been given in the above discussion on the oneness and unity of God. However, with the Semi-Arian cry of Sabellianism the homoousion doctrine must be looked at from a different perspective.

If one continued, after Nicea, to understand that the unity and oneness of God still resided solely in the Father as Godhead, and then proceeded to affirm that the Son is homoousios with the Father not only in the sense of being fully divine as the Father, but also in the sense of being one and the same reality, then one is forced to conclude something to the effect that the Godhead of the Father changes its mode of expression when seen as Son. Or to put it another way, if one did not grasp Athanasius' insight into the Nicene doctrine that the oneness of God did not reside solely in the person of the Father, but rather in God as such, then to say that the Father and Son are one reality is to say that the Father and Son are only nominally or notionally distinct since to say that the Son is one and the same reality as the Father is not understood to mean that they exist in the one nature of God, but rather that the Son is one and the same as the Father. If this were so, then, as Tertullian pointed out so long ago, change and

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1. Prestige, Fathers and Heretics, p. 92.

and mutation once more takes place in the Godhead as the Father changes his mode of expression to that of Son.

This may seem a complicated and round about way of becoming a Sabellian, but this is precisely what the Homoians thought that Athanasius and his Nicene party had done. They were aided in their false understanding by one of Nicea's proponents, Marcellus of Ancyra.[1] However, the problem lay not with Athanasius and Nicea, but as the above points out, with the Semi-Arians themselves. They still held to the notion that the Godhead resides in the Father alone. The influence of the principle of emanation is still being asserted.

Athanasius points out very clearly that neither he nor Nicea are Sabellian. The Father and the Son are not

> 'as one thing twice named, so that the Same becomes at one time Father, at another time Son, for this Sabellius holding was judged a heretic. But they are two, because the Father is Father and is not the Son, and the Son is Son and not also Father, but the nature is one,....and all that is the Father's, is the Son's.'[2]

In actual fact the term homoousios guarantees the distinction between Father and Son against the Sabellians. For to use the word homoousios implies that there are two which are homoousios with one another. As Athanasius states: We do not 'hold a Son-Father, as the Sabellians, calling Him monoousios but not homoousios, and thus destroying the Son.'[3] The Father and Son are not one and the same person, but one of the same God.

One final point needs to be made which will lead into the Christological side of the question. Up until Nicea and Athanasius the transcendence of God was understood by many to mean that God was not only wholly other than man and creation, but also apart from man and creation. This was again due to the Greek philosophical idea that the further God was from creation the more his immutable and unchangeable nature was insured. Part of the motivation behind the use of the principle of emanation was to protect the immutable transcendence of

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1. Cf. Kelly, pp. 240-241.
2. Athanasius, C. Ar., 3:4. See also C. Ar., 4: 3 & 4, and De Syn., 52 & 53.
3. Ibid., De Fide, 2.

the Father's Godhead. However, now that God is understood to be a Trinity of equal persons, all of whom equally are God and thus partake equally of the divine attributes, the Greek notion that God is apart from man fades from Christian theology. The Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are God and thus all equally transcendent and immutable. One of them is no more transcendent or immutable than the other. Thus while God as transcendent is wholly other, his transcendence does not isolate or shield him from the created order.

However, one may ask: Why can one not make the whole Trinity of persons transcendent in the sense of being apart from man? Before it was only the Father as Godhead, why not now the whole Trinity? Because one of the Trinity became man! In proclaiming the Logos to be God ontologically and absolutely, the very same Logos who became man and only came to be known because he did so, destroyed any notion of transcendence which understood God to be isolated from creation. Thus the transcendent God of Nicea is the transcendent God of the Old Testament - the God who is present as the immutable transcendent other in the created world of change and finitude. The homoousion doctrine has utterly purged Christianity of the Platonic One and all its implications.

B. The Christological Question

In light of the fact that the Logos is true God, homoousion with the Father, as Nicea has proclaimed, how can 1) he become man, and 2) as man experience all that it means to be man, and yet as God remain immutable and impassible? The Arians put this very question to the Orthodox. 'How could he (Logos), being God, become man?'[1] To the Orthodox it was a real question. For the Arians, however, this question was rhetorical eliciting a negative response.

1. Arius

It has been apparent that the negative response of the Arians was partially due to their understanding of God's immutable transcendence which would allow no contact with the order of creation or finitude without destroying it. This understanding has already been exemplified in the Arian notion of creation where God created the Logos and the

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1. Athanasius, C. Ar., 3:27.

Logos created all other creatures. The Logos acted not only as a mediator between God and creation, but also as a protector of God's immutable transcendence. If God's immutable transcendence demanded that the Logos be a creature in order to protect God even from the act of creation, so much the more must the Logos be a creature if it is he who becomes man. If God became man, he would ipso facto destroy his immutable transcendence and thus he would cease to be God, which is impossible. Thus the Logos, since he became man, can not be of the same ousia as the Father, but must be a creature.

While the presupposition in the above Arian argumentation is their false Platonic notion of transcendence, there is also an implicit assumption that the Logos in some way changes in the act of incarnating himself and becoming man.

Athanasius accused the Arians of believing this when he states: they 'suppose that by reason of the flesh He is changed and becomes other than He was.'[1] Thus for the Arians if the Logos were God not only would his becoming man mitigate God's transcendence as being apart from man, but also his transcendence as being other than man. John's statement that 'The Logos became flesh' is understood to mean then that the Logos in some way changed into flesh. Thus if the Logos were God, God would no longer be the immutable being he is in himself, but would be in some way changed into another in the Incarnation. This again is an impossible position to hold.

Unlike the Platonic aspect of transcendence which kept God apart from man, this aspect of transcendence, which demanded that God remain God, unchanged and immutable in himself, was a much more serious problem for Orthodox Christology for it as well would wish to maintain that God does not change into another in becoming man. The Arians themselves were able to alleviate the difficulty by professing that the Logos was a creature. Being a creature he was subject to change and mutation from the very beginning, and thus his becoming man with its subsequent change proposed no great problem.

The above exemplifies itself and is brought to the fore with all its repercussions in the Arian attack on the Orthodox understanding of the Logos' experience as man.

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1. Ibid., 1:36.

> 'How can the Son be from the Father by nature, and like him in essence, who says, "All power is given unto me...." If he was, as you say, Son by nature, He had no need to receive, but had it by nature as a Son. Or how can he be the natural and true Power of the Father, who....says "Now is my soul troubled...." How can he be the own Word of the Father, without whom the Father never was....who said upon the cross, "My God, My God, why hast Thou forsaken me?...." If the Son were, according to your interpretation, eternally existent with God, He had not been ignorant of the (last) Day, but known as Word; nor had been forsaken as being co-existent; nor had asked to receive glory, as having it from the Father; nor would have prayed at all; for being the Word, He had needed nothing; but since He is a creature and one of the things originate, therefore He thus spoke, and needed what He had not, for it is proper to creatures to require and to need what they have not.' 1

It was a scandal in the eyes of the Arians for the Logos to be God and to have died on the cross. 'How dare you say that He is the Word proper to the Father's Essence, who had a body, so as to endure all this?' In short, 'How can He be Word or God who slept as man, and wept, and enquired?'[2] For the Arians the answer was a simple matter of logic. Because human attributes implying change, passion and development were predicated of Christ in the New Testament then the Logos must be a creature. As Athanasius states, the Arians 'deny the Eternity and Godhead of the Word in consequence of those human attributes which the Saviour took on Him by reason of that flesh which he bore.'[3]

The problem of predicating human attributes to the Logos is not new. However, with the Arians the problem has taken a new turn and a more critical stance. This is due not just to the fact that Arius wished to deny that the Logos is God because of the human predicates attributed to him in scripture, but more so to the fact that the Arians' notion of the union between the Logos and flesh is understood in such a way that they are forced by reason to deny the true divinity of the Son.

At the centre of the Arian Christology, which forces them to maintain both that the Logos changes in becoming man and that subsequent upon this he is affected by the human experiences, lies the fact that the Logos is directly united only to flesh without a soul in a physical and natural conjunctive union, analogous to the union of soul and body.

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1. Ibid., 3:26.
2. Ibid., 3:27.
3. Ibid.

Ps.-Athanasius states their position: 'In vain, then, do the Arians use sophistry, suggesting that the Saviour assumed flesh only, and impiously referring to the impassible Godhead the notion of suffering.'[1] Or again, 'Arius acknowledhes flesh alone, in order to a concealment of the Godhead, and says that instead of that inward man which is in us, that is, the soul, the Word came to exist in the flesh: -- for he dares to ascribe to the Godhead the idea of suffering and the resurrection from Hades.'[2]

While more will be said concerning this position a little later with regard to Apollinaris, a few comments must be made at this time.

Firstly it is quite obvious that the Arian understanding of the union in Christ is an extreme form of Logos/Sarx Christology. Within this extreme understanding there is a substantial conjunctive union of Logos and flesh which is physical or vital. The Logos, taking the place of the soul, is united to flesh in such a way that it becomes the vivifying principle forming a new and complete being. It is not a union in the person, as will be seen in later Christology, but a physical and natural union composed of component parts, as body and soul, forming the complete reality of Christ. The Arians believed such a union was necessary to account for the fact that Christ was one being. It follows then that because the Logos enters into a vital and physical union with the flesh, and since he performs the functions of the soul, he must be changed from what he was into the new reality which is the consequence of the union.

Secondly, and flowing from this extreme Logos/Sarx framework, the human and physical attributes are not predicated to the Person of the Logos, but directly to his nature as such since it has become the vivifying component part of a new being and reality. Because of the nature of the union, what is predicated of the Logos must be predicated of him according to his nature. It should be noticed that Ps.Athanasius, in the above quotation, is shocked for this very reason. He is concerned not solely with the fact that the Arians denied the full humanity of Christ, that the Logos did not assume a soul as well as a body, but also, and maybe even more so, at the consequence of such a denial which

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1. Ps.-Athanasius, C. Apoll., 1:15. Trans. Later Treatises of St. Athanasius, Library of the Fathers, (Oxford: James Parker and Co., 1881).
2. Ibid., 2:3.

demanded that the human predicates attributed to the Logos refer to his very nature as God, and thus affect him as God.

The Arians, being well aware of this, followed the logic of their argument to its end. The Logos could not be God for God could not become man since to do so would mean that God would become mutable and changeable, and this is impossible.[1] Looking at the Orthodox Christology from within their framework it was only natural that the Arians should ask 'If he (Logos) were very God from God, how could be become man?'[2]

2. Athanasius

While Athanasius is mainly concerned with the Trinitarian question of the Logos being homoousion with the Father, nevertheless in book three of Contra Arianos he does take up the Christological challenges levelled against the Orthodox who maintain simultaneously that the Logos is God and that he became man. And even though a majority of Athanasius' arguments were concerned with the true divinity of the Logos, one of his primary aims throughout was to guarantee the fact that it was really God who became man. In actual fact Athanasius' major problem was not whether the Logos was God, but rather, as Meijering states, 'How God could really act in time without changing His nature,'[3] As has been seen the Arian doctrines of God, the Logos, and the Incarnation were all based on and argued from the major presupposition that God could not act in time and history and remain God. Athanasius tries to meet this challenge throughout and especially in his Christology.

Athanasius, like all Alexandrians, takes his starting point from Jn. 1:14. Echoing Tertullian, Athanasius states: The Logos 'became man

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1. Grillmeier may be correct when he maintains that the Arian doctrine of the Logos primarily and logically arose from their understanding of the union of the Logos and flesh rather than from their doctrine of God. Because of the physical and organic union between the Logos and flesh 'We are therefore justified in asking whether the doctrine of the Incarnation was not rather the starting point for the whole Arian system. Could not the heresy of the creatureliness of the Logos have been occasioned by the doctrine of the Incarnation....?' p. 190. See also pp. 189-192.
2. Athanasius, C. Ar., 3:27.
3. E.P. Meijering, Orthodoxy and Platonism in Athanasius: Synthesis or Antithesis? (Leiden: Brill, 1968), p. 194.

and did not come into man.'[1] Thus the Logos in becoming man is present in a different and much more profound way than in the prophets or saints. 'Of old he was wont to come to the Saints individually, and to hallow those who rightly receive Him, but neither, when they were begotten was it said that He had become man, nor, when they suffered, was it said that He Himself suffered.'[2] Working from a Logos/Sarx framework then Athanasius denies any sort of adoptionism, but rather states emphatically that God really became man. To maintain this, however, forces Athansius to face directly the Arian charge.

If God becomes man, does this not destroy his immutability? Does not the very concept of 'becoming' imply that the Logos was in some way changed? Athanasius answers that in becoming man the Logos 'did not become other than Himself on taking flesh, but, being the same as before, He was robed in it; and the expressions "He became" and "He was made", must not be understood as if the Word, considered as the Word, was made, but that the Word, being Framer of all, afterwards....putting on a body which was originate and made....'[3] It must be remembered that 'He (Logos) has become flesh not by being changed into flesh, but because he has assumed on our behalf living flesh and become man.'[4] For Athanasius, then, while the Logos really became man, he did not change in any way or become another. Making a very critical distinction Athanasius maintains that the Logos became man, but did not change into man.

This is an important junction of Orthodox Christology. Because of the faith of Nicea, Athanasius had to maintain the full divinity of the Son and thus his immutability. Likewise he could not uphold any form of adoptionism at the expense of denying a true incarnation. In order to maintain both he tries to define more precisely and technically the notion of 'becoming.' He does this by making, as has been seen, two important negative judgements. 'Become' neither means 'come into man,' nor does it mean 'change into man.' While these are important distinctions

1. Athanasius, C. Ar., 3:30.
2. Ibid., 3:31. See also Ad Adel, 3. Also Ad Epic., 2, 11, 12. It is interesting to note that Athanasius argues for a true incarnation in the above quotation from the communication of idioms. Because all human predicates are attributed to the Logos he must have become man and not just into man.
3. Athanasius, C. Ar., 2:8. See also ibid., 1:60.
4. Athanasius, Ad. Epic., 8.

in so far as they negate two false notions of 'become' which would mitigate against either the immutability of God or a real incarnation, they do not define in a positive way what 'become' does mean. It is at this point that Athanasius comes to an impasse.

The centre of Athanasius' understanding of the union is the belief that the Logos became man, which for him has an ontological and meta-physical meaning. However, in order to clarify the positive meaning of this statement Athanasius reverts to descriptive terminology that sometimes implies less than an ontological union or at least is ambiguous. Thus one constantly finds Athanasius' positive meaning of 'become' stated in such phrases as 'put on flesh and become man,'[1] or 'entering into the flesh,'[2] or 'took flesh,'[3] or the flesh seen as 'clothing.'[4] Athanasius even goes so far as to describe the Incarnation in terms of the favourite Antiochene analogy of the Logos dwelling 'in the flesh as in a temple.'[5] Such statements in no way imply that Athanasius in actual fact sees the union of the Logos and flesh as merely accidental; but rather such statements are made precisely because he does see the union as ontological, and yet does not wish this union to be such as to imply any change or mutation on the part of the Logos. As Grillmeier states: 'it is....remarkable that all the expressions which seem to suggest an accidental relationship between the Logos and flesh are immediately expanded by the intimation that the Logos really "became" flesh.'[6] The real problem resides in Athanasius' inability to state in one consistent conceptual framework both the ontological nature of the union and the distinction that must necessarily be made in order to ensure the integrity of the Logos, and as will be seen, the humanity. While Athanasius gives ontological depth to the statement that 'the Logos became flesh,' and can deny false interpretations of 'become,' because he lacks proper concepts he is unable to state exactly this ontological depth in positive ontological terms. He must resort to positive descriptive phrases in order to ensure that his ontological understanding of the union is not interpreted to mean that the Logos in some way changes or is mutable. He refuses to follow through with

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1. Athanasius, C. Ar., 2:47. Also 3:32 and 34. Also De. Incar., 8,9,10.
2. Athanasius, Ad Adel., 3.
3. Athanasius, C. Ar., 3:29 and 31.
4. Ibid., 2:8.
5. Athanasius, Ad Adel., 7. See also De Incar., 8, 9, 20.
6. Grillmeier, p. 218. For examples of this in Athanasius see C. Ar., 2:47, 3:29, 31. Also Ad Epic., 8.

the inherent logic of the Logos/Sarx framework. Athanasius is very close to an ontology of the hypostatic union, as the following will very clearly exemplify, but a full and exact conceptual statement of it will come only with Cyril.

Athanasius' proximity to the notion of the hypostatic union, which in a real sense presupposes such a union, is brought out in his treatment of the second Christological question concerning the Logos' passibility. Because Athanasius believes in a true incarnation of the Logos, he insists against the Arians that all human attributes must be predicated of him. Because the Logos has become man 'the properties of the flesh are said to be His, since he was in it, such as to hunger, to thirst, to suffer, to be weary, and the like of which the flesh is capable.'[1] Thus, 'when the flesh suffered, the Word was not external to it; and therefore is the passion said to be His.'[2] This is necessary

> 'because he [Logos] had a body, not in appearance, but in truth....with the affections proper to it....and as we say that the body was his own, so also we must say that the affections of the body were proper to Him alone....If then the body had been another's, to him too had been affections attributed; but if the flesh is the Word's....of necessity then the affections also of the flesh are ascribed to Him, whose the flesh is.' 3

Moreover, there is no hint that Athanasius understands this to be the case because of a confusion or mixture between the Logos and flesh. Not only does his understanding of the union, treated above, preclude this, but also 'we must recognize what is proper to each [nature]' even though 'we see and understand that both....are done by one.'[4]

Nevertheless, does this mean that the Arian claim that the Orthodox make God passible is true? Athanasius thinks not. Arguing from 1 Peter 4:1 Athanasius contends that the Logos' human experiences affect him only in so far as he is flesh and not as God.

> 'When he [Logos] is said to hunger and thirst and to toil, and not to know, and to sleep, and to weep...and in a word undergo

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1. Athanasius, C. Ar., 3:31.
2. Ibid., 3:32.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid., 3:35. See also De Sent Dion, 9.

> all that belongs to the flesh....Let no one stumble at what belongs to man, but rather let a man know that in nature the Word Himself is impassible, and yet because of the flesh which he put on, these things are ascribed to Him, since they are proper to the flesh, and the body itself is proper to the Saviour.' 1

For Athanasius, then, all human 'affections were not proper to the nature of the Word, as far as He was Word; but in the flesh which was thus affected was the Word....'[2]

It is at this point that Athanasius shows his greatest strength and his greatest weakness. Athanasius argues very astutely that if the Logos really became flesh, then he must be the subject of all predicates, human as well as divine. At the same time Athanasius clarifies exactly how these human attributes are to be predicated of the Logos. They are predicated of him, not in so far as he is God for to do so would destroy his immutable nature by making him passible, but rather they are predicated of him in so far as he is flesh. This clear and unambiguous understanding of the unity of subject exemplifies Athanasius' proximity to a hypostatic understanding of the unity between the Logos and the humanity.

> 'The special future significance of the Christological formula of St. Athanasius and of the Logos-Sarx framework in general,' [states Grillmeier] 'lies in its clear presentation of the "unity of subject" in Christ....A true conception of the personality of Christ is certainly revealed here. It is an old Christian legacy, which we were able to establish as early as Ignatius of Antioch and his source John 1:14.' 3

Athanasius has given a firm justification for the communication of idioms, which will be brought to fulfilment in the Nestorian controversy.

However, it is here also that Athanasius seems vulnerable to criticism which could undermine his argument for the impassibility of the Logos as subject of human experiences, as well as the humanity of Christ. 'The central problem of his Christology,' states Kelly, '[is] whether he envisaged Christ's humanity as including a human rational soul, or regarded the Logos as taking the place of one.'[4]

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1. Athanasius, C. Ar., 3:34.
2. Ibid., 3:55.
3. Grillmeier, pp. 218-219.
4. Kelly, pp. 286-287.

Athanasius often speaks of the Logos becoming 'flesh' rather than the Logos becoming 'man'. However, on a number of occasions he does say 'He [Logos] took flesh and became man,'[1] and once even points out that the Biblical use of 'flesh' means the complete man.[2] Likewise after the Synod of Alexandria in 362 in his Tomus ad Antiochenos, Athanasius professes against the Apollinarians that Christ must have a human soul.[3] Nevertheless, it is difficult not to come to Grillmeier's critical judgement that for Athanasius, while the soul may have been a physical factor, it played no theological role in his Christology.[4] This exemplifies itself in that the Logos becomes the sole motivating and vital force of all of Christ's actions analogous to the Platonic union of body and soul. The body becomes the mere external instrument of all that the Logos accomplishes.[5] Likewise in his scriptural exegesis concerning human attributes predicated of the Logos such as ignorance, sadness, suffering, etc., he makes no mention of a human soul. To have brought in the concept of Christ's human soul would have bolstered his argument against the Arians on how the Logos could be the subject of the human predicates without becoming passible in himself. However, he fails to do this.[6] Thus while Athanasius nowhere explicitly denies the human soul of Christ, he never brings out its theological significance.

Such a lack weakens not only Athanasius' understanding of the humanity of Christ, but also, and this is important for this study, his argument against the Arians that the human attributes do not affect the Logos directly in his divinity, but only in his humanity. Because Athanasius does not give any function to the human soul it is difficult,

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1. Athanasius, C. Ar., 3:31. See also 3:30 and 32. Also Ad Epic.8.
2. Cf. Athanasius, C. Ar., 3:30.
3. Cf. Athanasius, Tomus ad Antioch, 7 and 11.
4. Cf. Grillmeier, pp. 194-217.
5. Cf. Athanasius, C. Ar., 3:31 and 35. This can very easily be seen in Athanasius' understanding of Redemption. The flesh of Christ plays no real complementary role in the redeeming act, but is the mere instrument by which the Logos alone brings about redemption. Likewise, Christ's death is seen as the separation of the Logos from the flesh and not the human soul from the body. See C. Ar., 3:57. Also Ad Epic., 5,6.
6. Cf. M. Richard, 'Saint Athanase et la Phychologie du Christ selon les Ariens,' Mélanges de Science Religieuse, 4 (1947), pp. 5-54. See Athanasius, C. Ar., 3:54-58.

if not logically impossible, to see where the ignorance, sadness, agony and suffering directly reside since it is the soul that is the centre of these and not the flesh as flesh. Without the soul it seems that they must directly reside in the Logos himself. This, of course, would make him passible as God, which Athanasius would abhor. Even with Athanasius' very important and valid distinction between the Logos in himself and as incarnate, it is difficult not to come to such a conclusion.

Thus while Athanasius does argue well against the Arian Christology, he does not fully succeed, precisely because he fails to challenge them on their major weakness--the absence of a human soul which stems from their Logos/Sarx framework. Nevertheless, Athanasius' Christology is not just Arian Christology differing only 'in his estimate of the status of the Word' as Kelly maintains.[1] Nor is Athanasius, as will be seen, an Apollinarian. While all three work from a Logos/Sarx framework, only Athanasius keeps his framework 'open for an explicit doctrine of the soul of Christ. That of Apollinaris [and the Arians] is closed.'[2]

3. Apollinaris

Since Apollinaris works from within the same basic Logos/Sarx framework as the Arians and Athanasius, the same basic problems are present: the difference being that with Apollinaris the inherent weaknesses of a strict Logos/Sarx Christology become very much in evidence, and, being seen as such, cause a reaction to take place.

Being an arch-supporter of Nicea, Apollinaris upholds against the Arians the full divinity of the Logos. At the same time he was dissatisfied with any Christology which seemed to advocate an accidental or adoptionist union between the Logos and flesh such as that of Paul of Samosata, the Paulinians, Flavian, or Diodore. For Apollinaris there must be a substantial union between the Logos and flesh and this union is understood in the same manner as the union between the soul and body in man. Understanding the union in such a way obviously is not new. What is new is the acuteness and depth with which Apollinaris works out this understanding.

Christ is a compound being in which the Logos substantially joins

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1. Kelly, p. 287.
2. Grillmeier, p. 217.

himself to flesh and through this union constitutes a 'human being.' Christ could not have a human soul because this would mean that there were two wholes: the Logos and the complete man of body and soul. According to Apollinaris 'two perfect things cannot become one.'[1] Thus Christ is made up of parts which in union with one another form a new organic and complete substance. 'A single nature is constituted out of the several parts, and the Logos supplies to the whole a special energy....The same thing comes to pass in the case of the ordinary man out of two incomplete parts. These make up one complete nature and are revealed by one name....'[2] As the union of body and soul form a man, so the union of the Logos and flesh form Christ. It must be pointed out that because Apollinaris understands man to be any spirit united to flesh, he believes that he is able to maintain that while the Logos takes the place of the human soul, Christ is nevertheless man.[3]

However, because this new being is a compound of Logos and flesh and not a human soul and flesh, he is not man as other men. Rather to quote the New Testament, the Logos is 'Found as man' and 'In the likeness of men.'[4] Christ then is a 'Heavenly man.'[5]

The full significance of such a description of Christ is only grasped when one realizes that this union between the Logos and flesh is not seen in a static way, but rather the Logos gives life and vitalizes the whole of the flesh. In this new reality called Christ it is the Logos who is the sole governing and active principle.

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1. Ps.-Athanasius, C. Apoll., 1:2. While it does not affect this study it should be noted that there has been some discussion over whether Apollinaris saw Christ as made up of Logos and flesh (dicotomist) or Logos, animal soul, and flesh (tricotomist). For discussion of this point see: H. Lietzmann, Apollinaris von Laodicea und seine Schule (Tubingen: 1904). See also C.E. Raven, Apollinarianism (Cambridge, 1923); R.A. Norris, Jr., Manhood and Christ (Oxford: 1963); H. De Riedmatten, 'La Christologie d'Apollinare de Laodicea, Studia Patristica, Vol. II (T.U. 64, Berlin: 1957), eds. K. Alard and F.L. Cross.
2. Apollinaris, De Unione, 5, (Lietzmann, p. 187). Trans. R.A. Norris, p. 105.
3. Apollinaris, Anaceph., 16 (Leitzmann, p. 244). Trans. Kelly, p. 292. For a discussion of Apollinaris' anthropology see Norris, pp. 81-94.
4. Apollinaris, Fragment 45, (Lietzmann, p. 214).
5. Apollinaris, Tomus Synod. Also Fragment 25. Also Anaceph., 12, (Lietzmann, pp. 263, 210, 243).

'The flesh, which is moved altogether from without by the mover and agent..., and which is not in itself a complete living being, has come together into union with its governor, and has been put together with the heavenly governor, being conformed to it in virtue of its own passive nature, and receiving the divine (element), which has been made its own, by reason of (the latter's) active nature. For thus out of mover and moved one living being is constituted--not two, nor out of two complete and self-moving (parts).' 1

Thus one sees the full weight of Apollinaris' formula 'One nature of the Word incarnate.'[2] Christ is one not because of a hypostatic union, but one because of the naturalistic and organic unity of two parts.

Thus the concept of 'person' for Apollinaris is attributed not so much to the Logos as subject, but to the new composite being of the Logos and flesh as such. 'The flesh and the "determining principle of the flesh" are one prosopon.'[3] Or again 'Holy scripture makes no difference between the Logos and his flesh, but the same is one physis, one hypostasis, one power, one prosopon, fully God and fully man.'[4]

Because of this natural, physical, and vital unity between the Logos and flesh, which forms a new being, Apollinaris is able to justify the communication of idioms. However, it is now due, not to the fact that there is one subject in Christ, but to the fact that there is the one composite being of Christ. As Norris states:

> 'It is the fact of the composite, vital unity of material and spiritual principles which makes the "exchange of names" possible....This is Apollinaris' explanation of the scriptural datum of a double language...: an explanation founded on the view that the concrete nature of the incarnate Christ is constituted by an organic union of divine Spirit and human flesh, on the model of twofold human nature.' 5

However, Appolinaris did not believe that either the Logos or the flesh radically changed in the union, or that the communication of idioms denoted such change. 'The flesh of the Lord while remaining flesh even

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1. Apollinaris, Fragment, 107, (Lietzmann, p. 232). Trans. Norris, p. 100.
2. Apollinaris, Ad. Jov., 1. (Leitzmann, p. 251).
3. Apollinaris, Logoi, (Leitzmann, p. 248). Trans. Grillmeier, p. 230.
4. Apollinaris, De Fide et incarn., 6. (Leitzmann, pp. 198-199). Trans. Grillmeier, p. 231.
5. Norris, pp. 105-106.

in the union (its nature being neither changed nor lost) shares in the names and properties of the Word; and the Word, while remaining Word and God, in the incarnation shares in the names and properties of the flesh.'[1]

With regard to the first Christological problem of the Logos' immutability in becoming man, Apollinaris' Christology has a definite appeal. This is due to the fact that the relationship between the Logos and flesh is portrayed in a very dynamic and active way, and yet Apollinaris professes that the Logos remains immutable. However, at a closer study, this dynamism is such that it completely destroys the Incarnation. It not only has little regard for Christ's humanity, but also the immutability of the Logos as God.

While Apollinaris is able to maintain the oneness of Christ, the union is such that the parts united can no longer preserve their complete integrity. This is obvious with regard to the humanity of Christ, for which Apollinaris was condemned.[2] However, not only is the humanity of Christ incomplete without a soul, but the remaining flesh is also transformed. Because the divine Logos must now take the place of the soul it becomes the lifegiving principle of the flesh in a vitalistic and organic way, and thus transforms the flesh, or to use Apollinaris' term, makes it 'heavenly.' At the same time, in so becoming the life-giving principle, the Logos not only transforms the flesh, but he himself is also forced to undergo change and transformation, even though Apollinaris would protest this. (The Arians realized this and thus logically made the Logos a creature.) This is so because the necessity of Apollinaris' vitalistic and organic unity renders the concept of 'become' to mean that in some manner the Logos is changed. Ps.-Athanasius is very much aware of this when he asks: 'Do they suppose the Word to have undergone a conversion into flesh, or been made "like" to soul, or to have exhibited the human form in mere semblence....'[3]

While Apollinaris wished to uphold a true Incarnation, and his emphasis on the nature of the union is to do just that, he fails

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1. Cf. Timothy of Berytus, Ep. ad Hom., (Leitzmann, p. 278). Trans. Kelly, p. 295.
2. Apollinaris was condemned for denying the full humanity of Christ by Pope Damasus at the Council of Rome, 377. Also at the Synod of Antioch, 379. Finally, at the First Council of Constantinople in 381.
3. Ps.-Athanasius, C. Apoll., 2:1. See also 1:2, 3, 12.

because the union as he understood it must necessarily change and transform both the Logos and the humanity. In Apollinaris' Christology it is no longer God who becomes man because by the nature of the union he must change, and thus he can no longer be logically called God, but only that which he has changed into. Neither can God be said to be man since the flesh is likewise transformed and changed. Christ is rightly one for Apollinaris, but in the last analysis it is logically impossible to say that he is 'God become man' or 'God incarnate' since both the divinity and the humanity have been transformed by the union into a composite tertium quid. Because of Apollinaris' denial of the human soul, and because of the organic unity which ensued, Ps.-Athanasius can rightly ask:

> 'In what sense then, according to you, did the Word....having united flesh to Himself, become rational man, and how, being unchangeable and unalterable, did he become man, if it was not by constituting the form of the servant so as to be endued with reason, so that the Word might remain unchangeable, remaining what he was, and also the man, being God, might be seen on earth as rational?' 1

It may seem paradoxical but for Ps.-Athanasius it is only if Christ has a soul and is fully man that one can guarantee the immutable and full divinity of the Logos and thus also a true Incarnation. In other words to maintain a true Incarnation one must guarantee the immutability of the Logos not just because he is God, but also in order that one can truly say that it is God who became and is man. If the Logos changes because of the nature of the union in becoming man, then he is no longer God, and thus to say 'God has become man' or that 'God is man' becomes untelligible. The same is true with regards to the humanity. It too must maintain its integrity, if the Incarnation is to remain intelligible.

From the above discussion it is quite obvious what happens on the second Christological level concerning the passibility of the Logos as man. As was already stated in delineating Apollinaris' thought, because the union is organic the communication of idioms is justified not because there is one subject, but because there is one composite being. Apollinaris did not wish to imply that the Logos suffered as God,

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1. Ibid., 2:16.

but because of the nature of the union and the lack of a human soul the Logos, contrary to Apollinaris' protests, must both be mutable and passible in his divinity and not just as man.

Gregory of Nazianzus brings Apollinaris' argument to its logical end. 'For if the manhood is without soul, even the Arians admit this, that they may attribute his passion to the Godhead, as that which gives motion to the body is also that which suffers.'[1] If the Logos takes the place of the soul it must not only become the primary principle of life, it must also become the direct and primary centre of all human experiences--hunger, thirst, suffering, etc.. It is no longer the Logos as man who experiences these, as Athanasius maintained, but the Godhead of the Logos.

The only way that Apollinaris can protect the impassibility of the Logos as God is to deny the reality of his human experiences. This, of course, makes him a Docetist. Ps.-Athanasius presents Apollinaris' dilemma well when he says: 'These men either imagine an alteration of the Word, or suppose the economy of the passion unreal.'[2]

The whole dilemma on the second level concerning the passibility of the Logos as man goes straight back to the first level concerning the nature of the union. Because of Apollinaris' understanding of the union he is unable to maintain any real distinction between the Logos and humanity, and thus no real distinction between the attributes of each nature. Again Ps.-Athanasius sees this very clearly:

> 'But if you do not believe that Christ was passible because he was man, yet impassible because he was God, but, when driven into a corner, argue, that if you confess Christ to be God and Man, you will be saying, "Not one, but two," you must necessarily either....call the economy of the passion and the death and resurrection a mere appearance; or like Arius and his followers, call the Godhead of the Word passible.' 3

In the end the communication of idioms for Apollinaris is a word game, that has no foundation in his Christology even though he felt that his

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1. Gregory of Nazianzus, Ad. Cled. (Ep. 101). Trans. Library of Christian Classics, Vol. III, Christology of the Later Fathers, ed. E.R. Hardy (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1954).
2. Ps.-Athanasius, C. Apoll., 1:2. See also 1:3, 12, 16; 2:13, 17.
3. Ibid., 2:12.

understanding of the union was the only firm justification for it.[1]

4. The Inadequacy of the Logos/Sarx Framework

While the above three theologians have diverse conclusions concerning the ontological status of the Logos and mode of the incarnational union, they nevertheless have one thing in common: the Logos/Sarx framework. Arius, Athanasius, and Apollinaris realised that Christ was one ontological being. If this was not true, one could not speak of a true Incarnation. Working from the Logos/Sarx framework they very easily could give ontological depth and meaning to the concept of 'become' for all three, to a greater or lesser degree, understood the union as analogous to the ontological relationship between the soul and body. There was no fear of adoptionism for all three would agree that the 'Logos became "flesh"' and 'did not come into flesh.'

While it was Apollinaris who developed and elaborated most fully a Logos/Sarx Christology, it was Arius who saw most clearly its full implications. Apollinaris, in denying a human soul, very clearly explicated the organic and physical nature of the union in which the Logos becomes the life-giving and vivifying principle of the flesh. However, it was Arius who realised that such a union not only destroyed the integrity of the humanity, but also demanded that the Logos be mutable and passible in himself. Following the inherent logic of the Logos/Sarx framework Arius concluded that the Logos must be a creature.

Athanasius challenged Arius, but, as has been seen, was not fully successful. His lack of full success resided in his use of the Logos/Sarx framework. With it he could give ontological depth to the union, but could not make a positive statement on the ontological nature of the union in an ontological way which would uphold both the oneness of Christ and the integrity of the natures. He could deny any false notion of the union which would imply change or mutation in the Logos in becoming man; however, in order to give a positive meaning to the nature

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1. Cf. Gregory of Nazianzus, Ad. Cled. (Ep. 102). It should be noted that while the above arguments against Apollinaris are Christological in substance, the primary argument which caused his condemnation was soteriological: 'That which he (Logos) has not assumed he has not healed; but that which is united to his Godhead is saved.' Gregory of Nazianzus, Ad.Cled.(Ep. 101).

of the union so that he could state how the Logos could remain immutable in becoming man, he was forced to move from negative ontological statements concerning the union to positive descriptive statements of the union: 'took flesh,' 'put on flesh.' Unlike Arius, Athanasius was not conscious of the full implications of the Logos/Sarx framework, yet he unconsciously moved out of the framework when he wished to uphold the immutability of the Logos and the completeness of the humanity.

What Arius, Athanasius, and Apollinaris did not realise was that Nicea in proclaiming that the Logos was fully God rendered the Logos/Sarx framework unworkable. As Nicea's homoousion doctrine broke the Platonic principle of emanation on the Trinitarian level, so it broke the Logos/Sarx framework on the Christological level. It is incapable at one and the same time to explain both the ontological unity between the Logos and his humanity, and the real distinction between the two in order to ensure that the Logos remains God, and thus immutable, and that the humanity remains complete. This is due precisely to the fact that 'become' in the Logos/Sarx framework always implies change. To understand the concept of 'become' as expressing an ontological unity only, without at the same time expressing a distinction between the Logos and what he has become: man, destroys the terms to which 'become' is predicated. This is where the Logos/Sarx framework always failed. Its understanding of 'become' always tended to produce a hybrid tertium quid being.

What has to be grasped, and up until now has not been, is that while the concept of 'become' must express an ontological unity between the Logos and his humanity if a true Incarnation is to be maintained, it must likewise and at the same time guarantee the distinction within the unity between the Logos and his humanity for the very same reason. It will take the Nestorian controversy to bring this about.

Because of the above the situation becomes critical on the level of the communication of idioms. For Arius, Athanasius, and Apollinaris the Logos is the subject of all human predicates. However, it was only Athanasius who could maintain with any consistency and logic the homoousion doctrine of Nicea and the fact that the Logos was the subject *in* so far as he was man and not in so far as he was God. However, his distinction was weakened because, due to his Logos/Sarx framework, he did not utilize the human soul as the seat of the human experiences. With Apollinaris the distinction looses its whole rational. His

Christology dramatically showed the unworkability of the Logos/Sarx framework to account for the unity and distinction in Christ, and thus brought to the forefront the question of the communication of idioms. It is not surprising then that the Nestorian controversy started off on this level. If the Logos is homoousion with the Father and thus immutable and impassible as Nicea proclaimed, how could Mary be Theotokos? In actual fact it is not a new question, but an Arian question in Nestorian garb. Arius: 'If the Logos is born, how can he be God?' Nestorius: 'If the Logos is God, how can he be born?' The upshot is that while Arius and Nestorius are poles apart, both give negative responses to his respective question for the very same reason: God is immutable and impassible! Underlying both is the presupposition that God can not really be present in time and history and remain unchanged.

CHAPTER 2

CHALCEDONIAN CHRISTOLOGY: 'BECOME' AS PERSONAL/EXISTENTIAL

The full implications of Nicea's homoousion doctrine on Christology have not yet been fully realized and understood. The Patristic Church must live through the Nestorian and Monophysite controversies before it reaches maturity at Chalcedon. As with the previous controversies studied in Chapter 1, the controversies in this chapter do not primarily concern the immutability and impassibility of God as such. Rather they are conscious concerns within the primary problem of trying to state the unity and distinction in Christ. The Fathers who will be studied here wish to maintain that the Logos is immutable and impassible in himself. However, the difficulty in maintaining this, as was seen from Chapter 1, arises when one tries to formulate what it means for the Logos to 'become' man and be the subject of human experiences.

Basically two men will be studied in this chapter. Nestorius and Cyril of Alexandria. In relation to these men such personages as Theodore of Mopsuestia, Theodoret of Cyrus, Pope Leo and Euthches will also be mentioned. The chapter will conclude with a theological exegesis of Chalcedon.

A. Antioch and Alexandria

The controversies and the men treated in this chapter fall into either the Antiochene or Alexandrian school of theology. From the previous chapter, some idea of the Alexandrian school has already been obtained through the thought of Athanasius and Apollinaris. Nevertheless, it is impossible to fully appreciate the forthcoming Christological problems without some idea of the different theological milieus of each school.

It may be somewhat simplistic to say that the School of Alexandria is Platonic and the School of Antioch is Aristotelian, yet there is a basis for such a division, and such a division helps to grasp the different theological attitudes and presuppositions which influence their respective Christologies. The basic difference can be seen in the way each approaches reality. Being Platonic Alexandria tended to grasp reality through general and universal metaphysical principles,

always trying to get beyond the material and concrete appearances to the really real. Antioch, on the other hand, in true Aristotelian style, tended to stress the individual concrete and factual nature of empirical reality. This basic difference exemplifies itself in a number of areas that bear upon Christology.

Unlike the Alexandrians, who delighted in mystical and allegorial exegesis, the Antiochenes were factual and historical in their interpretation of Scripture. Thus, when it came to reflecting on Christ in the New Testament, Alexandria was interested in his inner metaphysical make-up, while Antioch delved into the factual and historical aspects of his human life and what he accomplished.

The same basic difference can be seen in their respective anthropologies. Man for the Antiochenes was the doer, the actor, the free moral agent. For Alexandria he was the thinker, the knower, the mystic. Thus, Antioch stresses what Christ <u>did</u> as man, how he acted, his <u>free moral</u> integrity. Alexandria sees Christ more as the <u>revealer</u>, the giver of <u>divine knowledge</u>, the guarantee of truth. Their soteriologies differ then also. Salvation for Antioch was not the divinization of man as it was for Alexandria, but the bringing about of man's moral rectitude.

The culmination of these two basic attitudes and approaches are found then in their understanding of the person of Christ. Stressing the distinct oneness and unity of individual existing beings, Antioch lays much more emphasis on the distinction between God and creatures; and thus the humanity and divinity of Christ are not only distinct, but tend to be understood as separate entities existing in their own right. Grounded in the historical and factual nature of reality Christ as <u>a</u> man is seen as a separate whole with the full operations of intellect and will. This is not only in keeping with their philosophical understanding of reality as composed of individual and distinct beings, but also in their anthropology and soteriology. The stress being in both instances that man is a free moral being. Christ with full moral integrity freely wills and acts to bring about the possibility for men to once more live virtuous lives. Thus, the Man Jesus remains distinct from the Logos. However, as will be seen, this is not just due to the Antiochene desire to maintain the full humanity of Christ, but also to avoid confusion with the divine nature of the Logos which would render him mutable and passible. However, such stress on the distinction of

natures obviously gives rise to the question of the unity in Christ.

Alexandrian Christology, as was seen, is more philosophical in nature, stressing the ontological oneness of Christ. But, as Apollinarianism exemplifies, the distinction of natures can become ambiguous and with it the Logos' immutability and impassibility.[1]

B. The School of Antioch: Nestorius

While Nestorius is the man most closely associated with the School of Antioch, he is neither the first nor the best of their theologians. Because of Nestorius' ambiguity his Christology can only be fully understood in the light of his predecessor Theodore of Mopsuestia, who in many ways was a much more careful thinker.

Theodore was the first theologian to bring together into a complete Christology all the Antiochene insights and presuppositions. It is not surprising then that he is primarily a scriptural exegete to the extent that he is known as 'the Interpreter,' rather than a systematic theologian. However, Theodore did not perform his exegsis in a theological vacuum, but like his predecessors Eustathius and Dodore of Tarsus took up the attack against the Arians and Apollinarians.

Theodore was well aware of why Arius denied the divinity of the Logos, and he also understood the full implications of the Apollinarian notion of the union. As he states:

> 'The disciples of Arius and Eunomius say that he (Christ) took a body but not a soul; the divine nature, they say, takes the place of the soul. And they lower the divine nature of the Unique (Son) ....and performs the actions of the soul....Consequently, if the divinity takes the place of the soul, it (the body) had neither hunger, nor thirst, nor was it tired nor did it have need of food; for all this happens to the body because of its weakness and because the soul is not equipped to satisfy the needs which it has save according to the law of the nature which God has given it.' 2

Theodore is not only concerned with the full humanity of Christ, but

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1. For a more extensive treatment of these two schools see Kelly, pp. 153-158; 301-302. Also R.V. Sellers, Two Ancient Christologies, (London: SPCK; 1954). R.V. Sellers, The Council of Chalcedon, (London: SPCK, 1961), pp. 132-181.
2. Theodore of Mopsuestia, Hom. Catech. v. 9, ed. R. Tonnieau, Studi e Testi, 145 (Vatican City, 1949), pp. 111f.. Trans. Norris, p. 150.

also with upholding the immutability of the Logos as God. In order to close all the openings to an Arian denial of the Logos' divinity, Theodore will stress the distinction and completeness of the natures against Apollinarianism. In this way he will not only guarantee that Christ is really a man; body and soul, intellect and will, for soteriological and anthropological reasons; but also that the Logos remains immutable and impassible and thus truly God. As Grillmeier states: 'Theodore is always moved by one concern: to deprive the Arians of any occasion of violating the divine transcendence....he is always concerned not to confuse the Godhead with the creature.'[1]

Flowing from his Aristotelian background, Theodore understands 'nature' (physis), to mean a concrete reality of a specific kind. Thus 'human nature' is not just a general abstract term specifying what is common to all men, but an individual concrete human being. Likewise, 'divine nature' refers to the individual reality of the Logos. It must be stressed that Theodore is not just maintaining the fact that Christ's humanity is real as opposed to illusionary against the Docetists, nor just complete against the Arians and Apollinarians. Rather, Theodore's concept of 'human nature' when applied to Christ also has the note of metaphysical oneness as a being in its own right. Thus Theodore can ask: 'How is it not plain that the divine Scripture clearly teaches us that God the Word is one thing, and the man another, and that it shows us the difference between them?'[2] Theodore can clearly speak of 'the man,' 'the assumed man,' and 'the man Jesus,' as opposed to 'the Logos,' 'the one who assumes,' 'the Son of God.'[3]

It would seem that because of Theodore's understanding of the natures as distinct realities in themselves, he must see the incarnational union as moral or accidental. However, he did not wish this to be the case.

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1. Grillmeier, p. 341. Cf. Francis A Sullivan, The Christology of Theodore of Mopsuestia (Roma: Universitatis Gregorianae, 1956), pp. 197-202.
2. Theodore of Mopsuestia, In Ps. viii,5, ed. R. Devréesse; Studi e Testi, 93 (Vatican City: 1939), p. 46. Trans. Norris, p. 199.
3. The separate realities of 'the Man' and 'the Logos' is so great for Theodore that 'the Man' can speak of and to the Logos in the second and third person. For example, see Theodore of Mopsuestia, In Ev. Jo. xii, 30, ed. J.M. Vosté, Corpus Scriptorum Christianorum Orientalium; Scriptores Syri, Series IV, vol. 3 (Versio), (Louvain: 1940), p. 174. Trans. Norris, p. 200.

> 'He became man, they [Nicea] said, And it was not through a simple providence that he lowered himself, nor was it through the gift of powerful help, as he has done so often and still (does). Rather did he take our very nature, he clothed himself with it and dwelt in it so as to make it perfect through sufferings; and he united himself with it.' 1

One can discern that Theodore did not wish to maintain an accidental or moral union from his opening denials and that he wishes to uphold a real union through the concepts of 'take,' 'clothe,' and 'dwell.' Nevertheless, it is assured that Theodore did not understand the Incarnation in any Arian or Apollinarian sense.

Commenting on John's Prologue Theodore states:

> '"And the Word was made flesh." He used this phrase in a very striking way....Since this was, in point of fact, the opinion of those who saw Him - because He existed in such a humble way in man that this alone was believed by many, just as he appeared -- so to explain the phrase was added: "and He tabernacled among us." And it must be noted that Scripture uses the word "flesh" to designate the whole man....And so in the present passage when it says "The Word became flesh," it means "The Word came to be in man." But "became" is not used as though he were changed, but it was believed so on account of the appearance.' 2

It is obvious that Theodore's commentary is motivated by one thought: the Logos must remain immutable and unchanged in the act of incarnating himself. For Theodore 'become' always means 'change into.' Thus, while it may <u>appear</u> to many that the Logos 'became' (i.e. change into) man, in actual fact he did not. Theodore in saying that the Word 'appeared' to become man is in no way denying a real incarnation or union. He is not saying that the Word only appeared to be man, but really was not, as Sullivan seems to imply.[3] Theodore holds that the Logos 'in reality' and 'not in appearance' took flesh.[4] Thus Theodore's use of 'appearance' is not a positive statement concerning the union, but only a denial of change in the Logos. 'So then, we find no other possible interpretation of the word "become" than to refer it to

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1. Theodore of Mopsuestia, <u>Hom. Catech.</u> vii, 1 (Tonneau, p. 161). Trans. Grillmeier, p. 348.
2. Theodore of Mopsuestia, <u>In Ev. Jo.</u> (Vosté, p. 23). Trans. Rowan Greer, <u>Theodore of Mopsuestia: Exegete and Theologian</u>, (London: Faith Press, 1961), p. 139.
3. Cf. Sullivan, p. 230.
4. Theodore of Mopsuestia, <u>De Incarn.</u> as quoted by Leontius, <u>Frag.</u> 8, <u>P.G.</u> 66, 981c-d. Trans. Sullivan, pp. 231-232.

appearance...and when it says "become" then it means it according to appearance; for (the Word) was not changed into flesh.'[1]

While Theodore's positive understanding of the union does not directly pertain to this study, its effects on the passibility of the Logos as man does. Briefly stated Theodore understands the indwelling of the Logos in the Homo Assumptus as taking place 'by good pleasure, and by "good pleasure" is meant the best and noblest will of God which he exercises when pleased with those who have been zealous to be dedicated to him....'[2] Moreover, the indwelling by good pleasure of the Logos in the Homo Assumptus is not like that in 'apostles or just men....for never would we rave -- but so as in a son.' For the Logos to indwell 'as in son' means 'that in coming to indwell, he united the assumed (man) as a whole to himself, and made him share with him in all dignity in which he who indwells, being Son by nature, participates: so as to be counted one prosopon according to the union with him.'[3] This prosopon however is not the Logos, nor for that matter, the Homo Assumptus, but rather a 'common prosopon' brought about as an effect and consequence of the union.

> 'For when we distinguish the natures, we say that the nature of God the Word is complete, and that his prosopon is complete (for it is not correct to speak of an hypostasis without its prosopon); and (we say) also that the nature of the man is complete, and likewise (his) prosopon. But when we look to the conjunction, then we say one prosopon.' 4

While Theodore then can clearly speak of Christ being one person in two natures, it is evident that he is not near Chalcedon's understanding. The common prosopon has no metaphysical or ontological content. It is not a 'who' in itself, but rather a phenomenal representation brought about by the closeness of the two natures. Thus in no real sense can one say 'God became man' or that 'God is man.' This is clearly seen in Theodore's understanding of the communication of idioms.

Theodore's understanding of the natures as well as the union not

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1. Ibid., Trans. Greer, p. 55.
2. H.B. Swete, Theodore Episcopi Mopsuesteni in Epistolas B. Pauli Commentarii, (Cambridge, 1882), Vol. 2, p. 294. Trans. Norris, p. 219.
3. Ibid., p. 295. Trans. Norris, p. 221.
4. Ibid., p. 299. Trans. Norris, p. 229.

only allows him to uphold the immutability of the Logos in 'becoming' man, but also his impassibility. Being an ontological entity in itself the human nature, the Man, becomes a subject in its own right. Thus the human experiences of Christ are not predicated of the Logos, but of the Homo Assumptus. Theodore was well aware of this and in his exegesis went to great lengths to ensure this. The Homo Assumptus must be the subject precisely because Theodore wished to main the impassibility of the Logos in himself against the Apollinarians. Thus in no real sense does Theodore allow such statements as 'God suffered,' or 'God died.' He only allows a mitigated form of the communication of idioms. The proposon of the union allows him to refer the two sets of predicates to the 'one Son,' or 'Lord,' but this is only due to the fact that the natures are seen as one because of the conjunction. The prosopon to which the predicates refer is neither the Logos nor 'the man' but rather a linguistic and grammaticaly contrivance 'to emphasize the conjunction between them.'[1]

While Theodore is not a Nestorian before Nestorius and did not wish to be one, it is easy to see that because of his Antiochene background and his zealous defence of the immutability and impassibility of the Logos, he was forced in that direction. Theodore's major problem was that he could not think abstractly in metaphysical and ontological categories. He did the best he could with descriptive pictorial images that had a biblical basis, but at the hands of a less cautious thinker the tensions in Theodore's Christology could very easily break into the open.[2] Nestorius was such a thinker.

Turning to Nestorius one finds basically the same type of Christology. However, because of the controversy with Cyril, all the Antiochene presuppositions and difficulties reveal themselves more clearly; and thus the role of the Logos' immutability and impassibility is more easily studied. With Nestorius the full implications of the Nicean homoousion doctrine come fully into focus on the two Christological levels concerning the immutability and impassibility of Christ. If the Logos is homoousion

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1. Sullivan, p. 264. Cf. Greer, pp. 62-63, 146f. Also Norris, pp. 228-233.
2. Greer sees the whole of Theodore's Christology worked out in biblical 'pictorial Semitic images.' p. 65.

with the Father and thus immutable, in what manner was he 'incarnate and made man?' And if he is impassible, in what manner was he passible in that he 'was born of the Virgin Mary, suffered under Pontius Pilate, was crucified, died and was buried.' It is no longer a question of whether the Logos is fully God nor whether the humanity is complete, but rather the question centres on the union and relationship between the two. The question concerns the Incarnation itself. Thus the Logos/Sarx vs. the Logos/Anthropos question is now superseded by concern over the nature of the unity and distinction in Christ. Within this discussion the concepts of immutability and impassibility played a major role.

While Theotokos is a title given to Mary, its Christological significance is radically apparent. To say 'Mary is the Mother of God' not only states who Mary is, but primarily and more importantly, it states something about her son. If Mary is the Mother of God then, to state the obvious, her son is God. While this may be obvious, the truth and meaning of such a simple logical conclusion demands distinctions and justifications, which up to this point in the Christological development, no theologian has fully rendered. With the fall of Apollinarianism, one could ask if any justification was possible. Such a question was put to Nestorius.[1]

While Nestorius judged Theotokos to be inappropriate and Christotokos to be much more precise and theologically sound, his major concern was much broader than one individual title.[2] For Nestorius Theotokos was but one example of a whole kind and type of statement which exemplified a false understanding of the Incarnation. To say 'God was born,' or 'God suffered, died and rose,' not only implied that the Logos was passible in himself, but that he changed in becoming man. The whole of Nestorius' Christology then is articulated to uphold the integrity and distinction of the humanity and divinity, and thus the immutability and impassibility of the Logos. This can be seen not only in his attack on the Arian, Apollinarian, and Cyrilian Christologies, but also

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1. Nestorius did not initiate the controversy over the appropriateness of the Theotokos title, but was asked to make a judgement on it as Bishop of Constantinople. Cf. Loofs, Nestoriana, (Halle: 1905), p. 185 (Ep. ad Joann. Antioch., December, 430). See also Tragoedia (Nestoriana, 230). Also Liber Heracleidis, p. 99. The references and translation of the Liber Heracleidis used here are from G.R. Driver -- L. Hodgson, The Bazaar of Heracleidis (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1925).
2. Nestorius' initial condemnations appear in Ep. ad Caelest. 1:3, ad Schol. Eunuch., and Serm. 1 (Loofs, Nestoriana, 167; 181f.; 191; and 252.

saying that the union with flesh resulted in one nature....even as the soul and the body are bound (together) in one nature in the body, suffering of necessity, whether he will or not, the sufferings of the nature which he took upon himself, as though he was not of the nature of the Father impassible and without needs....:he hungered and thirsted and grew weary and feared and fled and died; and in short they say that he naturally endured whatever appertained to the sensible nature which he assumed.' 1

However, it was not only the Arians who understood the union in such a way. While the Apollinarians wished to maintain that the Logos did not change in becoming man they also 'incline towards the Arians in saying that the union resulted in one nature, not by change of ousia but by combination and natural composition, as soul and body are combined in one nature....that which each one of them by its nature cannot accept, such as the sufferings and the activity, it has accepted in the natural combination by mixture, by one sensibility.'[2]

In the end the Apollinarians are

> 'compelled to join either the Arians or Manichaeans in such a way as to admit either that he suffered not naturally any of these things but only in illusion and fiction [Manichaean position]. Or, by granting that in nature naturally, by a passible sensibility, he accepted sufferings, you evacuate him of impassibility and of immortality, and of being consubstantial with the Father, because he acquired a change of nature, seeing that (the Son) accepts and (the Father) accepts not (these sufferings).' 3

Nestorius rightly condemns the Arians and the Apollinarians. He understands well that their organic and physical union demands that the Logos change in becoming man and that as man, since he possesses no human soul, he is the direct subject and seat of all human attributes and predicates. Thus he is on safe ground when he condemns their use of the communication of idioms.

The heart of Nestorius' critique of the Arians and Apollinarians lies in his realization that the concept of 'become' cannot mean 'change into' which causes 'mixture' and 'confusion' of the natures. He very

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1. Nestorius, The Bazaar of Heracleides, pp. 8-9. It should be noted that while The Bazaar is a post-Ephesian document, it will nevertheless be the source used here in presenting Nestorius' thought since there is no major development in his thought after the Council of Ephesus. Moreover it is less inflammatory and polemical than some of his earlier statements and thus his true thought is more easily discernible. Cf. Grillmeier, p. 452. Also Kelly, p. 312.
2. Nestorius, pp. 33-34.
3. Ibid., p. 39.

astutely perceives that this notion of 'become' is not only metaphysically impossible for God as well as man, but even if it were possible it would render the Incarnation unintelligible and meaningless. As Nestorius states:

> 'He indeed who changes the divine nature into human nature brings about its suppression, and he who changes human nature into the divine makes mock of it and makes of it a nature unmade, in declaring a nature (which is) made unmade, which cannot be.... It is not possible that the unmade (should become) made and the eternal temporary and the temporary external and that the created (should become) uncreated by nature....For how can anyone conceive that the Maker, seeing that he is in every way other than that which is made, should change into his being the other which has been made?....In effect either he is what he is by nature, eternally god, and became not another nature while remaining in the ousia of God; or not being the nature of God, he was made and is not the Maker, which is absurd and impossible.'[1]

What Nestorius is saying is the simple truth that God is what he is and cannot change himself into something other than he is. Containing all perfection God is immutably and unchangeably himself for all eternity. Even to conceive 'God' as potentially changeable reveals that the being so conceived is not really God. For God to change into another demands that he ceases to be God, but God cannot cease to be; therefore he cannot change into another. Likewise, the human nature cannot change into God without ceasing to be a human nature. Unlike God, material beings can change into other material beings but in so doing they no longer are what they were but that which they have changed into. Nevertheless, it is metaphysically impossible for a created material being to change into God. Thus the Creator cannot change into a creature, nor a creature into the Creator.

Even if one allowed such a change to take place, one could still not speak intelligently of the Incarnation. For Nestorius those who confess one nature in Christ must understand him neither to be God nor man but a tertium quid being combining the properties of both.

> 'You do not confess that he is God in ousia in that you have changed him into the ousia of the flesh, and he is no more a man naturally in that you have made him the ousia of God; and he is not God truly or God by nature, nor yet man truly and man by nature.' 2

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1. Ibid., pp. 26-27.
2. Ibid., p. 16.

Nestorius clearly perceives that to see the concept of 'become' as meaning 'change into,' by mixture or confusion, that is, the Lôgos and the humanity forming one nature (in his understanding of nature), destroys the real meaning of the Incarnation. God is not man since both the Logos and humanity have ceased being what they were. 'He indeed who by a change of ousia becomes man is of another nature and not of the nature of man, in that he has another description of nature and not that of man....'[1] In other words the Logos must be immutable and unchangeable in becoming man not only because he is God, but also because he is man, for the sake of the Incarnation. If the Logos changes in becoming man, he ceases to be God; and thus one cannot truly say that God is man, or that God became incarnate. On the same token one must maintain the Logos' immutability if one is to say that God became and is man. To see a change in the Logos by way of mixture or confusion in becoming man not only destroys the fact that it is God who is man, but also the fact that it is man he has become. This is so since the terminal effect of the change in the Logos in his becoming man resides in the human nature, thus causing it to change as well.

What one sees then in Nestorius is a threefold argument for the Logos' immutability. Firstly, the Logos must be immutable because he is God and God cannot cease being God. Secondly, he must be immutable because of the Incarnation, i.e., if God changes in becoming man, he who is 'man' is no longer God but that which he has changed into. Thirdly, the Logos must be immutable for the sake of the humanity, i.e. a change in the Logos in becoming man effects a change in the humanity as well; and thus one cannot speak of a true human nature or manhood. God may appear to become man, but not really since the manhood is changed. For Nestorius then it is impossible to see the Incarnation as forming one nature:

> 'For human nature is definite, and (the things) which he possesses who is man in ousia and in nature ought to be his (Logos') who comes to be in the nature of man neither more or less;...Either then (he became) man in such a way that the union of God the Word with the body and soul took place not with the view to (forming) one nature but in order to serve for the

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1. Ibid., p. 22.

> dispensation on our behalf, or he had the (properties) of another nature apart from that of man and of God, which is an animate body and God the Word which nature is neither that of a man nor that of God, but a new nature, to which belongs something of all our natures.' 1

Flowing from the above, it is easy to see why Nestorius is so adamant against the communication of idioms. Because of his understanding of ousia, the communication of idioms as traditionally used not only meant that the Logos in his ousia as God was born, grew, suffered, etc., but also implied a false notion of the Incarnation. The Arians and Apollinarians could predicate human attributes of the Logos because they saw the Incarnation as the ousia of the Logos changing into the ousia of the manhood by mixture or confusion forming one new tertium quid ousia. Nestorius is correct that their understanding of the Incarnation forced them either to admit that the Logos was passible and corruptible, and thus not God; or to deny the reality of the human nature with all the human attributes, and thus not man. As Nestorius states: 'One ought neither to be an Arian nor a Manichaean, according to whom the Incarnation took place in schema or in the nature of God the Word and (who: Arians) refer all things to him in their doctrine; the manner of life and the sufferings and the death.'[2] To uphold and maintain the integrity of each nature, that Christ is really God and man, and thus a true understanding of Incarnation, Nestorius believed that the attributes of each nature must be predicated only of the respective nature and not of the other. For Nestorius there is no distinction, as found in Athanasius, between the Logos in himself and as man. It is at this point that Nestorius' Christology begins to show its weakness. While Nestorius' understanding of the concept of 'nature' as a distinct individual reality helped him to criticize the Arian and Apollinarian errors and provided him with a conceptual tool to say what the Incarnation is not, when it came to expressing what the Incarnation is, his concept of nature drove him headlong into a Christological cul de sac.

Nestorius did not wish the union between the divine and human natures to be moral. He did not wish to be a Nestorian and accused Cyril of calumny for saying that he was.[3] He realized that there must

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1. Ibid., p. 36. Cf. pp. 181-182.
2. Ibid., p. 184. Cf. pp. 91-95.
3. Cf. Ibid., pp. 44-45, 189, 196.

be a substantial union between the two. However, working from within his framework, it seems impossible for him to do so.

Following the lead of Theodore of Mopsuestia, Nestorius sees the union between the divine and human natures as prosopic. That is, the union is such that it brings about a common prosopon of union. The common prosopon of union is the result and consequence of the union and not the union itself. The union which brings about the common prosopon is 'through the compensation of the prosopa and through the mutual interpenetration or perichoresis of these prosopa.'[1]

Through the compensation of the prosopa of the natures the prosopon of union comes into being and the Incarnation takes place. Taking his starting point from Phillipians 2, Nestorius stated that 'the likeness of a servant which was taken should become the likeness of God and God the likeness of a servant and that the one should become the other and the other the one in prosopon, the one and the other remaining in their natures.'[2] The Logos then 'made use of the likeness and of the prosopon of a servant, not the ousia nor nature, in such wise that he was by nature in them both, as being Christ.'[3] Remembering that prosopon is the appearance of the ousia, Nestorius then understands the Incarnation to be the appearance of the Logos humbling himself and taking the appearance of Man; thus the appearance of Man is exhalted becoming the appearance of God; and the union of the two appearances form a common appearance, the prosopon, of union.[4]

> 'In the prosopa of the union, the one in the other, neither by diminution nor by suppression nor by confusion is this "one" conceived, but by taking and giving and by the use of the union of the one with the other, the prosopa take and give one another but not the ousia. The one we conceive as the other and the other as the one, while the one and the other abide.'[5]

The mutual taking and giving of the two prosopa of the natures brings about the union forming the common prosopon--Christ.

Nestorius does not stop here but attempts to bring the union of

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1. Grillmeier, p. 442.
2. Nestorius, p. 183.
3. Ibid., p. 147.
4. Cf. Ibid., p. 246.
5. Ibid., p. 252. Cf. p. 233.

the natures even closer through the compenetration and perichoresis of the two prosopa. 'Confess then the taker as he took and the taken as he was taken, wherein (each is) in another, wherein (there is) one and not two, after the same manner of the Trinity.'[1] As the perichoresis of the persons in the Trinity form one God so the perichoresis of the two prosopa form one Christ. It is evident then that Nestorius wishes to express a substantial union. While the natures are distinct the prosopa are not. 'We understand neither that which took nor that which was taken in distinction but that which was taken in that which took.'[2]

Flowing from Nestorius' understanding of the Incarnation, it is not difficult to see why he insists that Christ is the subject of all predicates and not the Logos. Nestorius feels that Nicea supports him. The Council Fathers did not predicate the human attributes to the Logos, but to 'Jesus Christ' the common prosopon of union.[3]

However, has Nestorius then conceived a true substantial union? Has he explicated the true nature of the Incarnation? Is the Nestorian Christ: God-become-man? At first sight, it may seen that Nestorius has even gone too far and unwittingly become a Monophysite with the compenetration of the prosopa. However, there is really no fear of that for Nestorius has in no way united the natures by compenetration, but only the prosopa, the complex of properties of each nature. It is here where the crux lies. Christ as the common prosopon has no ontological depth, but is the mere phenomenal representation of the interplay between the two natures. One might say that Nestorius is a phenomenological Monophysite. Only the appearances are fused together as one, not the ousias. Christ is not a being in himself. He does not exist as a person or reality in and of himself, 'but owing to the concourse of the union of the divinity and humanity there came into being one Christ.'[4] For Nestorius Christ is the 'sum of two natures and sees these in turn merely as a collection of qualitative expressions.'[5] The Logos qua Logos with its prosopon (complex of qualities) is an

1. Ibid., p. 207.
2. Ibid., p. 208. Cf. pp. 218-219, 241.
3. Cf. Ibid., pp. 141-150.
4. Ibid., p. 144.
5. Grillmeier, p. 377.

ousia, an existing ontological reality. The manhood qua manhood with its prosopon (complex of qualities) is an ousia, an existing ontological reality. However, Christ qua Christ is not an ousia; and thus he is not an existing ontological reality, but a phenomenological conglomeration of divine and human qualities. Christ is not God become man nor the Logos incarnate, but rather 'he' functions as the external manifestation and representation of the relation which exists between the human and divine natures. In the end one must admit there is only a moral union between God and man.

Nestorius in delineating the positive content of his Christology makes two mistakes which are pertinent to this study.

The first mistake is that Nestorius 'does not fully see the metaphysical structure of the word "Christ".'[1] As the above demonstrates Christ is not a being or reality in his own right. This is due to the fact that while Nestorius realized that the Logos must be immutable not only because he is God, but also because he must remain immutable if one is to say that it is God who 'became' man; i.e., for the sake of the Incarnation, he was never able to grasp the metaphysical and ontological complexion of the concept 'become.' The concept 'become' for Nestorius lacks any note of substantiality, but only came to mean combine, join, or concur. He never grasped that the act of God becoming man terminated with the fact that God is man. Thus he is never able to comprehend the ontological nature of Christ's own personality. This is why he ultimately rejects the communication of idioms, and gives a faulty interpretation to Nicea. In order to say and understand that Mary is the Mother of God, or that God is born, hungers, suffers, etc., one must grasp the metaphysical nature of these statements: God ontologically became man, and Christ is the Logos incarnate. The Nicene Fathers intuitively realized that Christ as the Logos incarnate was ontologically one, and thus they could proclaim, with no hesitation, not only that 'Jesus Christ' was homoousion with the Father, but also born, died and was buried. As God the Logos was immutable and impassible, but as man he was mutable and passible. Nestorius never saw this, but always saw Christ as a phenomenological construct upon which one can hang divine and human qualities. As Kelly states:

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1. Ibid.

'All that it [common prosopon] in fact amounted to was the truism that Jesus Christ....was a single object of presentation.... The real problem, however, especially for one who set the independence and completeness of the natures so much in the foreground, was to explain what constitutes His person, the metaphysical subject of His being, and this Nestorius' theory hardly touched.' 1

But why was Nestorius not able to grasp the true nature of the Incarnation and the true personality of Christ? It was partially due to his fear of Apollinarianism. Above all else he did not want a union in which the integrity of the natures was jeopardized and thus the Incarnation itself. He also knew that Arius' and Apollinarius' understanding of 'become' always contained the note of 'change into.' Nestorius himself could not see any way in which 'become' could have ontological depth without at the same time meaning 'change into.' Thus he was forced to seek an understanding of the unity which would uphold the integrity of the natures, and yet be substantial. As has been seen, he failed in his search.

However, the reason he failed and ultimately the reason why he never understood the ontological nature of the Incarnation lies in his understanding of the concept 'nature.' Nature for Nestorius is not a generic, universal, or abstract term, but an individual specific thing as such. Nature (ousia) was a concrete individual reality or being in itself. Philosophically there is nothing inherently wrong in this. Fido has one individual canine nature as opposed to the individual nature of another dog. God is one kind of nature and man another. However, when it comes to Christ, a difficulty does arise since he is said to have two, and yet be one being or reality. If one sees and understands the divine and human natures existing separately prior to the 'Incarnation,' the only modes of union possible are either some sort of moral union or a substantial union in which the natures change in the uniting. There is no fear of the latter in Nestorius. There also seems to be no hint of the former either. It is obvious that Nestorius did not see the human nature existing chronologically prior to the union. The Logos did not adopt an already existing man. For Nestorius the union of the divine and human natures took place at conception.[2]

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1. Kelly, p. 317.
2. Cf. Nestorius, p. 60.

However, while the human nature for Nestorius did not exist chronologically or existentially prior to the union, it did exist conceptually and logically prior to the union, that is, in the mind of Nestorius. Thus he always conceived and thought of the Incarnation as two individual realities coming together. The human nature, as conceptually conceived by him, was already individuated prior to the union. The incarnational act was not understood as the Logos bringing into being, individuating and uniting to himself a human nature, and thus becoming man; but rather the uniting of two individual natures one of which eternally existed and the other, while not existentially existing prior to the union, was conceptually conceived to be an individual reality in itself logically prior to the union. Nestorius' mistake was not one of faith, but one of conceptual understanding. Because he conceived the human nature to be individual prior to the union, he could never see how they could be substantially and ontologically united without in some way causing substantial change in each. Thus, while Nestorius did not wish to have a moral union, he had no other option open to him since, above all, he wanted to uphold the integrity of the natures.

C. Cyril of Alexandria

The failure of Nestorius to account for a substantial union in Christ and thus a true incarnation lay in the fact that he began with the natures distinct and individual, and then tried to put them together. However, as Prestige clearly states:

> 'A permanently valid doctrine of Christ could only be forthcoming from men who somehow made the unity of His person the ultimate ground for their thought about the duality of His natures, taking their start from what is single, not trying to reduce two incompatible concepts to identity.' 1

Until one grasped the fact that Christ is one ontological reality in himself and that the distinction of natures must be made within this one reality, one would never understand the true character of the Incarnation. Nestorius never obtained this insight. Cyril of Alexandria did.

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just in appearance but in reality.

> 'Yet how is it not obvious to all that the Only-Begotten being God by nature has been made man, not by connection simply considered as external or accidental, but by true union, ineffable and passing understanding. And thus he is conceived of as One and only, and everything said befits him and all will be said of one person. For the Incarnate Nature of the Word himself is after the union now conceived as one, just as will reasonably be conceived in regard to ourselves too, for man is really one, compounded of unlike things, soul I mean and body. But it is necessary now to notify that we say that the body united to God the Word is insouled with a reasonable soul. And I will for profit's sake add this too: other than the Word out of God is the flesh, in regard to its proper nature, other again essentially the nature of the Word itself. But even though the things are sundered in diverseness of nature, yet is Christ conceived of as one out of both, the Godhead and manhood have come together one to another in true union.' 1

Whatever questions the above might raise, one thing is radically apparent: for Cyril Christ is one.

What is not so obvious is exactly what Cyril means by Christ being one. To Nestorius and the Antiochenes it was all too obvious that Cyril was an Apollinarian, or at least his understanding of the Incarnation and union was such that it demanded a change in the Logos and in the humanity as well. In the above passage, for example, the Antiochenes would seize upon two phrases which they believed would prove their point. It contains first of all Cyril's celebrated or notorious mia physis formula; and secondly, he speaks of 'one out of (ek)both.' If one interprets these two phrases from a Nestorian understanding of 'nature,' ^Cyril obviously is a heretic. To speak of 'one physis' could only mean to an Antiochene that the physis of the Logos and the physis of the manhood were united in such a way as to form a new tertium quid physis which is Christ, thus changing the Logos and the manhood. Cyril's 'one out of both (natures)' was the key to their interpretation for it implied that he, like them, conceived the human nature to be an individual concrete reality logically prior to the union. Believing then that Cyril's understanding of 'nature' was the same as

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1. Cyril of Alexandria, C. Nest. 2:proema. All quotations from Cyril are from the English translation, Cyril of Alexandria, On the Incarnation Against Nestorius. Library of the Fathers, (Oxford: James Parker and Co., 1881) unless otherwise noted. All following references are to Cyril unless otherwise noted.

theirs, it was only logical that they thought Cyril did what they rightly knew could not be done. Even though Cyril says he upholds the completeness of the natures, as the above passage exemplifies, and while he protests against any change in either, Nestorius attributes these statements to Cyril's confused and muddled mind.[1]

While Cyril championed the mia physis formula against Nestorius because he thought it came from Athanasius (actually it is from Apollinaris), it is obvious that it could cause confusion, especially in the light of his unfortunate phrase 'one out of both.' Nevertheless, it is possible to ascertain Cyril's true meaning.

Part of the confusion lies in the fact that Cyril uses two variants of the mia physis formula. In the more common formula, Cyril has the sesarkomene modify the mia physis/hypostasis. At other times, however, it modifies the tou theou Logou. Thus one can have mia physis/hypostasis tou theou logou sesarkomene or sesarkomenou. There may seem to be little difference in the two; however, what difference there is changes the emphasis and meaning of the formula.[2]

Before explicating the difference it must be noted that for Cyril physis and hypostasis are complementary concepts; thus he feels free to interchange them. Physis (not only) means 'nature' or 'essence' as it did for Nestorius, but also contains the note of actuating or giving life. However, for physis to be actuated it needs hypostasis which expresses the notion of existential being or reality. Taken together they express the ontological or metaphysical make-up of one individual existing being or reality.[3] Thus these concepts tend to express not only what something is: its essence or nature; but also who it is who is of such an essence or nature: the person. Thus when Cyril uses physis/hypostasis, he is speaking of one individual who is an ontological existing being or reality of a certain nature. However, depending on the context in which physis/hypostasis is used, the stress may be on one part of the total meaning rather than another.

Proceeding now to the two renditions of the formula, Cyril in both

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1. Cf. Nestorius, Bazaar, p. 327.
2. For examples of Cyril's use of and reference to the formula see Cyril of Alexandria, On the Incarnation against Nestorius, Library of the Fathers, p. 41. n. C; p. 341, n.i. Also see Hubert du Manoir de Jauye, Dogme et Spiritualité chez Saint Cyrille D'Alexandrie, (Paris: Vrin, 1944), pp. 124-141.
3. Cf. Grillmeier, p. 410-411.

instances speaks of mia physis/hypostasis tou theou logou. The meaning given to this depends on whether Cyril ends with sesarkomene or sesarkomenou. If he ends with sesarkomene, which then modifies the mia physis, he is saying that Christ is the one nature (person) of God the Word incarnate. The sesarkomene specifies the mode or manner of existing of the physis tou theou logou. The one nature (person) of the Logos exists as incarnate, as man. (It is easy to see that physis/hypostasis here tends to mean person in the Chalcedonian sense although Cyril does not fully come to this understanding. As will be seen the Chalcedonian understanding of person is more easily seen in Cyril's concept of the hypostatic union.)[1] However, when Cyril ends with sesarkomenou, which then modifies the tou theou logou, he is saying that Christ is one physis/hypostasis of the incarnate Word of God. He is stating that the Logos as incarnate forms or is one physis/hypostasis, one 'nature.' The one physis/hypostasis is the consequence of the union. This could be very close to, if not actually, Monophysitism. If Cyril is Monophysite, then Nestorius is correct. The physis of God and physis of man cannot remain what they are if they form the one physis of Christ. To understand what Cyril means in saying that the Logos as incarnate is one nature, it is necessary to see how he conceives the Incarnation.

When Cyril professes that Christ is one physis of God the Logos incarnate (sesarkomene),above all else he is proclaiming that God really became man. The physis of the Logos is incarnate, is man. As he states Against Nestorius:

> 'Shall we grant that the Word, God out of God, was incarnate, and say that he was made man? Or shall we allow this in no wise, but suppose that a man came hereto, connected with God, according to thee?....If he was truly incarnate and has been made flesh, he is accredited as man, and not connected with a man, by mere indwelling or eternal relation or connection.' 2

For the Logos to truly become man, demands that Christ be one.

> 'We say that the very Word essentially sprung forth from God the Father, was made as we and was incarnate and made man, that is, he took to himself a body from forth the holy Virgin, and made it

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1. Cf. Ibid.
2. C. Nest. 1:3.

> his own: for thus will he be truly one Lord Jesus Christ, thus let us worship him as one, not putting apart man and God, but believing that he is one and the same, in Godhead and in manhood, that is God alike and man.' 1

The Logos who has been from all eternity homoousion with the Father 'has been both sent and hath been made consubstantial with us, i.e., man.'[2] Thus what one sees in Cyril is the notion of 'become' (once more) taking on an ontological complexion. For the Logos to become man, to incarnate himself, terminates in the fact that the Logos is man. Christ is God as man. Christ then is one ontological being in himself. The names Jesus, Emmanuel, Christ denote one reality, the one physis of the Word of God incarnate.[3]

It is now possible to grasp what Cyril means when he uses the genitive sesarkomenou modifying tou theou logou. He is not so much giving or attributing to Christ one nature or essence in the sense of denoting one quiddity. He knows that Christ is not a composite tertium quid being: thus he is not using the formula in an Apollinarian or Monophysite sense. What Cyril is doing is making an ontological judgment concerning the being of Christ, rather than giving an essential definition of what Christ is. It is in the other variation of the formula that Cyril defines who Christ is--the one nature (person) of the Word incarnate (sesarkomene). For Cyril to say that Christ is 'one nature of the incarnate (sesarkomenou) Word of God' means that ontologically Christ is one being or reality in himself, and not that the nature or essence, the quiddity, of Christ is one. As Cyril states in a passage already quoted above:

> 'The nature (physis) of the Incarnate Word himself (e autou tou logou sesarkemenou) is after the union now conceived as one (mia), just as will reasonably be conceived in regard to ourselves too, for man is one, compounded of unlike things, soul I mean and body....One out of both.' 4

It is also clear now what Cyril means by 'out of both.' He is not using it in a Monophysite sense as Eutyches will; that is, out of two natures one composite tertium quid nature is formed. Rather, 'out of'

1. Ibid., 2: proema.
2. Ibid., 3:3. For further references to the fact that Christ is consubstantial with us see ibid. 3:3, 3:5.
3. Cf. Scholia de Incarn. Unigen. 1-3.
4. C. Nest. 2: proema.

the humanity and divinity one being or reality comes to be. This is the whole point behind his use of the now 'ancient' analogy of the union of body and soul. Cyril uses the analogy to illustrate not that the divine and human natures form a new composite nature such as manhood, but rather to show only that as the body and soul form the one reality of man, so the divine and human natures form the one individual reality of Christ.[1]

Cyril wishes this same point to be made when he refers to the union as 'natural' or 'according to nature.' The union is 'natural' in the sense that it results in one ontological being. Again as the union of body and soul is 'natural' forming the one reality of man, so the union of divinity and humanity is 'natural' forming the one reality of Christ.[2]

Cyril's use of physis/hypostasis and 'natural' in the above described sense can obviously cause a great deal of confusion and ambiguity not only for Nestorius, but also for the Alexandrians who come after him. Eutyches and the Monophysites will interpret the above use of the mia physis not as one ontological reality, but as one nature, one quiddity. Nevertheless, the point that Cyril is trying to make is legitimate and true. Christ is one being in himself. The 'becoming' must be such that Christ as the Logos incarnate is ontologically one.

The inevitable question now arises: How can Christ be ontologically one? How can the Logos ontologically become man without changing either himself or the manhood he has become? It does no good to say

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1. For examples of Cyril's use of the body/soul analogy cf., Scholia de Incarn. Unigen. 8 and 27. Cyril is aided in his use of the body/soul analogy since he has a Platonic understanding of the union between the two. In Platonic thought while the union between the two form one being (man), yet the soul is complete and entire in itself and maintains its unchanging integrity even in the union with the body. Thus for Cyril as the soul forms one reality in union with the body, and yet remain unchanged; so the Logos forms one reality with his manhood, and yet remains unchanged.
2. For examples of Cyril's use of 'natural union' see C. Nest. 2:1 and 13, also Ep. 45 ad Succens. 1, also Ep. ad Nest. 3 and appended 3rd Anath. Trans. of the last two references see The Seven Ecumenical Councils, ed. H.R. Percival, Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, Second Series, Vol. 14, (Oxford: James Parker & Co., 1900). All translations of Cyril's letters to Nestorius are taken from this volume.

that Christ is one if the one he is is neither God nor man. As Nestorius knew so well, his oneness must be such that he is both God and man or a true Incarnation has not occurred.

Cyril insists throughout that the Logos does not change in becoming man.

> 'God the Word full by nature and in every way perfect....(is) in no wise wronged in his own proper nature, nor changed so as to become otherwise, nor made in ought inferior, for inconvertible and unchangeable is himself even as he who begot him....But when he was made flesh, i.e. man, he made....the poverty of the human nature his own....in that he was once made man, albeit he remained God.' 1

It is 'unlearned and exceedingly unholy to think that it [become or was made] means change, rather (one must) strive to conceive of it in some other way, and to turn to wisdom to what most especially befits and is congruous to the unchangeable God.'[2] While Christ is

> 'one living thing,' [nevertheless], 'as often....as we hear that the Word was made Flesh, let us conceive of man made out of soul and body. But the Word being God was made perfect man....Hence we say not by mutation or change has the Word of God been made man, nor yet that it recked not of being God (how could it be so?) but that taking flesh of a woman and united to it from the womb, he proceeded forth the same, Man and God....' 3

For Cyril the Logos must be immutable both because he is God, and because it is God who is man. Commenting on Jn. 1:14 Cyril states:

> 'For he (John) said that the Word was flesh, showing the force of the true union, i.e. understood as one "of person," and by saying he "tabernacled among us," he does not allow us to conceive that the Word who is from God by nature passed into flesh which is of the earth. For one not thoroughly exact as to what the divine nature which surpasses everything generate is, might (I suppose) have deemed that it was haply recipient of change and could become regardless of its own essentially-accruing goods, and change....into something other than what it is, and be brought down to the measure of the creation, subjected....to changes and alterations. But that this is utterly impossible (for the nature of God is established and hath unshaken abidence in that where in it is), he (John) hath testified saying, that the "Word tabernacled among us," albeit made flesh: both skillfully explaining the wisdom of the economy and guarding full well that the nature of the Word be not accused by any as though it had become flesh by change and turning aside.' 4

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1. Scholia de Incarn. Unigen. 5.
2. Quod unus sit Christus, (trans. p. 241), (S.C. 718:a).
3. Scholia de Incarn. Unigen. 27.
4. C. Nest. 1: proema. Cf. ibid. 1:8.

What one sees in the above quotations is Cyril echoing Nestorius' arguments presented earlier. The Logos must be immutable because he is God and for God to be God he must contain all perfection. Containing all perfection, it is impossible for him to acquire new perfection through change and alteration. Moreover, Cyril professes Nestorius' second argument for the immutability of the Logos, though not in quite so explicit a way. Cyril says that John added 'and tabernacled among us' to show that the Logos did not change in becoming man. What Cyril is pointing out is that if it is God who is man then he cannot change in so becoming. If he did then one can not say that it is God who is in our midst, who tabernacles among us, but rather that which he has changed into. While God can be in our midst only if he really becomes flesh, at the same time he must remain unchanged if it is really God who is in our midst.

With the same force Cyril maintains that the manhood does not undergo change either in the Incarnation. Not only is it impossible for the flesh to change into the nature of God since what is created cannot become uncreated, but also, even if the flesh could and did change into the nature of God, then one could not say that God truly became and is man.[1] 'If his [Logos] flesh changed into the Nature of the Godhead, he ceased to be Son of Man....'[2] The humanity must remain unchanged for the same reason as the divinity: because it is God who is man. Neither will some sort of mixture do.

> 'If they say that flesh has been commingled with the Word, there is every need of saying that each of the above mentioned leaves being what it was, and makes up of both some one intermediate thing, of a different nature full surely from what each was individually and as yet unmingled one with another.' 3

The heart of Cyril's Christology has now been reached. Cyril realises that for a true understanding of the Incarnation the 'becoming' must be such that it not only allows for the fact that God is man, that Christ, as one ontological being, is God incarnate; but he also realises

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1. Cf. Frag. C. Synous. (p. 367). This and following fragments are collected and translated in Cyril of Alexandria, On the Incarnation against Nestorius, Library of the Fathers. Page reference is to this volume.
2. Ibid., (p. 371). Cf. ibid., (pp. 367, 369, 370).
3. Ibid., (p. 373). Cf. C. Nest., 5:4.

that for a true understanding of the Incarnation the 'becoming' must be such that God remains God in the 'becoming' if it is God who is man, and likewise, the manhood must remain unchanged if it is man that God has become. Patristic Christological development has finally reached the ultimate question in Cyril. How does one conceive of such a notion of 'become,' a notion of 'become' that guarantees that the Logos is man, that it is the Logos who is man, and that it is man that the Logos is? Has Cyril conceived 'become' in such a way that such a *union* is effected?

From what Cyril says concerning the Incarnation and what he wishes to maintain as already delineated in the above study of his Christology, it is obvious that he at least wishes to understand 'become' and the ensuing union in such a way. However, he does not fully explicate the notion of 'become' that he knows must be necessary if one is to grasp a true understanding of the Incarnation. Nonetheless, one can determine how Cyril conceives 'become' not only from what he explicitly says about it, but also from the way he conceives the union effected by the 'become.'

For Cyril, as has been seen, the same Logos, who exists from all eternity with the Father before the union, now, after the union, exists as man. 'The same even before the Incarnation was Son of God and Word of the Father, and after it hath become man as we and been made flesh.'[1] The Logos exists as God 'before the ages....at the end Man also....'[2] It is the Logos 'who before the incarnation is called....only-begotten, Word, God....after the incarnation, man, Christ Jesus....'[3] *It* is one and the same Logos 'who is homoousion with us in that he has been made man....' and yet he is also homoousion with the Father himself, in that he remained God even in human nature....'[4] In a series of rhetorical questions Cyril asks:

> 'Who is it who receives the servant's form which before it was free by nature, he is found to be man also who was not so, before he was so found when he was not? Who then is he that was rich by nature and abased himself into lowliness? Who the full, that he may be conceived as emptied?....Who that not being aforetime man as we is said to be found?' 5

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1. C. Nest. 2:10. Cf. ibid., 2:6.
2. Frag. C. Theod. Mops. (p. 338).
3. Scholia de Incarn. Unigen.
4. C. Nest. 3:3.
5. Ibid., 5:2.

The Incarnation for Cyril does not bring into existence a new person, but rather the Incarnation is the same person existing in a new way. To become incarnate then does not mean 'that the nature of the Word was changed and became flesh, or that it was converted into a whole man consisting of soul and body; but rather that the Word having personally united to himself flesh animated by a rational soul, did in an ineffable and inconceivable manner become man....'[1] Thus 'the Word of God....was made hypostatically one flesh....'[2] Christ is 'the one person of the Word of God incarnate.' Christ is the Logos, God himself, existing as man.

What one sees in the above is Cyril's attempt to define what it means for the Logos to become man, to become incarnate. 'Become' does not mean that the Logos is some way changes into man. The 'becoming' is not, what might be called, an essential becoming, i.e. the essence or nature of one being does not change into the essence or nature of another being. There is no exchange of quiddities. Neither what the Logos is (God) nor what he becomes (man) undergoes change. What 'become' does mean is that the Logos takes on a new mode of existence. 'To become man' means for Cyril 'to come to be man,' and thus to exist as man. The incarnational 'becoming' is a personal/existential becoming, i.e. one and the same person comes to be, comes to exist in a new manner or mode. In the act of coming to be man the Logos brings into being (by the power of the Holy Spirit and the Virgin Mary), individuates, and unites to himself a human nature, and thus comes to exist as man.

The whole point of Cyril's emphasis on the pre- and post-incarnational status of the Logos and also his emphasis that it is one and the same Logos who is God and man is to highlight and make evident the fact that 'to become man' denotes not a change of nature, but a new manner of existence for the Logos. In understanding the Incarnation as the Logos personally or hypostatically uniting to himself a human nature, Cyril takes the 'becoming' out of the realm of natures changing from one thing to another thing and places the 'becoming' in the realm of personal existence. The person of the Logos existing as God in hypostatically uniting to himself human nature comes to exist as man. What the Logos is: God, and what the Logos becomes: man, in no way undergoes change. What is new is the manner in which the person of

1. Ep. ad Nest. 2.
2. Ibid. 3.

the Logos exists.

The whole tenor of the mia physis formula is such that it emphasises one fact: For the Logos to become man means that he Logos comes to be man, to exist as man. The sesarkomene does not denote any change in the Logos, but rather specifies in what manner the Logos is--as incarnate, as man. Paraphrasing Cyril's formula Sellers states: 'Jesus Christ the eternal Logos himself has become flesh, and that he is still one and the same person, though that same person now incarnate.'[1]

Cyril's understanding of the incarnational act is a real Christological breakthrough. In seeing the incarnational act as the Logos hypostatically uniting to himself a human nature and thus coming to exist and be man allows him to maintain both the proper oneness and duality in Christ. Christ is one and the same person of the Logos existing in two different modes: as God and as Man. The distinction between the natures (what the Logos is) is not made prior to or outside the incarnational act or the one reality of Christ as Nestorius would have it. Nor does the incarnational act, 'the becoming,' abolish the distinction of natures. Rather the distinction is established in the incarnational act itself and maintained within the one being of Christ. The very act of the Logos coming to be man, which establishes that Christ is one being: the Logos incarnate, also establishes and maintains the dual distinction of natures, or dual modes in which the Logos exists: as God and as man. Thus for Cyril Christ is one person in two natures. Cyril logically and in truth can say: 'The very Word essentially sprung forth from God the Father, was made as we and as incarnate and made man....He (Logos) is one and the same, in Godhead and in manhood, that is God alike and man.'[2]

From Cyril's understanding of the Incarnation it is obvious why he attacked so vehemently Nestorius' denial of Theotokos. Since it is one and the same person who is God and man, it is only right and proper to understand that the 'holy virgin brought forth corporally God made one with flesh....for this reason we also call her Theotokos.[3] Cyril in no way wants to imply that Mary was the Mother of God qua God, but rather because the Logos who is God is really man also, one must

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1. R.V. Sellers, The Council of Chalcedon, pp. 138-139.
2. C. Nest. 2: proema.
3. Ep. ad Nest. 3. Cf. C. Nest. 1:1.

say that Mary is the Mother of God (qua man). As Cyril states: The Fathers called

> 'the Holy Virgin Mother of God, not as if the nature of the Word or his divinity had its beginning from the Holy Virgin, but because of her was born that holy body with a rational soul, to which the Word being personally united is said to be born according to the flesh.' 1

Moreover it was not only the title Theotokos that interested Cyril, but like Nestorius, he was concerned with the whole question of the communication of idioms. Flowing from his understanding of who Christ is--the Logos incarnate, it was all too clear to Cyril that the Logos must be the subject of all divine and human attributes and predicates. 'All the words in the Gospel are to be applied to one person, to one hypostasis of the Word Incarnate. For the Lord Jesus Christ is one, according to the Scriptures.'[2] Cyril is able to justify this only because he has clarified the true understanding of what it means for the Logos to become man.

Before proceeding however it must be pointed out that unlike Athanasius who was at least ambiguous about Christ's human soul, and unlike Apollinaris who denied it outright, Cyril not only affirms that Christ has a human soul, but also makes it an intricate part of what it means to be man.

> 'He makes his own all that belongs, as to his own body, so to the soul, for he had to be shown to be like us through every circumstance both physical and mental, and we consist of rational soul and body: and as there are times when in the incarnation he permitted his own flesh to experience its own affections, so again he permitted the soul to experience its proper affections, and he observed the scale of the emptying in every respect.' 3

For Cyril the flesh of Christ is 'animated by a rational soul' and thus, unlike Apollinaris, the humanity of Christ has its own natural principle of existence.[4] Even though Cyril still understands the body/soul

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1. Ep. ad Nest. 2. Cf. Scholia de Incarn. Unigen. 28.
2. Ep. and Nest. 3.
3. Cf. De Recta Fide, 176, C,D, (trans. Prestige, Fathers and Heretics, p. 166).
4. Ep. ad Nest. 2. Cf. Scholia de Incarn. Unigen. 8.

relationship in a Platonic sense, he nevertheless sees that the soul participates in the affairs of the body, and is the 'natural principle of suffering.'[1]

Because Cyril lets the human soul fulfil its function, he is not caught in the illogic of the Apollinarian Christology. As has been seen, because Apollinaris denied the human soul and saw the union of the Logos and flesh as substantial and dynamic, logic demanded either a denial of the divinity of the Logos in order to save the real human attributes, or a denial of the real human attributes to save the divinity of the Logos. Cyril's understanding of the true functioning of the soul escapes the Apollinarian dilemma.

The above, however, is preliminary to Cyril's exposition of the manner in which human characteristics are attributed to the Logos. Following the above quotation on the birth of Christ, Cyril continues:

> 'We say that he [ths Logos] suffered and rose again; not as if God the Word suffered in his own nature stripes, the piercing of the nails, or any other wounds, for the divine nature is incapable of suffering, inasmuch as it is incorporial, but since that which had become his own body in this way, he is also said to suffer for us....In the same manner also we conceive respecting his dying....' 2

What is important to grasp is that Cyril is not attributing human attributes such as suffering and death to the divine nature, but to the person of the Logos. To attribute human predicates to the divine nature implies not only that the Logos qua God is passible, but also that the Logos qua God in becoming man and existing as man changed. As was seen above, the person of the Logos came to be man, and thus is man without change or mutation. The union is in the person, it is hypostatic, and thus it not only guarantees that the Logos as God is immutable in becoming man, but also remains impassible in his divine nature even as man. Cyril brings this out in his somewhat paradoxical statement that the Logos 'suffers impassibly.'

> 'He [Logos] suffered without suffering....If we should say that through conversion or mutation of his own nature *into* flesh, it would be in all ways necessary for us even against our will to confess that the hidden and divine nature was

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1. Ep. 46, ad Succens. 2, (Acta Conciliorium Oecumenicorum, I, 1, 6, 158: 13-18).
2. Ep. ad Nest. 2.

> passible. But if he has remained unchanged albeit he has been made man as we, and it be a property of the heavenly nature that it cannot suffer, and the passible body has become his own through the union: He suffers when the body suffers, in that it is said to be his own body, he remains impassible in that it is truly his property to be unable to suffer.' 1

The point Cyril is making is that in the Incarnation the person of the Logos really came to be man; and thus as man he really undergoes all that pertains to man. However, it is only as man, in that manner or mode of existence, that the Logos is born, suffers, etc. precisely because the Logos came to be man and was not changed into man. One and the same person is also God, and in that manner or mode of existence he remains impassible. As Cyril states: 'He suffers humanly in the flesh as man, he is impassible divinely as God.'[2] To say 'God suffers' simply means that God the Logos <u>as man</u> actually suffers. Thus 'Whoever shall not recognise that the Word of God suffered in the flesh, that he was crucified in the flesh and that likewise in that same flesh he tasted death, and that he became the first-born from the dead....: let him be anathema.'[3]

In conclusion, the difficulty so long ago articulated by Celsus is overcome by Cyril. For Celsus one either had to profess Docetism or a change in God.[4] In Cyril's Christology it is possible to grasp that the Logos really did become man without changing his divinity. The Logos <u>is</u> God and <u>is</u> man.

D. <u>Ephesus and the Aftermath</u>

Ephesus was called upon to judge between Nestorius and Cyril. However, unlike Nicea and Constantinople I, it did not form a new creed. Nevertheless, what it did do was important. Nestorius denied that Mary is the Mother of God, and in so doing implied that God did not really become man. Ephesus anathematised this and professed that Cyril's understanding of the Nicene Creed was the correct understanding.

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1. <u>Scholia De Incarn. Unigen.</u> 37, (pp. 232-233).
2. <u>Ibid.</u>, 36.
3. <u>Ep. ad Nest.</u> 3, Anath. 12.
4. Cf. Origen, <u>C. Cels.</u> 4:18.

Ephesus proclaimed what Nicea proclaim:

> '"One and the same is the eternal Son of the Father and the Son of the Virgin Mary, born in time after the flesh; therefore she may rightly be called Mother of God."....
> This was the dogma of Ephesus....Divine life with the Father, descent to the earth, incarnation and humanity must be predicated of one and the same subject, the Logos who is homoousios with the Father.' 1

It was Cyril's Second Letter to Nestorius, officially accepted by the Council of Ephesus, that demanded that Nicea should thus be understood.

> 'The holy and great Synod (Nicea) therefore says, that the only begotten Son, born according to nature of God the Father, very God of very God....came down, and was incarnate, and was made man, suffered and rose....and ascended into heaven....
> This expression, however, "the Word was made flesh," can mean nothing else but that he partook of flesh and blood like us; he made our body his own, and came forth man from woman, not casting off his existence as God, or his generation of God the Father, but even in taking to himself flesh remaining what he was....therefore they (Fathers) venture to call the holy virgin, the Mother of God....because of her was born that holy body with a rational soul, to which the Word being personally united is said to be born according to the Flesh.' 2

For Ephesus, as for Cyril, the primary reason for refuting Nestorius and attributing all to the one subject is the fact that God the Logos did not come into man, but that he truly came to be man and exist as man, while remaining God. Ephesus sanctioned Cyril's metaphysical intuition that Christ is one ontological being and that the distinction between who he is and the manner in which he is must be made within the one reality. Thus the Logos is properly the subject of all predicates which pertain to his two modes of existence. As Pelikan states:

> 'In intent if not in all details the Fathers joined themselves to the position that "the Logos from God the Father was united to the flesh in a hypostatic way, and that with his own flesh he is the one Christ, the same one simultaneously God and Man." It was wrong to assign some of the statements of Christ about himself, or those of the saints about him, to one or the other

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1. Grillmeier, p. 416. Cf. Pelikan, p. 261.
2. Ep. ad Nest. 2.

hypostasis rather than to the single Christ.'[1]

The Council of Ephesus did little however to bring about peace or unanimity in Christological thought. This was due to the fact that Ephesus did not go far enough in clarifying Christological concepts and terminology. Cyril not only maintained his ambiguous language, but his Third Letter to Nestorius with its Twelve Anathemas was also the catalyst for an intensification of the controversy. Nestorius and his followers felt sure that Cyril's Council of Ephesus was Apollinarian.[2]

For Theodoret the major problem and concern is no longer over the human soul of Christ, but over the immutable and impassible nature of God. In his critical commentary on Cyril's anathemas Theodoret is motivated by one major concern:

> 'All we who follow the words of the evangelists state that God the Word was not made flesh by nature, nor yet was changed into flesh, for the Divine is immutable and invariable....It is plain that,...the form of God was not changed into the form of a servant.' [To speak of a hypostatic union with one hypostasis means that] 'there was a mixture of flesh and Godhead....(and) mixture is of necessity followed by confusion and the confusion destroys the individuality of each nature.' 3

Thus it was not the Logos 'who suffered but the man assumed of us by God.'[4]

The only step toward clarification and understanding was the shortlived peace brought about by the Formula Unionis of 433. The

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1. Pelikan, p. 261. Crowe states the same, 'The governing factor is simply the scriptural datum that the one who is eternal is the same one who is born temporally. And it is this what gave the hypostatic union its meaning; the order was not the other way around.' 'Christology and Contemporary Philosophy,' God, Jesus, Spirit, (New York: Herder and Herder, 1969), p. 145.
2. Cf. Theodoret of Cyrus, Ep. 150 ad Joannes Antiochi and Ep. 157, Relatio Orientalis Conciliabuli. Trans. Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, Vol. 3, 2nd Ser., Theodoret, Jerome, Gennadius, Rufinus, (Oxford: James Parker and Co., 1892). All English quotations from Theodoret are from this volume unless otherwise stated.
3. Theodoret, Reprehensio, 1 and 2, in Cyril of Alexandria, Apol. ctr. Theodoret. See also, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 10. (ACO I, 1, 6, 107-146).
4. Ibid., 12.

importance of this document lies not in any theological development, but rather in the clarification of theological terminology and concepts which would lead to Chalcedon's definition. Cyril and John of Antioch could agree that:

> 'We confess, then, our Lord Jesus Christ the only-begotten Son of God, perfect God and perfect man, consisting of rational soul and body, begotten of the Father before the ages as to his Godhead, and on the last days the same, for us and for our salvation, of Mary the Virgin as to his manhood; the same homoousios with the Father as to his Godhead, and homoousios with us as to his manhood....We confess the holy Virgin to be Theotokos because the divine Logos was incarnate and made man....' 1

The breakthrough here was the recognition by Cyril of the true and clear distinction of natures with no confusion and mixture, and his willingness to lay aside his mia physis formula. On the Antiochene's part they were willing to confess one and the same was God and man, and thus 'one Christ, One Son, One Lord.' With this clarification both sides began to grasp the insights of the other. However, it must be pointed out that while the two sides could give assent to the wording of this document, and while they began to understand one another, it would be false to presume that each understood the Formula Unionis in exactly the same way. This is evident by the mere fact that it was only a short time later that Theodoret and Cyril were engaged once more in the controversy.

With the death of Cyril (444) and the rise of the radical Alexandrians, Dioscorus and Eutyches, Theodoret once more takes up the attack in his three Dialogues called Eranistes in which he treats 'The Immutable,' 'The Unconfounded,' and 'The Impassible.' As Theodoret states:

> 'For clearness' sake I will divide my book into three dialogues. The first will contain the contention that the Godhead of the only begotten Son is immutable. The second will by God's help show that the union of the Godhead and the manhood of the Lord Christ is without confusion. The third will contend for the impassibility of the divinity of our Saviour.' 2

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1. Formula Unionis. Denziger-Schönmetzer, 271, 272. Trans. Grillmeier, p. 432. The main architect of the Formula seems to be Theodoret of Cyrus.
2. Theodoret, Eranistes, 1.

While Theodoret states very clearly the Antiochene position (far more clearly and precisely than Nestorius) there is really little new in theological substance. Theodoret can expound all the reasons why the Logos must remain immutable in becoming man, why the union must not fuse and confuse the natures, and why the Logos as God is impassible; but he begs the real question concerning the Logos' truly becoming man and existing as man, and thus being the subject of all the human experiences.

Theodoret does come to the point of speaking of one person (prosopon), but this prosopon is again the result of the union between the divine and human natures. 'We preach so close an union of Godhead and of manhood as to understand one person undivided.'[1] Theodoret continues to hold a phenomenological notion of person. Person is what one sees: the countenance. Thus the one person of Christ is the one combined appearance of God and Man. 'When we are discussing the person we must then make what is proper to the natures common and apply both sets of qualities to the Saviour....'[2] Grillmeier states:

> 'This prosopon is constituted by the union of Word and manhood--one might almost say by making the two of equal status....His picture of Christ is built up too symetrically and is not constructed clearly enough around the hypostasis of the Logos. For him, the common subject of the sayings is "Christ" (as the conjunction of the two natures), so that here the divine and human expressions are really justified, as of one subject. On the other hand, he will not make the Logos the common subject of the divine and human sayings.' 3

Theodoret, while he is close to Cyril in wording, has not yet grasped Cyril's metaphysical insight that the Logos really came to be man and exists as man.

In Alexandria, to the horror of the Antiochenes, Eutyches proclaimed: 'I confess that before the union our Lord had two natures, but after the union I confess one single nature.' The Robber Synod (449) followed suit in saying: 'Whoever teaches two natures, let him be anathema.'[4] It is difficult to ascertain exactly how Eutyches conceived this one

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1. Ibid., 3.
2. Ibid., 2.
3. Grillmeier, p. 425.
4. Acts of the Council of Chalcedon, 527 and 492-493, (ACO, 2, I, 1:143 and 140).

nature, but what is certain is that no matter how he did conceive it, the union cannot uphold the immutable divinity of the Logos nor the complete humanity. Eutyches readily admits that Christ's humanity is not consubstantial with our own.[1]

The source of Eutyches' problem is the fact that he did not understand Cyril's notion of what it means for the Logos to become man, and exist as man. Unlike Cyril, Eutyches understands the mia physis formula to mean that Christ has one nature in the sense of one quiddity. Paradoxically Eutyches seems to conceive of the human nature in almost the same way as Nestorius did. Like Nestorius, Eutyches conceives the human nature as existing, at least mentally and logically, prior to the union. However, where Nestorius refused to fuse the two together, Eutyches did.

The key to this interpretation is Eutyches' phrase 'before the union our Lord had two natures.' Before the union there was neither 'Our Lord,' nor a human nature. There was only the Logos qua Logos. The human nature did not exist outside the Incarnation nor can it be conceived to exist logically and mentally prior to the Incarnation. The incarnational act is not the fusion of two 'realities,' but rather the Logos bringing into being and uniting to himself a human nature, and thus coming to be man. The distinction is established in the very act of becoming and maintained within the union effected, and not outside or before it. Eutyches, as all real Monophysites, understands 'become' not in Cyril's personal and existential sense of 'coming to be,' as taking on a new mode of existence, but rather in an essentialist sense of pertaining to natures in some way coming together forming one quiddity. Understanding 'become' in this way always demands change and mutation, both in the divinity and humanity. The Antiochenes were very much aware of this and so was Pope Leo the Great.

Pope Leo in his Tome to Flavian is 'astonished' over Eutyches' formula of 'two natures before' and 'one after.'[2] For Leo: Christ is not 'out of two natures' but rather:

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1. Cf. E. Schartz. Der Prozes des Eutyches. (Sitzb. Bay. Akad. Wiss., Phil. hist. 1929, 5), 15.
2. Pope Leo I, Tomus ad Flavian, (trans. from Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, Vol. 14, Second Series).

> 'While the distinction of both natures and substances was preserved, both are united in one person....The same who, remaining in the form of God....was made man in the form of a servant. For each of the natures retains its proper character without defect; and as the form of God does not take away the form of a servant, so the form of a servant does not impair the form of God.' [Later Leo writes:] 'For the self same who is very God, is also very Man....(since) the Word does not withdraw from equality with the Father in glory, so the flesh does not abandon the nature of our kind.... This unity of person....is to be understood as existing in both the natures.' 1

As the above demonstrates, Leo, like Cyril, understands the Incarnation as the person of the Logos existing in two modes or manners: as God ans as man. Once more the Incarnation centres on the person and his manner of existing and not on the union of natures. Thus Leo can uphold both the ontological unity of Christ as well as the integrity of the natures.

With this understanding of Christ, Leo can in rythmic style predicate divine and human characteristics of one and the same person. Because the Logos is both God and man

> 'Lowliness was assumed by majesty, weakness by power, mortality by eternity; and in order to pay the debt of our condition, the inviolable nature was united to a passible one....(that) Christ Jesus might from one element be incapable of dying and also from the other capable. Therefore in the entire and perfect nature of very man was born very God, whole in what was his, whole in what was ours.' 2

As Grillmeier states: 'One and the same is God and man, twofold in nature but one in person. This unity of person is the point on which the pendulum of Leo's diphysite approach swings.'[3]

The stage is now set for Chalcedon. Eutyches has brought the problem of unity and diversity once more to the fore. The Council of Ephesus' lack of a precise formulation, the break down of the Formula Unionis, the failure of the Synod of Constantinople in 448, and the fiasco of the Robber Council, all demanded a new Council and a 'new' creed.

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1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.
3. Grillmeier, p. 467.

E. The Council of Chalcedon

The Fathers came together at Chalcedon to express and profess clearly who Christ is in himself. As in the earlier councils the main difficulty resided not in a doubt as to what the faith is, but rather in conceiving and rendering the faith in such a way as to leave no doubt as to what the faith is. The problem was conceptual and linguistic. It resided in how to conceive and express the unity and diversity in Christ.

The Council reaffirmed the Creed of Nicea, as well as Cyril's interpretation of it as found in his Second Letter to Nestorius. It also canonized Leo's Tome as expressing the true faith. With these as their basis the Council Fathers set forth their own exposition of who Christ is.

The key phrase for this study is that 'One and the same Christ, Son....[is] made known in two natures [which exist] without confusion, without change, without division, without separation....concurring into one prosopon and one hypostasis.'[1] The Council professes that Christ is God the Logos become man and in so doing neither what he is (God) nor what he became (man) is confused or changed. Moreover, neither are they divided nor separated. To fully understand what the Council means by this and how it can say this one must understand what goes before.

First of all, for Chalcedon the terms 'nature' and 'person' do not denote diverse 'things' or 'components' out of which Christ is somehow formed. Christ is not one person (the Logos) attached to or made up of two 'things' called natures, one divine and one human. The concepts 'person' and 'nature' are not Christological building blocks or arithmetic integers. One does not pull together two natures and then proceed to place a person on top or between them. Nor is Christ the sum of two natures and one person. Rather the concepts of 'person' and 'nature' for Chalcedon are metaphysical and ontological denoting who is and the manner in which the who is. This is clearly seen in the first part of the Chalcedonean Creed.

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1. Denzinger-Schönmetzer, 301, 302. Trans. R.V. Sellers, The Council of Chalcedon, pp. 210-211.

For Chalcedon the one historical being, Jesus Christ, is 'One and the same Son' who is 'perfect in Godhead (and) perfect in manhood.' The same Son is 'truly God and truly man.' The same Son is 'homoousios with the Father' and 'homoousios with us.' The same Son who was 'begotten of the Father before ages as to his Godhead' is 'in the last days (begotten)....of Mary the Virgin Theotokos as to his manhood.' What Chalcedon is stressing in almost repetitious monotony is that Jesus Christ is the one Son, the Logos existing in two ways or modes: as God and as man. The stress on the 'one and same' is to make clear that the Son who is God as the Father is God is likewise the same Son who is man as man is man. In saying that the Son is Homoousios with the Father and with man, the Council is not conceiving of ousia (substance) as a block or hunk of 'stuff,' as if Christ possessed a hunk of divine substance and a hunk of human substance, but rather specifying what the Logos is: fully God and fully man.

Likewise when the Council speaks of one person and two natures, what it is distinguishing is who is, i.e. the Logos; and the manner in which the who is, i.e. as God and man. Again nature, like ousia is not conceived as something apart from the Logos and to which the Logos is attached or made out of, but rather for Chalcedon to be 'in two natures' is to be God and man, the term 'nature' denotes what the Logos is.

The whole Counciliar discussion over the preposition ek (out of) or en (in) centres on this point. Christ is not made 'out of' a union of two previously separate things one called a divine nature and the other called a human nature as if 'a nature' was some sort of thing in itself apart from the Logos. To say that Christ is 'made known in two natures' indicates that the Logos who exists as God now exists as man also, and reveals himself as being both.[1]

It is at this point that one can grasp how Chalcedon understands the notion of 'become'. Because the Council Fathers understand Christ to be the one person of the Logos existing in two ways, as God and as man, one can see that like Cyril, they do not understand 'become' in a way that implies a change of natures. The Logos does not change his

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1. Over the confusion concerning which Chalcedon chose: ek or en, because of documentary discrepancies see Sellers, The Council of Chalcedon, pp. 120-121, fn. 6. Cf. Denzinger-Schönmetzer, 302 fn.

nature, what he is, from God to man. Nor does what he becomes; man, change in some way into the nature of God. Rather Chalcedon understands 'become' as an existential/personal concept denoting that the Logos has taken on a new mode of existence, that the Logos has come to be man. Chalcedon even rids this understanding of Cyril's ambiguity. The Council is opting for 'in two natures' rather than 'out of two natures' clarifies the fact that what the Logos is (God) and what he comes to be (man) is not changed or confused in the 'becoming' but rather the 'becoming' maintains the fact that the Logos remains God and establishes the fact that the Logos comes to be and is truly and fully man. To be 'out of two natures' implies that the becoming forms a tertium quid nature which in turn implies confusion and change. To be 'in two natures' means that God the Logos comes to be and continues to be man.

It is now possible to understand what the Council means when it states that the natures exist 'without confusion, without change, without division, without separation.' There is no confusion or change because the 'becoming' does not pertain to a union of natures, but to the mode of existence of a person. Thus Christ is God the Logos existing as man, and his modes of existing, his two natures, what he is, remain unchanged and unconfused. In like manner since the 'becoming' established what the Logos is, what he is not only remains unconfused and unchanged, but also undivided and unseparated. The natures 'concur into one prosopon and one hypostasis.' Thus it is within the one reality of Christ that the unity of Person and distinction of natures is made.

It is obvious that with regards to the passibility of the Logos, the Council has upheld Cyril. As Grillmeier states: 'Chalcedon leaves no doubt that the one Logos (person) is subject of both human and divine predicates.'[1] This is so precisely because Chalcedon clearly perceives that it is the one Logos who is truly God and man. Thus the Logos as God remains impassible, but since he is man also, he is truly passible. Because the natures exist without confusion and change the Logos as God remains impassible. Moreover, while the natures exist without confusion or change, they nevertheless are not divided or separated, but concur in one person. Thus one and the same Logos can

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1. Grillmeier, p. 490.

truly be said to thirst, hunger, suffer, and die, etc., as man.

In closing this chapter, it should be pointed out that while Cyril and Chalcedon may have been able to conceive of 'become' is such a way as to imply that there is no change in the immutability of God, and yet that the Logos really did come to be man, and while they were able to conceive of the unity and distinction in the one Christ without confusion, change, division, or separation (especially Chalcedon), they did not in any way destroy the mystery of the Incarnation. One can still ask, either in doubt or amazement: 'Who ever heard of such a notion of "become"? Who ever heard of one person existing as God and as man?'

CHAPTER 3

THOMISTIC CHRISTOLOGY: 'BECOME' AS A MIXED RELATION

While this chapter is concerned with Saint Thomas Aquinas, it would be a mistake to suppose that Christology came to a halt with Chalcedon and only began to develop again with Aquinas. Space was the determining factor in skipping the intervening years. While the problem discussed in this paper lost a great deal of its urgency and controversial atmosphere with the invasion of the Moslems into Egypt and the subsequent demise of the Monophysite movement as a powerful force in the Empire, it nevertheless remained part and parcel of all Christological discussion.[1]

A. Anselm of Canterbury

This can be very clearly seen if one takes a brief look at the 'Father of Scholasticism' St. Anselm of Canterbury (1033-1100). While Anselm in Cur Deus Homo is primarily remembered for his soteriological theory, it is constructed precisely to answer the criticisms of the infidels who see the Incarnation not only as dishonourable to God, but also as incompatible with his divinity. As related by Boso:

> 'Infidels ridiculing our simplicity charge upon us that we do injustice and dishonor to God when we affirm that he descended into the womb of the virgin, that he was born of woman, that he grew on the nourishment of milk and the food of men; and, passing over many other things which seem incompatible with Deity, that he endured fatigue, hunger, thirst, stripes and crucifixion among thieves.' 2

The problem raised by the infidels is hardly a new one. It is precisely the one discussed here. Does not God change in becoming man,

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1. For post-Chalcedonian studies in Eastern Christology see W.H.C. Frend, The Rise of the Monophysite Movement, (Cambridge: University Press, 1972). John Meyendorff, Christ in Eastern Christian Thought, (Washington: 1969). Jaroslav Pelikan, The Christian Tradition 2: The Spirit of Eastern Christendom (600-1700), (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974).
2. St. Anselm, Cur Deus Homo, I, 3. Trans. St. Anselm: Basic Writings, trans., S.N. Deane (La Salle: Open Court Press, 1968).

and is not his impassible nature then passible? Anselm's approach in answering their criticism nevertheless is unique.

Without going into the details of Anselm's soteriology (which would lead into a controversy far afield from this present study) the premises Anselm wishes to establish in order to defend the Incarnation are easy to ascertain. For Anselm man's sin so violates the honour of God that only God can restore and make satisfaction for the loss since once man has sinned he is unable to restore himself to a condition in which he can properly give God the honour and love deserved. Nevertheless, because it is man who has sinned the obligation of restoring God's honour falls directly upon man's shoulders. Thus for Anselm sin has created a situation in which 'None but God can make satisfaction....But none but a man ought to do this.'[1] What is needed therefore, in order to break the dilemma, is a person who is both God and man. As Anselm states: 'If it is necessary, therefore, as it appears, that the heavenly kingdom be made up of men, and this cannot be effected unless the aforesaid satisfaction be made, which none but God can make and none but man ought to make, it is necessary for the God-man to make it.'[2] Thus, Hopkins is correct when he states:

> 'In a sense, the entire Cur Deus Homo is directed towards proving this thesis. For Anselm thinks that if he can show the impossibility of human redemption's occuring other than through the agency of a God-man, he will have removed the stigma which seems to accompany the notion of incarnation.'[3]

Thus the criticisms of the infidels that the Incarnation dishonours God are somewhat assuaged.

Flowing from his soteriological premises Anselm's Christology demands both that God really become man, and yet at the same time neither God nor what God becomes: man, must undergo change or mutation. Anselm very clearly brings out the full implications of his theory as follows:

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1. Ibid., II, 6.
2. Ibid.
3. Jasper Hopkins, A Companion to the Study of St. Anselm, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1972). p. 187. Also Anselm of Canterbury: Trinity, Incarnation, and Redemption: Theological Treatises, ed. and trans., J. Hopkins and H.W. Richardson (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1970), p. xix. Also J. McIntyre, St. Anselm and His Critics, (London: 1954), p. 127.

> 'The divine and human natures cannot alternate, so that the divine should become human or the human divine; nor can they be so commingled as that a third should be produced from the two which is neither wholly divine nor wholly human. For, granting that it were possible for either to be changed into the other, it would in that case be only God and not man, or man only and not God. Or if they were so commingled that a third nature sprung from the combination of the two...,it would neither be God nor man. Therefore the God-man, whom we require to be of a nature both human and divine, cannot be produced by a change from one into the other, nor by an imperfect commingling of both into a third; since these things cannot be, or if they could be, would avail nothing to our purpose.' 1

For Anselm then while it is impossible for God to change into man or vice versa, even if this could be done, it would soteriologically serve no purpose. On soteriorological grounds Anselm rules out any form of Docetism, Apollinarianism, or Monophysitism all of which demand some alteration in the divinity or humanity.

Moreover, for these very same soteriological reasons Anselm rules out Adoptionism and Nestorianism.

> 'If these two complete natures are said to be joined somehow, in such a way that one may be divine while the other is human, and yet that which is God not be the same with that which is man, it is impossible for both to do the work necessary to be accomplished....Since, then, it is necessary that the God-man preserve the completeness of each nature, it is no less necessary that these two natures be united entire in one person....for otherwise it is impossible that the same being should be very God and very man.' 2

For Anselm one and same person must be both God and man without change or mutation if man is to be saved.

Thus when Anselm uses Deus-Homo (the God-man) as a definitional name for Christ, it should not be thought that Anselm sees Christ as two separate and complete entities or natures existing juxtaposed to one another and united by some sort of moral union.[3] What Anselm is doing in using such language is stressing and highlighting the soteriological aspect of his Christology. Only a being who is fully God and fully man (Deus-Homo) is able to bring about salvation.

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1. Anselm, Cur Deus Homo, II, 7.
2. Ibid.
3. For examples of Anselm's use of the term 'Deus-Homo' see ibid., II, 6 and 7.

Likewise when he uses the phrase Assumptus homo in his Ep. de Incarnatione Verbi to designate the humanity of Christ, he is not understanding the Incarnation to be the Logos assuming an already existing man. Rather he is stressing the fact that the Logos became and is fully man. As Anselm states:

> 'For, although in Christ one thing is God and another is man, this does not mean that there is one person who is God and another person who is man. On the contrary, one and the same person is both God and man. "The Word made flesh" assumed another nature, not another person.' 1

What one finds then in Anselm is a systematic soteriological argument for Chalcedonian Christology. Christ is one person existing in two natures. Following Chalcedon Anselm states in his Ep. de Incarnatione Verbi that 'Clearly God did not assume manhood in such a way that God and man were one and the same in nature, but in such a way that God and man were one and the same in person.'[2] Anselm realizes that while Christ is one, the Incarnation does not bring about a terium quid being, for that would demand change and alteration, but rather the Incarnation is the Logos coming to be and existing as man.

The Christology which Anselm believes necessarily flows from his soteriology shows then not only that it is appropriate and necessary for God to become man, but also against the infidels it clarifies in what way it is proper to attribute human predicates to God. Those who think that it is incompatible with Deity to predicate of it human attributes 'do not fully understand our belief'.

> 'For we affirm that the divine nature is beyond doubt impassible, and that God cannot at all be brought down from his exaltation....But we say that the Lord Jesus Christ is very God and very man, one person in two natures....When, therefore, we speak of God as enduring any humiliation or infirmity, we do not refer to the majesty of that nature, which cannot suffer; but to the feebleness of the human constitution which he assumed. And so there remains no ground of objection against our faith.' 3

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1. Anselm, Ep. de Incarnatione Verbi, 11. Trans. Anselm of Canterbury: Trinity, Incarnation, and Redemption: Theological Treatises, ed. and trans. J. Hopkins and H.W. Richardson. See also Hopkins, A Companion to the Study of St. Anselm, pp. 198-202.
2. Anselm, Ep. de Incarnatione Verbi, 9; see also 1.
3. Anselm, Cur Deus Homo, I, 8. See also Ep. de Incarnatione Verbi, 11.

Anselm is but echoing the teaching of Cyril and the Council of Chalcedon concerning the communication of idioms. It is because one and the same person is God and man that it is proper to predicate divine and human attributes of him. Thus to say 'God thirsts,' means for Anselm, as for Cyril and Chalcedon, 'God the Logos as man thirsts.'

McIntyre completely misunderstands Anselm on this point. He believes 'that there occurs in St. Anselm a foreshadowing of the Lutheran communicatio idiomatum....'[1] By this McIntyre means that the human and divine predicates are not properly said of the person only, but as in Luther's Christology a real 'transference of properties takes place between the natures.'[2] Whether McIntyre's understanding of Luther is correct is not at issue here. Luther's Christology will be discussed later. However, it is obvious that McIntyre does not understand Anselm's use of the communication of idioms. Anselm in no way sees the communication of idioms as specifying or delineating the transference of divine and human attributes from one nature to the other. For Anselm the diverse attributes are predicated only of the person and not of the distinct natures. As was seen above in Anselm's remarks on the misunderstanding of the infidels, the human attributes predicated of the Logos only refer 'to the feebleness of the human constitution which he assumed.' If McIntyre's understanding of Anselm were correct, the infidels would have had an accurate understanding of what Christians believe, and thus the Christian belief would 'do injustice and dishonor to God.' As strange as it may be, McIntyre's understanding of Anselm's use of the communication of idioms seems to be the same as that of the infidels, which is precisely the understanding Anselm wishes to deny. Anselm wished in his Christology to clarify exactly what the Christian use of the communication of idioms means. In McIntyre's case Anselm obviously failed in his attempt.

More could be said concerning Anselm, but enough has been given to show that he was as much concerned with what it means for God to become man, and to be passible as man as the patristic theologians. Likewise it is evident that Anselm, like Chalcedon and Cyril, understood 'become' to mean 'come to be' which upholds both the ontological unity of person and the unchangeable distinction of natures, thus also allowing for a correct understanding of the communication of idioms.

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1. J. McIntyre, p. 141.
2. Ibid., p. 142.

B. St. Thomas Aquinas

When one comes to Aquinas, it is not surprising then that he too is concerned with the problem of God's immutability and his becoming man, as well as his passibility as man. It should not be surprising either that Aquinas' methodological approach to the subject is more systematic and clearly defined than that of the Fathers. This is due not only to the literary manner in which he approaches theology: the Questio Disputatae, but also to the fact that he, as no other theologian before him, and for the most part after him, nuanced and clarified theological concepts and language.

Reality for Aquinas is rich in meaning and the concepts and language by which man grasps and expresses the meaning of reality is therefore rich also. This richness of conceptual understanding and linguistic expression helps man understand the fullness of reality, but the fullness can only be appreciated and known if man distinguishes the many uses and meanings of his concepts and words. Many modern readers of Aquinas are put off by his many distinctions, but such a reaction is not so much a criticism of his 'scholastic' hair-splitting, as much as modern man's failure to appreciate the fullness of reality and the concepts and language used by man to grasp and express it.

Moreover, it is not only the finite world that man must come to know and express for Aquinas. Man's wisdom does not consist solely of mathematics, astronomy, psychology, and metaphysics. For Aquinas God's revelation in word and action must be known and expressed and thus man's concepts and language must make room for such revelation. For Aquinas revelation is not just grasping finite reality in a new or deeper way, but rather because of God's revelation reality itself has changed and taken on new dimensions. New truths are operative in reality, truths not due to man's insight, but to God's revelation. Thus for Aquinas, theology, as other sciences, has its own first principles from which it proceeds to greater depths of understanding and clarity of expression, and these principles 'are the articles of faith.'[1] Because of this

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1. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, I, 1,8. See also I, 1, 6, ad. 1. Trans. Summa Theologica, English Dominican Fathers, (New York: Benziger Brothers, 1947). All the following references will be from St. Thomas Aquinas' works unless otherwise stated.

there is operative in Aquinas' Christology what can be called 'Christological logic.'[1] If one accepts in faith who Christ is as he revealed himself and which has been handed down in Scripture and tradition, what must logically be understood and expressed concerning him? For Aquinas there is no stronger basis for theological argumentation than: 'Assuming, as the Catholic faith requires....'[2]

Flowing from this it should be pointed out not only for the sake of understanding Aquinas' approach to Christology, but also as a preliminary to the study of some contemporary Christologies, that he in no way uses philosophy in an Averroeistic manner.

For Averroes the Koran could be understood in three ways corresponding to the three different kinds of men. For the simple and unlearned religious person the Koran was used for exhortation and the exterior and symbolic meaning was accepted in faith. For the theologians, who gloried in dialectics, probable truth could be obtained. However, it was the philosopher with his superior philosophic knowledge who could judge the Koran's true meaning. Unlike the ordinary man, the philosopher did not have faith, but rather being 'in the know' because of his philosophy, he obtained truth in its pure form. This not only meant that the philosopher knew the Koran better, but that his pure knowledge surpassed what the Koran expressed only symbolically. 'In the doctrine of Averroes,' writes Gilson, 'there is absolutely nothing that philosophy does not know better than simple faith....'[3] If a contradiction arose between the two, the Koran must be made to conform to philosophy since it was truth in the fullest sense. The highest philosophy, and thus the purest truth, for Averroes was Aristotle.

Aquinas would have none of this. While the theologian may better understand and articulate the faith because of philosophy, what he believes is the same as the ordinary Christian. Philosophy does not make the theologian or philosopher a better Christian because he (somehow) comes to know what others simply believe.

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1. Colman E. O'Neil, Appendix I, p. 216 in Summa Theologiae Vol. 50, The One Mediator, (London: Blackfriars, 1965).
2. Cf. S.T., III, 16, 1.
3. E. Gilson, History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages, (London: Sheed and Ward, 1972), p. 219.

> 'This science (sacred doctrine) can in a sense depend upon the philosophical sciences, not as though it stood in need of them, but only in order to make its teaching clearer. For it accepts its principles not from other sciences; but immediately from God, by revelation.' 1

What God reveals in word and action is beyond finite reality and beyond man's normal ways of obtaining knowledge, and thus is verifiable not by a superior philosophic knowledge, but by God's authority.

Thus when Aquinas treats the mystery of God and the Incarnation, one cannot help but notice his 'Christological logic' at work in the distinctions he makes in his linguistic and conceptual analysis. While he may be using Aristotelian concepts and language, what he is doing is following the pattern first used by the Fathers and sanctioned by Nicea. One may use and need to use non-scriptural philosophical concepts, yet one must give to them a meaning which conforms to the revelational truth contained in Scripture and the Church's tradition, and not vice-versa. By giving new nuances to Aristotelianism, Aquinas wishes not only to baptise Aristotle, and thus make Christianity intelligible to his contemporaries, but also clarify and enlarge the understanding of what is revealed. Through the use of Aristotelian concepts Aquinas never dissolves the Incarnation by making it intellectually knowable in itself, but rather clarifies and delineates exactly what the mystery is and in so doing developes the Church's traditional understanding of the mystery.[2]

Thus Aquinas in his Christology does not say anything that is radically new and different from Chalcedon or Cyril, but rather wishes only to say what they said in a way that is intelligible and clear. His theological insights are insights in conceptual and linguistic expression and not in new doctrines. It is for this reason that Aquinas is treated here. Only in philosophy does a radical newness accrue and that, as is well known, revolves around his notion of <u>esse</u>.

1. <u>God: Actus Purus and Immutability and Impassibility</u>

From the Church's tradition Aquinas inherited the teaching that God is almighty, all-powerful, all-perfect, immutable and impassible.

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1. <u>S.T.</u>, I, 1, 5, ad. 2.
2. On this point see E.L. Mascall, 'Guide-Lines from St. Thomas for Theology Today,' <u>St. Thomas Aquinas</u>, (1274-1974), <u>Commemorative Studies</u>, Vol. 2 (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1974), pp. 489-501.

To give philosophical expression to this teaching Aquinas turned to his notion of esse to show how these adjectives can be applied to God. He in no way changes their traditional meaning, but rather clarifies exactly why, when applied to God, they have the meaning traditionally given.

A great deal has been written in recent years concerning Aquinas' notion of God.[1] For this reason a full scale study is not necessary here. Nevertheless, the main features of Aquinas' notion of God and his immutability and impassibility must be stated in order to understand how he answers the Christological problem of God's becoming man and his passibility as man.

To understand Aquinas' notion of God it is first necessary to grasp his notion of esse. This can be done only by seeing how esse pertains to finite creatures. In finite beings

> 'every essence or quiddity can be understood without knowing anything about its being. I can know, for instance, what a man or a phoenix is and still be ignorant whether it has being or reality. From this it is clear that being is other than essence or quiddity, unless perhaps there is a reality whose quiddity is its being.' [2]

No finite being then is of such a nature that its nature demands that it be or exist. As Gilson states: 'The definition of no empirically given thing is existence; hence its essence is not existence, but existence must be conceived as distinct from it.'[3] There is then a distinction in finite creatures between what an ens is, its essence or quiddity, and that by which an ens is, its esse. It is at this point that one is able to grasp how Aquinas understands esse.

While it may be stating the obvious, the first thing that must be recognized is that esse (to be) is a verb. It does not signify some sort of thing. Esse has no quiddity, but rather is an act, and thus

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1. For more complete studies see for example E. Gilson, God and Philosophy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1941). E. Gilson, The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas, (London: Gollancz, 1957). E.L. Mascall, He Who Is, (London: Libra Book, 1966). E.L. Mascall, Existence and Analogy, (London: Libra Book, 1966). H.P. Owen, Concepts of Deity, (London: Macmillan, 1971).
2. De Ente et Essentia, 4,6. Trans. On Being and Essence, Armand Maurer, (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1968).
3. Gilson, God and Philosophy, p. 71.

cannot be conceptually grasped by the mind. One cannot say what esse is because there is no 'whatness' about esse. Being a verb esse specifies, as do all verbs, action, but in this case what is specified is the act which is the very basis or ground of all subsequent actions (all subsequent verbs) in that esse is the act by which a being (an ens) is or exists: 'ens dicetur quasi esse habens.'[1] Thus Aquinas states: 'Esse est actualitas omnium actuum, et propter hoc est perfectio omnium perfectionum.'[2] Esse in an ens is the primordial act and perfection of all other acts and perfections for without esse an ens would not be at all. Phelan states Aquinas' understanding of esse well:

> 'Things which "have being" are not "just there" (Dasein) like lumps of static essence, inert, immovable, unprogressive and unchanging. The act of existence (esse) is not a state, it is an act, the act of all acts, and therefore, must be understood as act and not as any static and definable object of conception. Esse is dynamic impulse, energy, act--the first, the most persistent and enduring of all dynamisms, all energies, all acts.' 3

Now it should be obvious that while Aquinas understands esse and essentia to be a real distinction in finite beings and not just conceptual, this in no way means that esse and essentia are distinct realities or things in themselves.[4] As was seen above, esse as act contains no quiddity and, as is also evident from the preceding, essence in itself contains no notion of esse, but purely denotes the quiddity of an ens. Only beings exist and the distinction of esse and essentia is made within the existing being. Esse and essentia are constitutive principles of an ens.[5] Thus they are related to one another in an act/potency relationship, for 'that in which act is present is a potentiality, since act, as such is referred to potentiality. Therefore, in every created substance there is potentiality and act.'[6] Thus for Aquinas

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1. XII Metaphysica, lect. 1, 2419.
2. De Potentia, 7, 2, ed. 9. Cf. De Anima, 6.
3. Gerald Phelan, 'The Existentialism of St. Thomas,' Selected Papers, ed. A.G. Kirn (Toronto: 1967), p. 77.
4. Cf. De Veritate, 27, 1. Trans. Truth, Robert W. Mulligan (Chicago: Henry Regnery Comp., 1952). Also I Sent. d.13,q.1, art. 3.
5. Cf. E. Gilson, Being and Some Philosophers, (Toronto: Pontificial Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1952), p. 172.
6. Summa Contra Gentiles, II, 53,3. Trans. On the Truth of the Catholic Faith, Eds., J. Anderson, A. Pegis, V.J. Bourke, J. O'Neil (Garden City: Image Books, 1955-1957). See also De Ente et Essentia, 4,8.

'dicitur esse ipse actus essentiae.'[1] All created beings then are composite, 'For a certain composition is found in them by the fact that in them being is not the same as what is.'[2]

Given all the above Aquinas argues that the esse of finite creatures must come from an extrinsic cause.

> 'Whatever belongs to a thing is either caused by the principles of its nature....or comes to it from an extrinsic principle.... Now being itself cannot be caused by the form or quiddity of a thing (by "caused" I mean by an efficient cause) because that thing would then be its own cause and it would bring itself into being, which is impossible. It follows that everything whose being is distinct from its nature must have being from another.' 3

Since no finite reality contains within its nature the sufficient reason for its existence, Aquinas continues that 'there must be a reality that is the cause of being for all things, because it is pure being [esse tantum]. If this were not so, we would go on to infinity in causes, for everything that is not pure being has a cause of its being, as has been said.' For Aquinas pure esse 'is the first cause or God.'[4]

Whether Aquinas' argument as it appears in his early work De Ente et Essentia is a proof for God's existence and whether he understood it to be such is debated by scholars. What is important here is not so much these questions as the light the above gives to Aquinas' understanding of esse and God as pure esse. This seems to be his primary purpose as the above arguments are rendered in the two Summae.[5]

In the two Summae Aquinas' interest is to ascertain not whether God is, but rather to explicate the nature of the God who is. (Since God is pure esse for Aquinas the question whether God is and the question what God is can be reduced to the same question, but only after they have been treated separately.) Thus one sees from the above that Aquinas

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1. I Sent., d.33, q.1, art. 1, ad. 1. See also De Pot. 7,2, ad. 9.
2. S.C.G., II, 52, 1.
3. De Ente et Essentia, 4,7. See S.T., I, 3,4, and S.C.G., I, 22,6.
4. Ibid., all of the above.
5. S.C.G., I,22,6. S.T., I, 3,4. For debate see A. Maurer, On Being and Essence, Introduction, p. 20 and fn. 33.

argues to his understanding of God as pure *esse* from what *esse* is in creatures. *Esse* is the act by which a finite being is, but no finite creature *is* by necessity from what it is. Thus God must be pure *esse* for this is what finite beings lack and are in potency to and must be given if they are to exist. If the essence of God were not pure *esse*, he would be in the same circumstances as finite creatures where his essence would differ from his *esse*, and thus need an extrinsic cause to account for his being also. God's nature must be pure *esse* not so much to account for what specific things exist, i.e. horses, dogs, etc., but to account for the fact that things exist at all, that they possess *esse*. Thus while finite creatures are composite beings in which their essence and *esse* are in an act/potency relationship, God whose nature is pure *esse* is not composite, has no potency, and 'therefore his essence is his existence.'[1] God as pure esse is *ipsum esse, esse subsistens, actus purus*.

To truly grasp what Aquinas means by God being pure *esse*, it must always be remembered that *esse* is act, that *esse* is a verb. Thus to say that God is pure *esse* means that God's essence is nothing other than *to be*. In creatures essence or quiddity denotes what a thing is and always is a noun. To say that God's essence is existence is also to say what God is, but it is not a noun. It is a verb. For the essence of God to be *ipsum esse* means that God is pure act. For God to be pure act then does not mean that God is *something* fully in act, but rather that God is act pure and simple. There is *no-thing*, no essence (in finite sense) in God to be actualized, but just act or *esse* it-self. Likewise to say that God has no potency does not mean that God in some way fully actualized all his potential comparable to a man who has fully actualized all his potential, but rather God has no potency because there is no potency to actualize. He is *actus purus*.

God being *actus purus* it is almost, if not completely, self-evident why God is all-perfect and being all-perfect why he is infinite, eternal, immutable, etc.. If '*esse est actualitas omnium actuum, et propter hoc est perfectio omnium perfectionum*,' then God as *actus purus* 'must needs to be most actual, and therefore most perfect; for a thing is perfect in proportion to its state of actuality, because we call that

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1. *S.T.*, I, 3,4. Cf. *S.T.*, I, 3,1-3.

perfect which lacks nothing of the mode of its perfection.'[1] While man, for example, is perfect or tends to perfection in so far as he actualizes his potential and talents (and this is due first of all to the fact that he is), God is perfect not because he has reached some limit of perfectability, but being ipsum esse he is perfection itself.

Thus God is immutable. Finite beings are mutable in that they come to be and can cease to be. Likewise they can undergo substantial and accidental change.[2] However, God being pure esse necessarily exists and cannot cease to be. Likewise, God being pure act is all-perfect and being all perfect it is impossible for him to acquire more perfection through change, that is, by actualizing some potential. 'Everything which is in anyway changed, is in some way in potentiality. Hence it is evident that it is impossible for God to be in any way changeable.' Being actus purus God contains 'all the plentitude of perfection of all being. He cannot acquire anything new' through change, by actualizing some potential.[3] Thus to say that God is immutable is to deny something of God that is inherent in finite reality. However, while it is a negative adjective, it is based on something positive which makes God unlike creatures, that is, the fact that God is pure act, being itself.[4]

God is immutable then for Aquinas not because he is static, inert, or inactive, but precisely because he is so supremely active and dynamic, because he is pure act. He is so much in act that it is ontologically impossible to be more in act. Paradoxically God is supremely immutable because he is supremely active.

One should not be misled into thinking that God's immutability is like the immutability of a rock only more so. What God and rocks have in common is only the fact that they do not change. The reason for their unchangeableness is for polar-opposite reasons. The Rock of Gibraltar does not change or changes very little because it is hardly in act at all, and the change that it does undergo is mainly from outside causes--wind and rain. God is unchangeable not because he is insert or static like a rock, but for just the opposite reason. He is so dynamic, so active that no change can make him more active. He is act

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1. De. Pot, 7,2, ad. 9. S.T., I, 4,1. Cf. S.C.G., I, 28.
2. Cf. S.T., I, 9,2.
3. Ibid., I, 9,1.
4. Cf. Ibid., I, 13,2. Also S.C.G., I, 30,4.

pure and simple. (By way of an aside, this should be kept in mind when Process Theology is treated later. Process Theology believes that a God who changes is more dynamic than traditional theism, such as expressed by Aquinas. However, just the opposite is true. In making God mutable process theology's notion of God has more in common with rocks than Aquinas' notion of God.)

A few words need to be said about the impassibility of God. Passibility for Aquinas pertains to the will and to objects toward which the will tends. The object of the will is the end willed which is always understood as good, and the will tends to the good as an object loved.[1] Now in man the will desires a good the more the good comes to be known as good.[2] Man in knowing a thing as good arouses the sensible appetite, which in turn activates the will to desire the good out of love for the good as known. The arousal of the appetite by a loved, known good is called passion.[3] Thus in man passion denotes a change in that the knowledge of a known good motivates and arouses the will to desire the good known and loved, and to seek ways to obtain the good. Again this is an act/potency relationship which denotes change.[4] Now God being pure act knows, wills, and loves all good in the one act which he is himself. Thus there is no passion in God because, being pure act, there is no need for arousal to the good and desire for the good.[5] Thus God loves himself and all things in himself in the one act which he himself is because in the one act he knows and wills himself as pure goodness.[6]

A problem does arise however with sorrow and pain in God. If God is love and loves perfectly all creatures, does he not become sad and pained at sin and evil effected by man and which affects man? Is he not saddened by man turning from him and his love? If one understands sadness and pain as due to a lack of good and the presence of evil, then God is not sad in this sense.[7] For Aquinas sadness in this sense is predicated of God metaphorically. Because Aquinas sees sorrow and pain as due to a lack of good he cannot attribute sorrow and pain to God. Man's turning from God does not harm him by depriving him of good.[8]

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1. Cf. S.T., I, 20,1 and I, 82, 2, ad. 1.
2. Cf. ibid., I, 82, 3, ad. 2.
3. Cf. ibid., I, 20, 2, ad. 1.
4. Cf. ibid., I, 82, 3, ad. 2.
5. Cf. ibid., I, 20, 2, ad. 1.
6. Cf. ibid., I, 14 and 19.
7. Cf. ibid., I-II, 1-2; I, 20, 1, ad. 2.
8. Cf. ibid., I-II, 47,1,ad.1; I-II,73,8,ad.2.

However, it would seem that because of God's love for men, it could be said that God is sad, not because he is deprived of a good, but because the man who sins is deprived of a good. Thus sadness could be predicated of God, not as a change in God, as the loss of a good possessed, but as an aspect of his almighty and all-consuming unchangeable love for his creatures. Aquinas hints at this, but unfortunately does not develop it in the Summa Theologiae when he states that sin injures man and such an injury 'redounds to God, inasmuch as the person injured is an object of God's providence and protection.'[1]

By way of concluding Aquinas' notion of God it should be noted that because God is ipsum esse, he is not one of many beings. While the esse of finite beings and God as pure esse are analogous in that both signify act, finite esse is related to and proportionate to the essence it actuates. Thus while finite esse does not belong to a genus itself, since it has no quiddity, the being of which it is the actuating principle always falls within a specific genus or species: animals, plants, etc.. Likewise finite beings then are substances in that they are individual existing things of a specific kind. However, God as pure esse transcends the order of finite reality, the order of beings. God as pure esse not only falls outside the order of genus by the fact that esse as such does not belong to a genus, but also by the fact that being pure esse he does not have a quiddity other than his esse, and thus unlike finite beings he does not have an essence that places him within a genus. 'Each thing,' states Aquinas, 'is placed in a genus through the nature of its quiddity, for the genus is a predicate expressing what a thing is. But the quiddity of God is his very being. Accordingly, God is not located in a genus.'[2] God does not even fall within the genus of substance for while substance denotes an individual existing thing in itself, unlike God its 'existence is not its essence. Thus it is clear that God is not in the genus of substance.'[3] As ipsum esse God ontologically transcends the order of finite beings and thus cannot be numbered as one being among many. Mascall states Aquinas' position when he says:

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1. Ibid., I-II, 47, 1, ad. 1. Cf. H.P. Owen, pp. 23-25.
2. S.C.G., I, 25, 5. Cf. S.T., I, 3, 5. Also De Pot. 7,3.
3. S.T., I, 3,5. Cf. S.C.G., I, 25, 9-10.

'We cannot lump together in one genus God and everything else, as if the word "being" applied to them all in precisely the same sense, and then pick out God as the supreme one. For if God is the Supreme Being, in the sense in which Christian theology uses the term, "being" as applied to him is not just one more instance of what "being" means when applied to anything else. So far from being just one item, albeit the supreme one, in a class of beings, he is the source from which their being is derived; he is not <u>in</u> their class but <u>above</u> it.' 1

Aquinas sums up his understanding of God when he states that the most proper name of God is the name revealed to Moses: 'He Who Is' (Ex. 3:13-14). It is most proper 'For it does not signify form, but simply existence itself. Hence since the existence of God is his essence itself, which can be said of no other, it is clear that among the other names this one specially dominates God, for everything is denominated by its form.'[2] To say that God is 'He Who Is' signifies that the proper nature of God is 'to be,' his existence is his essence, and thus the name, 'He Who Is' does not signify any knowable form for form in creatures signifies a specific knowable essence. Thus 'He Who Is' in signifying no form denotes that God transcends knowable finite reality for form in creatures is always of a specific genus. Now it is possible to say, as Aquinas does in his second usage of the word 'form,' that God's form is 'to be,' but in so saying this he does not mean that one properly knows what the essence or form of God is. To know <u>that</u> the proper name (form) of God is <u>ipsum esse</u> is not the same as knowing <u>what</u> <u>ipsum esse</u> is or means. Thus 'He Who Is' is the proper name of God precisely because while it denotes God's proper form as <u>ipsum esse</u>, it at the same time signifies that God as <u>ipsum esse</u> is unknowable, and thus that God transcends knowable finite reality. Thus Aquinas' metaphysical understanding of 'He Who Is' is totally in keeping with the Hebrew understanding. For both God in revealing his name as 'He Who Is' reveals himself as the unknowable.[3]

With such an understanding of God, God can never be in a situation that would demand that he change. This is so not because it would be inappropriate, but because it would be metaphysically impossible. Being

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1. E.L. Mascall, <u>He Who Is</u>, p. 9.
2. <u>S.T.</u>, I, 13,11. Cf. <u>S.C.G.</u>, I, 22. Also <u>De Pot.</u> 2,1.
3. Cf. Gilson, <u>Spirit of Medieval Philosophy</u>, Chapters 3 and 4. Also E.L. Mascall, <u>Existence and Analogy</u>, pp. 12-15.

pure act, God, even if he 'wanted to,' could not bring about change in himself, nor could he place himself in a situation which demanded change. This is not a hardship on the part of God, being pure act, containing all perfection, he needs nothing other than himself for his good and happiness. This is more easily understood by man once God revealed himself to be a Trinity of persons.

The question arises though: Is not God in situations which demand that he change, and are not these situations due to the fact that God himself has brought these situations about? Does not God's creation and conservation of the world establish a situation which demands change in God? Likewise and more so, is not the Incarnation such a situation? In both instances there must be a relationship between God and something outside himself. If there were no relationship between God as Creator and beings as created, God would not be the Creator and finite beings would not be. If there were no relationship between the Logos and his humanity the Logos would not be man, nor would it be man that the Logos is. But does not the very notion of relation demand change in the terms related? Aquinas thinks not.

2. Christ: God subsisting as Man

Aquinas, like Cyril and Chalcedon before him, works out his Christology with three things in mind. Treating the question 'Whether this is true, "God is man"?' Aquinas states: 'Supposing the truth of the Catholic belief....we say that this proposition is true and proper, God is man--not only by the truth of its terms, i.e. because Christ is true God and true man, but by the truth of the predication.'[1] To uphold the truth of the Incarnation one must maintain that God truly is man, that it is truly God who is man, and that it is truly man that God is. One's conceptual understanding and linguistic expression must account for all the above for this is what has been revealed and handed down.

This concern can be clearly seen in Aquinas' treatment in the Summa Contra Gentiles of the classic Christological errors. Against those such as Ebion, Paul of Samosata, and Photinus who held that Christ was a man only and in some way adopted by God, Aquinas points

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1. S.T., III, 16, 1.

out that 'this position destroys the Incarnation's mystery. For, according to this position, God would not have assumed flesh to become man.'[1] Likewise the Manicheans and Valentine who deny that the manhood of Christ was real, but only phantasmal, Aquinas argues that 'they reduce the whole mystery of the Incarnation to a fiction.'[2] Believing that Apollinaris held that the Logos was changed into man, Aquinas protests that it is not only impossible for God to change since he is immutable, but to do so would so affect the manhood of Christ that it would 'follow that there was not in Christ true flesh or anything of the sort.'[3] Aquinas uses this same argument for real and true manhood against Arius' and Apollinaris' denial of a human soul.[4] When Aquinas comes to Theodore of Mopsuestia and Nestorius, his concern switches from guaranteeing the full divinity and humanity of Christ to the substantial union of the two. No moral union will do for 'the indwelling of God's Word in man is not for God's Word to be made flesh....this.... indwelling....cannot be called incarnation.'[5] It is only when 'God's Word and the man Christ are one supposit and consequently, one Person' that one can truly speak of the Incarnation.[6] Nevertheless, this substantial union cannot destroy the terms of the union, for to do so would mean that it is neither God who is man, nor man that God is. Thus against Eutyches, Aquinas protests: One cannot

> 'say that the form of God in Christ is corrupted by this union, because thus after the union Christ would not be God. Nor again, can one say that the form of the servant was corrupted in the union, because thus he would not have received the form of the servant. But neither can one say that the form of the servant is mixed thoroughly with the form of God, for things mixed thoroughly do not retain their integrity....If a mixture were to come into being, neither nature would be preserved.... but some third.' 7

From Aquinas's criticism of the classic Christological errors one sees that his primary concern is to give intelligible meaning to the fact

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1. S.C.G., IV, 28, 3 and 4.
2. Ibid., IV, 29,1. Cf. the whole of 29 and 30.
3. Ibid., IV, 31,2. Cf. 5.
4. Cf. Ibid., IV, 32-33.
5. Ibid., IV, 34,3.
6. Ibid., IV, 34,29.
7. Ibid., IV, 35,4. Cf. 8.

that God became man. While the 'becoming' must be such that God can truly be said to be man, and thus substantial, it must not bring about a change in the terms, for it must really be God who is man and man that God is. A denial of a substantial union, or the immutability of God, or the completeness of the manhood destroys the very notion of the Incarnation.

Aquinas' concern can be seen even more clearly in his treatment of the contemporary Christological theories. They came to be known as the 'assumptus-homo theory,' the 'habitus theory,' and the 'subsistence theory.' The basic outline of these theories came to Aquinas and his contemporaries through the Sentences of Peter Lombard.[1]

Peter Abelard is the source of the Assumptus-homo theory. In it he wished to maintain that while there is one person, there are two hypostases in Christ. Thus according to Aquinas 'they have held that the soul and flesh in our Lord Jesus Christ constitutes one substance, namely a certain man of the same species as other man.'[2] While the union was in the person of the Logos, nevertheless because the manhood was a substance of its own, the union was one of the person of the Logos assuming the hypostasis of this man. Aquinas maintains that the distinction between person and hypostasis is merely verbal, but beyond that to hold that the manhood is a supposit of its own apart from the Logos demands that Christ be two beings and that the union between them must be moral and accidental comparable to that taught by Nestorius. 'Things which are many in supposit,' writes Aquinas,

> 'are many simply, and they are but incidentally one. If, then, in Christ there are two supposits, it follows that he is two simply....and this is "to dissolve Jesus" (1 Jn. 4:3), for everything, in so far as it is, is one.' 3

Trying to avoid such a criticism some of Abelard's followers proposed that the soul and body were not united together, and thus there would not be a human person or supposit, but separately united to the Logos 'just as a man puts on his clothes.'[4] While this 'habitus theory' solves the problem of the human person, Aquinas again believes

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1. Cf. Peter Lombard, Sentences, III, questions 6, 7, 10, 21, 22. For Aquinas' commentary see his III, Sentences.
2. S.C.G., IV, 38,1.
3. Ibid., IV, 38,11.
4. Ibid., IV, 37,1.

it to be Nestorian and even worse. 'For there is no difference in saying that the Word of God is united to the Man Christ by indwelling, as in a temple (as Nestorius said), or by putting on man, as a garment....rather it is something worse than Nestorius--to wit, that the soul and body are not united.'[1] To deny that the body and soul are united is to deny the true humanity.[2]

Aquinas' critique of these two theories brings out two priorities in his Christology. As Aquinas states both theories were motivated by the old Nestorian fear that it 'seemed impossible that one thing be substantial to another, yet not be of the nature which that other previously had, without any mutation taking place; and the Word, of course, is entirely immutable.'[3] In order to uphold the immutable divinity of the Logos, they opted for a moral or accidental union. Aquinas, however, without belittling their concern, points out that 'If the Word was united to the soul and body accidently....the human nature was not the nature of the Word.'[4] In other words, God <u>is not man</u>. For Aquinas it does no good to uphold the immutability of God with regards to the Incarnation if one does not hold that God <u>is man</u>, for the basic reason for maintaining God's immutability in the Incarnation is in order to hold that it is really <u>God</u> who is man. To deny that it is man that God is for the sake of the immutability is to undermine the very reason why God must be immutable in becoming man, that is, to hold that it is truly <u>God</u> who is man. Aquinas' concern here is primarily incarnational. It is a concern for the fact that God must be truly man if one is to uphold a true understanding of the Incarnation, and God must be immutable so that it is really God who is man.

Aquinas' second priority likewise concerns the true humanity of Christ. The '<u>habitus</u> theory' not only denied a substantial union, but also in trying to uphold the one person of Christ denied the union of soul and body. However this is to deny the true humanity. Again Aquinas would not denegate their desire to maintain one person in the

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1. <u>S.T.</u>, III, 2,6. Cf. <u>S.C.G.</u>, IV, 37, 6.
2. Cf. <u>S.C.G.</u>, IV, 37,10. For fuller studies of Aquinas' treatment of these theories see Walter H. Principe, 'St. Thomas on the <u>Habitus</u>-Theory Of the Incarnation,' <u>St. Thomas Aquinas (1274-1974), Commemorative Studies</u>, I ed. Armand A. Maurer, (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1974), pp. 381-418. See fn. 2.
3. <u>S.C.G.</u>, IV, 37,1. Cf. III, <u>Sent.</u>, d.6,q.3,a.1.
4. <u>S.C.G.</u>, IV, 37,6.

Incarnation, he criticises them precisely for not doing so, nevertheless to do so by undermining the true humanity defeats one's purpose. 'One will not be able to say that the Word assumed human nature if he did not assume a body united to a soul.'[1] For Aquinas if the one person of the Logos is not truly man, then the whole point of it being the one person of the Logos is lost.

Aquinas himself holds for the 'subsistence theory' which he believes is not 'to be called an opinion, but an article of the Catholic faith.'[2] The reason for this being that it maintains that the human and divine natures of Christ are united 'not by indwelling only, nor in an accidental mode...,but in one hypostasis and one supposit.'[3] For Aquinas Christ as one being (ens) or supposit, must be the one person of the Logos existing both as God and as man. To deny this is to deny a true Incarnation and the Church's belief. But how does such an Incarnation come about?

Following Cyril's and Chalcedon's lead, Aquinas holds that 'the Word of God from all eternity had complete being in hypostasis or person; while in time the human nature accrued to it, not as if it were assumed into one being inasmuch as this is of the nature....but to one being inasmuch as this is of the hypostasis or person.'[4] In becoming man the Logos did not become a tertium quid being, one nature, but rather the Logos who existed as God from all eternity now exists as man.

> 'Since the human nature,' [writes Aquinas] 'is united to the Son of God, hypostatically or personally....and not accidentally, it follows that by the human nature, there accrued to him no new personal being [esse personale] but only a new relation of pre-existing personal being [esse personale] to the human nature, in such a way that the person is said to subsist not merely in the divine nature but also in the human nature.' 5

'Become' means, as it did for Cyril, not that the Logos changed into a man, that he became a new person, but that the Logos took on a new mode or manner of existence, that is, as man. 'The mystery of the Incarnation was not completed through God being changed in any way from the immutable

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1. Ibid., IV, 37,4.
2. S.T., III, 2,6.
3. S.C.G., IV, 39,1.
4. S.T., III, 2,6, ad. 2.
5. Ibid., III, 17,2.

state in which he had been from all eternity, but through his having united himself to the creature in a new way or rather through having united it to himself.'[1]

To fully grasp the meaning of this notion of 'become' and how it is truly an incarnational notion, special notice should be taken of Aquinas' stress that the human nature is united to the Logos and not vice-versa, and his use of '<u>esse personale</u>.'

It is not by chance that Aquinas emphasises that the human nature 'is united to' or 'accrued to' the Logos. The incarnational act is not one of local motion or change on the part of the Logos, as if he somehow 'left heaven' and 'came down' to earth, and changed himself into man. Rather the incarnational act, the 'becoming' is the uniting of a human nature to the very person of the Logos in such a way that the Logos exists as man. This union with the Logos then is not by way of some mediating act on the part of the Logos, but rather the human nature is united to the very person of the Logos as the Logos <u>is</u>, as he exists immutably as God, in his <u>esse personale</u>. The Logos acquires no new personal being, as Aquinas states, (if he did, he would no longer be God); but rather he (as God) acquires a new mode of existing (as man), and this can be accomplished only if the human nature is united to him as he really is in his <u>esse personale</u> as God. Aquinas' use of the term '<u>esse personale</u>' specifies that the union is in the Logos as he is as God, and thus does not change, thus assuring not only the immutability of God for God's sake, but also for the sake of the Incarnation, that is, so that it is really the Logos <u>as God</u> who becomes and is man. In so doing Aquinas likewise guarantees that the Logos <u>is</u> man and exists <u>as man</u>. Since the human nature is united to the very person of the Logos, the Logos must subsist in it and thus truly <u>be man</u>.

> 'Whatever adheres to a person is united to it in person, whether it belongs to its nature or not. Hence, if the human nature is not united to God the Word, it is in no wise united to him; and thus belief in the Incarnation is altogether done away with.... Therefore, inasmuch as the Word has a human nature united to him, which does not belong to his divine nature, it follows that the union took place in the person of the Word....' 2

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1. <u>Ibid.</u>, III, 1,1,ad.1.
2. <u>Ibid.</u>, III, 2,2.

While it may seem paradoxical, but nevertheless true, what Aquinas is pointing out is that the union must be in the person of the Logos if it is to be really the Logos who is man, and thus the 'becoming' must be the uniting of the human nature to the very person of the Logos as he exists as God if it is to be really man that the Logos becomes.[1]

The heart of Aquinas' Christology has now been reached concerning God's immutability and his becoming man. It is fairly easy to understand how Aquinas sees the incarnational act from the above, and one can see that he argues from a 'Christological logic,' that is, the incarnational act must be such because revelation demands it. However, can a rational philosophical underpinning be given to it, not only by way of apologetic, but also by way of clarifying and giving a deeper understanding. After all, is it not true, for example, that 'whatever acquires a new nature is subject to substantial change;...Then if the hypostasis of the Son of God becomes to subsist anew in human nature, it appears that it was substantially changed.?'[2] Aquinas believes that such a criticism can be answered as well as giving a philosophical rational to what faith demands if one understands the type of relation established in the Incarnation.

Aquinas grants that 'become' usually implies change, but it can happen that

> 'whatever is predicated relatively [by way of relation] can be newly predicated of something without its being changed, as a man may be made to be on the right side without being changed, and merely by the change of him on whose left side he was. Hence in such uses, not all that is said to be made is changed, since it may happen by the change of something else....Now to be man belongs to God by reason of union, which is a relation. And hence to be man is newly predicated of God without any change in him, but by a change in the human nature, which is assumed to a divine person. And hence when it is said, "God was made man," we understand no change on the part of God, but only on the part of the human nature.' 3

Thus, 'This union,' writes Aquinas 'is not really in God, but in our way of thinking, for God is said to be united to a creature inasmuch as the creature is really united to God without any change in him.'[4]

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1. For the difference of meaning between the concepts of 'assume' and 'unite' see Ibid., III, 2,8.
2. S.C.G., IV, 40,3. See S.T., III, 16,6,obj.2.
3. S.T., III, 16,6, ad.2.
4. Ibid., III, 2,7,ad.1. See III,2,7, and ad.2. Also III,6,6, ad.2. Also III Sent., d2,q.2,a.2,sol.3,ad.2. Also III Sent.,d.5,q.1,a.1, sol.1.

In placing the incarnational act within the conceptual framework of relations, Aquinas has made an original contribution to Christology. However, on first reading the above, it seems to raise more questions than it answers. The obvious initial reaction is that such a relation is no relation at all. God may appear to be related, but really is not. It only seems so to our way of thinking. For this reason a short study of Aquinas' understanding of relations must be made before trying to explicate exactly what Aquinas is trying to say about the incarnational act as relational.

3. Mixed Relations: e.g. Creation

For Aquinas while relation is a genus, it is unique among other genera. Of all the genera

> 'only in relations alone is found something which is only in the apprehension and not in reality. The other genera, such as quantity and quality, in their strict and proper meaning signify something inherent in a subject. But relation in its own proper meaning signifies only what refers to another [ad aliud].' 1

Quantity and quality signify what pertains to the subject in himself, weight or whiteness, and thus signifies something. Relation, however, does not posit a new reality in the subject, rather it is apprehended as referring one subject to another. This does not mean that relations are mental constructs imposed on reality, rather relations are apprehended as an association between two subjects which in some sense exist.

Relation by definition involves two extremes, terms or subjects. Now the relation between two subjects can be logical or real and it can be logical or real in three ways. Both terms can be logically related, really related, or the relation can be logical in one term and real in the other. This last can be called a mixed relation. Basically then for Aquinas there are three classes of relations.[2] The first two must be briefly examined and the third at greater length.

The first class is called logical relations (rationis relatio) or

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1. S.T., I, 28,1. See De Ver. 1, 5, ad. 16. For a complete study of Aquinas' teaching on relations see A. Krempel, La Doctrine de la Relation Chez Saint Thomas, (Paris: J. Vrin, 1952).
2. S.T., I, 13,7.

relations according to reason (secundum rationis). Both terms are logically related when the relation 'is in idea only, as when mutual order or habitude can only be between things in the apprehension of reason.'[1] For example, when reason conceives a relation 'between being and non-being....apprehending non-being as an extreme.' Or a relation due to an act of reason, as genus and species, and the like.[2] Logical relations are established by the mind and its understanding of the terms and is not due to the terms themselves. This does not mean that there is no basis in reality for the relation, but that the relation does not exist in reality, but in the apprehending mind. For this reason logical relations are sometimes called 'unreal' relations. However, it must be kept in mind that to call such relations unreal is not to say that there is no relation between the terms. For unreal relations to mean that would be a contradiction of the very definition of relation. Moreover, when two terms are related logically, nothing in the reality of the terms undergoes change since the relation is made in the mind. To say that Fido is related to the canine species does not change Fido or the canine species. ¶ Real relations

> 'are realities as regard both extremes, as when for instance a habitude exists between two things according to some reality that belongs to both....(such as) quantity: as great and small... and the same applies to relations consequent upon action and passion, as motive power and the movable thing, father and son, and the like.' 3

Real relations are the most commonly considered and experienced. The relation is due to something in the reality of the terms themselves and what establishes the relation is due to something they have in common or brings about some change in the terms due to some causality. One person is relatively taller than another for both have height in common. A brother and sister are related because they have the same parents in common. A man is not a father until he has a son.

Aquinas also maintains that besides having relations that are mutually logical or mutually real, it is also possible to have a relation that is real in one term and logical in the other. 'Again, sometimes

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1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.

a relation in one extreme may be a reality, while in the other extreme it is an idea only: and this happens whenever two extremes are not in the same order.'[1] By 'order' Aquinas means ontological order. Such mixed relations exist between creator and creature, knower and know, and, as has been seen, between the Logos and his humanity.

Besides the above examples of mixed relations Aquinas on a number of occasions gives the example of being on the right or the left.[2] For a man to move from the right to the left of a column only is a change as far as the man is concerned. The relation is real in him. However, it is only logical for the column since right and left is due to man's conceptual understanding of place and being on the right or left in no way affects the column. Aquinas in using the example of being on the right or left has caused a great deal of confusion in understanding what he means by a mixed relation. If Aquinas means this example to be a true and literal example of the case in point, i.e., a mixed relation, then he must change his definition of what a mixed relation is for being on the right or left has nothing to do with the terms being in different ontological orders as his definition claims they should be. It would seem that Aquinas uses this example not as a literal case in point, but as an example analogous to real mixed relations. Using this analogous example, which is taken from empirical everyday life, Aquinas can give some idea of two main features of a mixed relation, i.e., how one term (logical term) can be related to the other term (real term) only because the latter is related to the former, and thus also how and why the logical term remains unchanged. Aquinas seems to use this example only when he wants to convey these two points. However, it should be noted, and this is the main reason for treating this point, that in failing to be an example where the terms are in different ontological orders Aquinas gives the impression that to be a logical term in a mixed relation means there is no relation to the real term other than that man's mind so conceives it to be. Man's mind brings the relation about. In reality the logical term has no relation to the real term at all. If that were the case God would not in reality be creator, man in reality would not be a knower, and the Logos in reality would not be man, but only so conceived to be in man's mind. Those critics of Aquinas who take the

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1. Ibid.
2. Ibid., I, 13,7; III, 16,6, ad. 2.

right and left example as a true mixed relation can rightly criticize Aquinas if that is what he means with regards to God as creator, the Logos as man as well. However, it would seem that Aquinas does not mean that. In a true mixed relation the logical term is in a radically different situation as will be seen. Nevertheless, this ambiguity will keep appearing in Aquinas' treatment of mixed relations.

In order to gain a true understanding of this type of relation and at the same time as a preliminary to fully understanding Aquinas' notion of the Incarnation it would be good to analyze the relation between creator and creature.

In explicating Aquinas' understanding of God it was shown that God is ontologically distinct from finite reality. Thus while both God and finite beings exist, there mode or order of being is distinct. Nevertheless, if God as pure act is the cause of all other acts, and if God alone can be the only sufficient reason for the existence of finite beings, then some relationship is necessarily implied.[1]

For Aquinas 'Creation signified actively means the divine action, which is God's essence, with a relation to the creatures. But in God relation to the creature is not real, but only a relation of reason; whereas the relation of the creature to God is a real relation....'[2] Creation signifies action on the part of God, but being pure act creation signifies no other action than the act by which God is, that is, as <u>ipsum esse</u>. This does not mean that God by necessity creates, but rather God as pure act creates by no other action than the pure act that he is.

To create then is to bring something into being. Creation pertains not to the fact that beings are of such and such a kind, what they are, but rather to the fact that beings of any kind are at all. 'To create is, properly speaking, to cause or produce the being of things [<u>esse rerum</u>].[3] Thus while a created being is always of a certain kind, it is called created 'because it is a being, not because it is this being.'[4] Thus to create is 'to produce being absolutely, [and] not as this or that being.'[5] This is why to create is to make something from nothing.

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1. Cf. <u>S.C.G.</u>, II, 11. <u>De Pot.</u> 7,8. <u>S.T.</u>, I, 28,1, ad. 3.
2. <u>S.T.</u>, I, 45,3, ad. 1.
3. <u>Ibid.</u>, I, 45,6.
4. <u>Ibid.</u>, I, 45,4, ad. 1.
5. <u>Ibid.</u>, I, 45,5.

If creation pertains to the being of things then there can be no-thing previous to creation. Thus one can only figuratively speak of 'before' creation since ultimate nothingness nullifies that there is anything to which something could be before. Nothing signifies the complete absence of being and all that flows from being.[1] Likewise then to create does not imply motion, change, or succession, for motion, change, and succession only take place in previous existing beings or state of affairs. As Aquinas states: 'In every change or motion there must be something existing in one way now and in a different way before, for the very word change shows this. But where the whole substance of a thing is brought into being, there can be no same thing existing in different ways.'[2] One conceives of creation as a change only because one imagines a state of non-being previous to creation, but this is only imagined since there is nothing and 'no before' creation.[3] Mascall puts this nicely when he states that while 'creation does indeed "make a difference" to the creature, and the most radical of all differences, since were it not for creation there would be no creature at all; nevertheless, were it not for creation there would be no creature to which this difference could be made.'[4]

Thus to create does not imply a change in the creature, but something much more radical and dynamic, the establishing of the creature itself as existing. The effect of creation in the creature is the creature itself, the fact that it is and was not. 'In creation it is not non-being that receives divine action, but the thing which has been created.'[5] The effect pertains not to the essence of the creature by way of change, but to the esse of the creature, and the effect is esse itself. 'Creation is not a change,' writes Aquinas, 'but the very dependence of the created act of being upon the principle from which it is produced.'[6] Thus one sees why the relation of creature to creator is real in the creature. It is more real than any other real relation that may exist between two creatures which implies change, for the real effect of the relation

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1. Cf. Ibid., I, 45, 1-3. Also S.C.G., II, 11. Also De Pot. 3,1.
2. S.C.G., II, 17,4. Cf. S.C.G., II,19. Also De Pot. 3,2.
3. Cf. S.T., I, 45,3, ad.2. Also S.C.G., II, 17.
4. E.L. Mascall, Existence and Analogy, p. 145. Cf. E.L. Mascall, Via Media, (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1956), p. 31ff.
5. De Pot. 3,3, ad.1.
6. S.C.G., II, 18,2.

is nothing other than the fact that the creature is a creature, an existing being. As Aquinas states: 'Creation places something in the thing created according to relation only; because what is created, is not made by movement, or change....Creation in the creature is only a certain relation to the creator as to the principle of its being.'[1]

It should be rather obvious now why for Aquinas God creates by no other act than the pure act that he is, and also why God's relatedness to creatures is logical. To produce being absolutely, which implies the complete absence of being of any sort, demands a being who absolutely is, whose very essence is to be, who is ipsum esse.[2] Thus to create demands that God acts by no other act than the pure act that he is as ipsum esse for no other act will do. But if the act of creation demands that God act by no other act than by the act that he is as ipsum esse then obviously creation does not change or effect God. The whole effect is in the creature precisely because it is in being related to God as ipsum esse that he comes to be. That God is only logically related to creatures is not something negative, but rather specifies and clarifies the exact nature of the real relation in creatures; that is, a relatedness to God as he is in himself as ipsum esse which effects the very coming to be and continued existence of the creature.[3] Thus God as pure act must be immutable not only because he is pure act, but also, since creation demands a cause that is pure act, he must by necessity be immutable to be creator as well. If God changed or was affected by the act of creation, it would mean that he acted by some other act than by pure act, which is impossible both because God is pure act and can have no other act, and because no act other than pure act can create.

It should be noted then that for God to be the logical term of the relationship does not mean that he is not closely related to the creature. Just as was seen above that to say that creation does not mean change, does not imply a lack of dynamism, but rather something more dynamic than

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1. S.T., I, 45,3. To be utterly dependent on the creator does not imply loss of independence, but rather the establishment of the creature's independence. See Gilson, Spirit of Medieval Philosophy, p. 30.
2. Cf. S.T., I, 45,5. Also S.C.G., II, 21. Also De Pot. 3,4.
3. For the fact that creation and preservation are the same see S.T., I, 9.2; I, 8,1; I, 104,1. Also De Pot. 5,1.

any change or movement could be, so now to say that God is logically related to creatures demands a closeness to creatures which is far greater than any mutually real relation. If in creation God creates by no other act than the pure act that he is, and if the creature is only by being related to the very act that God is, then God is present in the creature by his very essence, by the pure act that he is. For Aquinas 'God is said to be in all things by essence, not indeed of the things themselves, as if he were of their essence; but by his own essence; because his substance is present to all things as the cause of their being.'[1] Even Pantheism falls short of such a close relationship, for in Pantheism God is never fully present as he is in himself, by his essence, but by some lesser emanation or divine spark of his being.

At the start it was pointed out that a relation which is real in one term and logical in the other takes place when the two terms are in distinct ontological orders. What Aquinas means by this is now clear. The relationship is between two distinct ontological orders precisely because the relationship establishes one of the orders, i.e., the lesser order. It is not as if both terms existed prior to the relationship and then were related by some third mediating act, but the very relation is one of bringing into being the lesser of the terms, and the relation is real in that term precisely in that the term comes to be and exists. It is logical in the other term because the second term is totally dependent for its existence on being related to the first term <u>as the first is in itself</u>, and not by any other act. Thus one sees that to describe a relation as logical in one term and real in the other is to predicate a creative relationship, and one then that is supremely dynamic and intimate.

It is at this point that the difficulty in Aquinas first alluded to in his example of being on the right or left can be solved. First however the problem must be accentuated. Aquinas consistently states concerning the logical term of a mixed relation such as God that 'the relation is not really in God, but only in our way of thinking.'[2] What does Aquinas mean by this? Does he mean that God is not actually related to creatures as the column is not actually related to the man on its right, but only conceived to be related by man's conceptual understanding?

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1. <u>S.T.</u>, I, 8, 3, ad. 1.
2. Cf. <u>S.T.</u>, I, 13,7; III, 2, 7, ad. 1. Also <u>S.C.G.</u>, II, 13, 4. Also <u>De Ver.</u> 3, 2, ad. 8. Also <u>De Pot.</u> 7, 8-11.

If God's relation to creatures in purely due to our way of thinking, then in reality he is not creator nor in the Incarnation man. From explicating the creator/creature relationship it is impossible to think that this is what Aquinas means. Aquinas himself states that 'It cannot be said, however, that these relations exist as realities outside God.'[1] Moreover he himself gives this interpretation as an objection to his own position.[2]

What Aquinas could mean is that 'to man's way of thinking' God as creator establishes a relation in which he acquires something new and thus is changed. To man's way of thinking God in creating not only is God in himself, but now because of the creative relationship receives a new note of being a creator. However, while this is man's way of thinking it is not true, for 'if a relation were predicated of God as really existing in him, it would follow that something accrues to God anew, and thus is changed either essentially or accidentally,' which is impossible since God is ipsum esse.[3] While man may think this way, even though it is false, it would not seem to be what Aquinas means when he uses the phrase 'to our way of thinking.'

What Aquinas does mean is that we understand God to be related to man, not because of some effect or change in him, but solely and precisely because the creature is really related to God. It is only because the creature is related to God in a new way, such as a creature, that we understand God in a new way, as creator. God is creator not because we so conceive him to be, but we understand that he is creator because creatures are really related to him in a creative relation.[4]

Thus God for Aquinas is in reality creator, but he is creator not because of a newness within his being, but because in reality something is newly related to him as he is, the creature. It is because the creature is really related to God as the source of its being, that God is actually related to him as creator. Thus one can say that while God is the logical term of a mixed relation in that he does not change, nor establishes the relation by some mediating act, but by relating the creature to himself as he is, he nevertheless is actually related to the

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1. S.C.G., II, 13, 1.
2. Cf. S.T., I, 13,7, obj. 5. Also De Ver. 3,2, obj. 8.
3. S.C.G., II, 12,5.
4. Ibid., II, 13,4.

creature because the creature is really related to him. Such an interpretation of Aquinas is witnessed by what he himself states concerning the name 'Lord.' 'Since God is related to the creature for the reason that the creature is related to him; and since the relation is real in the creature, it follows that God is Lord [and thus Creator also] not in idea only, but in reality, for he is called Lord according to the manner in which the creature is subject to him.'[1]

The basic confusion lies in Aquinas' ambiguous use of the expressions 'logical term' and 'logical relation.' He never explicitly distinguishes the difference between being a 'logical term' in a mutual logical relation and being a 'logical term' in a mixed relation. When he uses this concept in the two situations the distinction is evidently there, but he never devotes a '<u>questio</u>' to it. The distinction is that the logical terms in a mutual logical relation are related by man's conceptual understanding. Man in his understanding relates Fido and canine species. The same is true of the example of being on the right or left. However, in a true mixed relation, the logical term is related not because man establishes the relation in his mind, but to the fact that <u>in reality</u> some second term is really related to it as it is in itself and not by any mediating action, and thus <u>in reality</u> the logical term is actually related. The logical term is understood in a new way because of the real effect in the second term. While in both instances the logical term remains unchanged, since nothing new adheres to its being (and this is why Aquinas uses the term in both instances), yet in a mixed relation a further note is added to the concept of 'logical term,' that of <u>actually</u> being related to the second term because the second term is really related to it.

The lack of this clear distinction between the different meanings given to the concept 'logical term' due to the different situations in which it is used, obviously can cause confusion and ambiguity. Giving 'real relation' the meaning of a relation that denotes and effects some newness in the terms, Aquinas continued to use 'logical relation' to express a relation that does not denote or effect a newness in the term. One wonders if Aquinas in taking over Aristotle's terminology did not fail to realize how much he had changed Aristotle's understanding of mixed relations since Aristotle never dealt with such relations as

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1. Cf. <u>S.T.</u>, I, 13,7,ad.5. See ad.1. Also <u>S.C.G.</u>, II, 11,2.

creation and the Incarnation imply. However, that is another problem and another study. Ideally, there should be a different word to express the full truth contained in the use of 'logical term' in a mixed relation. Unfortunately Aquinas did not find one, nor does it seem that he thought he needed to; and no one has found one since. In the above 'actual relation' was used to express the reality of the relation, but only to give the full meaning to the concept 'logical relation' as used in a mixed relation. Real relations are obviously actual also.[1]

Before closing this section on relations it should be noted that Aquinas also sees the relation between the knower and the known as a mixed relation. It must suffice to say that the effect of the relation is real in the knower in that the knower comes to be the known in a universal and immaterial way and thus is related to the known as the known <u>is</u>. The known object is logically related to the knower in that it remains unchanged, and yet <u>actually</u> is related to the knower since it is known. The interesting point being that unlike the creator/creature relationship, an 'incarnational' aspect is present. The real effect in the knower is not that it makes a copy of the extramental object. If these were the case, he would not know the object as it is, but only the copy. Rather the knower in the act of knowing <u>comes to be</u> in a universal and immaterial manner, through the power of the intellect, <u>the object known</u>. For Aquinas then truth lies in the judgement that what the knower has come to be is what is or is not in reality.[2]

4. <u>A Mixed Relation: the Incarnation</u>

With the above exposition of a mixed relation exemplified by the creator/creature relationship, one can easily and quickly see now why and how Aquinas places the Incarnation in such a conceptual framework. Aquinas' reasoning seems to be twofold. Firstly, it gives a philosophical rational as to how one can conceive a true incarnation. While it is a mystery, such a relation as the Incarnation implies, while unique, is

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1. Kelly <u>may be</u> proposing an understanding of a mixed relation similar to the one delineated here. Cf. A.J. Kelly, 'God: How Near a Relation?', <u>Thomist</u>, 34 (1970), pp. 216-219. Also A.J. Kelly, 'Trinity and Process: Relevance of the Basic Christian Confession of God,' <u>Theological Studies</u>, 13 (1970), pp. 412-413.
2. For a fuller exposition see <u>De Ver.</u>, 1. Also <u>S.T.</u>, I, questions 12,14,16,17,79,84,85. See also J. Maritain, <u>Degrees of Knowledge</u>, ed. 4. (London: Geoffrey Blis, 1959), pp. 112-124. Also E. Gilson, <u>Being and Some Philosophers</u>, pp. 190-215.

not completely irrational. The creator/creature relationship and the knower/known relationship are of a similar type, and even being on the right or left is somewhat analogous. All of the above, except the last, as mixed relations demonstrate how the relation can be real in one term and logical in the other and yet both be actually related. Thus when applied to the Incarnation, one can in some measure grasp how the Logos can truly remain unchanged and thus be truly God, and yet at the same time be truly man.

However, it was not only for apologetic reasons that Aquinas placed the Incarnation in the conceptual framework of a mixed relation. By so doing he also specified and clarified the nature of the 'becoming' in the Incarnation and the ensuing union. Previously, it was shown that Aquinas saw the 'becoming' as the uniting of the manhood to the Logos in such a way that the Logos subsisted in it. Looked at now from the conceptual framework of a mixed relation one can see the exact nature of the 'becoming'. The real effect in the manhood is both that it comes to be, not by way of change, but more dynamically that it comes to be or exist; and also that it is united to the Logos. It is a real and true humanity that comes to be and is related, and thus for Aquinas the real effect in the humanity is created.[1] Moreover, by maintaining that the Logos is the logical term of the relation, and this is the main point, Aquinas specifies the closeness and depth of the real effect in the humanity. The grace of union or the created relational effect in the humanity is not 'ordained to (another) act, but to the personal being [ad esse personale] of the Logos.'[2] The humanity is not united to the Logos by some mediating act, but united to the Logos as the Logos is in himself, in what Aquinas calls, his esse personale. This makes it possible to maintain that it is really the Logos as God who is man. Because the Logos as the logical term remains unchanged, and thus in turn making it possible for the real effect in the humanity to be that of coming to be and being united to the Logos as he is, one can grasp how in the Incarnation it can really be God who is man, and truly man that God is. All this can be said briefly by stating that the real created effect in the humanity is nothing other than the eternal uncreated Logos subsisting in it. As

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1. Cf. S.T., III, 2, 8.
2. Ibid., III, 8, 5, ad.3.

Aquinas says 'The grace of union [the created relational effect in the humanity] is the personal being itself [ipsum esse personale] that is given gratis from above to the human nature in the person of the Word.'[1]

While the confusion and ambiguity of Aquinas' use of the concept 'logical relation' is present in his Christology as it was in the creator/creature relationship, one can see now both from the previous study of the ambiguity and from the above how Aquinas conceives the Logos as the logical term, and what he means when he states that 'this union is not really in God, but only in our way of thinking, for God is said to be united to a creature inasmuch as the creature is really united to God without any change in him.'[2] Aquinas does not mean that the Logos is not actually related to the humanity and thus is not actually man, but only so conceived to be by our way of thinking. Nor is he just pointing out that such a relation concerning the Logos seems to us to imply change but really does not, although that may be true. What Aquinas does mean is that the Logos is understood to be related, and actually is related, not by some effect or change in him, but because the manhood is really related to him. It is because the manhood is really related to the Logos as he is that he becomes and is man, and man understands him in a new way: as man.

It may be worthwhile mentioning in concluding this section that it is only within the conceptual framework of a mixed relation that one can understand Aquinas' teaching on the number of esses in Christ. For Aquinas Christ is one being, ens, by the esse personale of the Logos, but he is one ens by the esse personale only because the created relational esse, i.e., the real relational effect in the humanity, is that it comes to be and is united to the Logos in such a way that the Logos subsists in it.[3]

5. The Passibility of God as Man

Aquinas does not contribute anything substantially new to the

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1. Ibid., III, 6,6.
2. Ibid., III, 2, 7, ad.1.
3. Cf. Ibid., III, 2,8; III, 17,2. Also De Unione Verbi Incarnate, 1, ad.10; and 4.

Church's tradition on the communication of idioms. He closely follows the teaching and arguments of Cyril.

Aquinas holds that

> 'since there is one hypostasis of both natures, the same hypostasis is signified by the name of either nature. Thus whether we say <u>man</u> or <u>God</u>, the hypostasis of divine and human nature is signified. And hence, of the man may be said what belongs to the divine nature, as of the hypostasis of the divine nature, and of God may be said what belongs to the human nature, as of a hypostasis of the human nature.'[1]

It is because one and the same person <u>is</u> both God and man that one can truly predicate to each the attributes of the other. 'God's Word and the man Christ are one supposit and, consequently, one Person, and whatever is said of that man must be said of the Word of God, and conversely.'[2] The attributes are not then predicated directly to each nature, but to the person who exists both as God and as man. 'With respect to the "about which" each class is predicated no distinction must be made, but unity is discovered. But with respect to "what" is predicated, a distinction must be made.'[3]

As with Cyril, the basis for the above is the fact that God truly <u>is</u> man, it is truly <u>God</u> who is man, and it is truly <u>man</u> that God is. Only because of this can one say with any true intelligible meaning that God hungered, thirst, died, etc.. It is because the Logos <u>is man</u> that 'every suffering that took place in the body of that man can be ascribed to the Word of God. So it is right to say that the Word of God--and God-suffered, was crucified, died, and was buried.'[4]

What must be pointed out concerning Aquinas is not so much the above, but rather the incarnational relevance of the immutability of God to his passibility as man.

It has been stressed that Aquinas in his Christology was motivated to uphold the immutability of the Logos not just for <u>theo</u>-logical reasons, but primarily for incarnational reasons. The Logos for Aquinas

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1. <u>S.T.</u>, III, 16,4. Cf. <u>S.T.</u>, III, 16,5.
2. <u>S.C.G.</u>, IV, 34, 29.
3. <u>Ibid.</u>, IV, 39,2.
4. <u>Ibid.</u>, IV, 34,11. For all the human qualities that can be predicated of Christ cf. <u>S.T.</u>, III, 14-15.

must remain immutable in becoming man, not only because he is God, but also to ensure the fact that it is truly God who is man. The same incarnational motivation is present in Aquinas' treatment of the passibility of God as man.

In ensuring that it is truly God who is man Aquinas ensured that it is truly God who is passible as man. While Aquinas does not say it explicately, what is present in his incarnational motivation for the immutability of God is the paradox that God must remain immutable in becoming man so that it is truly God who is mutable and passible as man.

This motivation and concern in Aquinas' teaching can be seen not in his teaching on the fact that it is God who is man, since God's passibility as man is not at question there, but rather in his teaching on the fact that it is really man that God is. Treating the question of 'Whether the Son of God ought to have assumed a true body?' Aquinas argues that if he did not, he firstly would not then be man, and secondly 'if his body was not real but imaginary, he neither underwent a real death, nor those things which the Evangelists recount of him, did he do any in very truth, but only in appearance....'[1] While the argument concerns the real humanity, the whole point of it is to guarantee that God is man. He who must really suffer, die, etc. is the Son of God. It is interesting to note that against the objection that this destroys the dignity of God, such as his immutability, Aquinas adroitly stresses that the incarnational act and union does not bring about a change in the Logos, but rather guarantees that it is really the Logos as God who is man, since 'he assumed a body to the unity of Person.'[2]

While much of the above treatment of Aquinas may seem abstract and 'lifeless,' it is here where all that went before gains in meaning. Every human being thirsts, hungers, suffers, dies, and for Christ to be just another man added to the human race makes little difference. It is only if Christ is truly God who as man thirsts, hungers, suffers, dies, in time and history that time and history and every human life is changed and made new.

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1. S.T., III, 5,1. Cf. III, 5,2-4. Also S.C.G., IV, 29-32.
2. S.T., III, 5,1, ad. 2.

CHAPTER 4

KENOTIC CHRISTOLOGY: 'BECOME' AS COMPOSITIONAL

The jump from Aquinas to the late nineteenth and early twentieth century is quite large to say the least. Again this gap does not imply that Christological speculation stood still. However, as will be seen, the problems which culminated in Kenotic Christology arise as far back as Luther and the Reformation and continually surface between then and the turn of this century. Looked at from that perspective the gap between Aquinas and the Kenoticists is not so great.

Because Kenotic Christology is the culmination of a long process this chapter will be introduced by a short study of Luther's Christology and the problems and speculations it spawned which lead to Kenotic Christology. However, the main concern of this chapter will be Kenotic Christology itself, and specifically Charles Gore and Frank Weston. These two Anglican bishops and theologians were chosen both because of the influence they exerted in their day, and because of the maturity of their Kenotic Christological theories.

A. Luther and Lutheran Christology

The most obvious feature of Luther's Christology is its soteriological orientation. This soteriological orientation has two repercussions. Firstly, Luther is not primarily interested in the ontological constitution of Christ as such, but rather in the functional or pro me aspects of his person. Because of this and secondly, Luther once more reverts to biblical categories of thought to express his Christology. The following exemplifies this perfectly:

> 'Christ has two natures. What has that to do with me? If he bears the magnificent and consoling name of Christ, it is on account of the ministry and the task which he took upon himself; it is that which gives him his name. That he should by nature be both man and God, that is for him. But that he should have dedicated his ministry and poured out his love to become my saviour and my redeemer, it is in that that I find my consolation and well-being. To believe in Christ does not mean that Christ is a person who is man and God, a fact which helps nobody; it means

> that this person is Christ, that is to say, that for us he came forth from God into the world; it is from this office that he takes his name.' 1

This does not mean that Luther sees no importance in whether Jesus is God and man, but rather the importance of this lies only in the function that Jesus performs as saviour and man's acceptance of him as such. As Congar states: 'For Luther, the incarnation is not only inseparable from the redemptive act; it is also considered only in the concrete exercise of the redemptive act; the metaphysical mystery of the hypostatic union is considered solely in the act of salvation of which it forms the very reality.'[2] While this complicates the attainment of Luther's understanding of the ontological structure of Christ, the main aspects can nevertheless be ascertained.

It is readily evident that Luther understands Christ to be both God and man, and yet one and the same person. Siggins very nicely lays out appropriate texts to show this. For Luther Christ is 'very God and very man'; 'two natures united to one person'; 'God and man in one person'; 'essential, natural, true, complete God and man in one person, undivided and inseparable'; ....'true God of true God, and true man of true man'; 'begotten of the Father in eternity, and conceived by the Holy Ghost, born of the Virgin Mary in time.'[3] There is no doubt that all this has a Chalcedonian ring about it. Luther himself maintains that Chalcedon was correct. Nevertheless, one can ask: How did Luther understand Chalcedon, and whether his understanding was the same as Chalcedon's?'[4]

To obtain Luther's real meaning of the formulas it must be remembered that his Christology arises mainly from his scriptural exegesis and

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1. As quoted by Yves Congar, 'Considerations and Reflections on the Christology of Luther,' Dialogue Between Christians, (London: Geoffrey Chapman, 1966), p. 374. Cf. pp. 375-376. This article first appeared in French in Das Konzil von Chalkedon: Geshichte und Gegenwart, Vol. III, ed. G. Grillmeier and H. Bacht, (Wurzburg, 1954), pp. 457-486. Cf. Ian D. Kingston Siggins, Martin Luther's Doctrine of Christ, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970), pp. 197-198, 212. Also Paul Althaus, The Theology of Martin Luther, (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1966), pp. 190-192.
2. Congar, p. 377.
3. As quoted by Siggins, pp. 205-206. Cf. pp. 191-214.
4. Cf. Siggins, p. 206. Also Congar, pp. 272-273.

soteriology and not from theological speculation. Thus Luther in reading the Gospels sees the historical concrete personage of Jesus as speaking and acting sometimes as God and sometimes as man and always as pro me. In so speaking and acting he reveals both the divine and human natures, and yet since it is the one historical person who does both, he reveals that he is nevertheless one. 'First he speaks as God, then as man. So I learn my article that Christ speaks as God and man.' Or again, 'If Christ were to speak as God all the time, we could not prove that he was true man; but if he were always to speak as true man, we could never discover 'that he is also true God.'[1] The above is reminiscent of the Antiochene form of exegesis found especially in Theodore of Mopsuestia. The divine and human sayings and actions of the historical Jesus are juxtaposed to one another, and because of this juxtaposition one comes to grasp that the natures are distinct. One feels at this point that Luther's nominalistic background is also exerting influence. This, however, raises the old problem. If the natures are juxtaposed, how are they united? What is the nature of the 'incarnational becoming?' How does God become man without compromising either the immutability of God or the integrity of the humanity? How is it that this one historical Jesus speaks and acts, at different times, as God and as man? The key to answering these questions lies in the answer to this question: Who is it who speaks and acts at different times as God and man?

Because Luther sees the natures as juxtaposed and Christ speaking and acting at one time as God and at another time as man, one would normally expect that like the Antiochenes he would be accused of perpetrating a doctrine of two Sons. Depending on what was being said or done would depend on which nature, which person, which Son was doing the speaking and acting. However, just the opposite happened. Zwingli accused Luther in the Eucharistic controversy over the ubiquity of Christ of confusing the two natures and making them one. In other words, Zwingli believed that Luther saw the union between the two natures as bringing about change and mutation in each. He believed that Luther saw the union between the two natures as bringing about a tertium quid being, that Christ was a combination of both.

In response to Zwingli Luther maintains 'We hold Christ Our Lord as God and man in one person, non confundens naturas nec dividendo personam

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1. As quoted by Siggins, p. 209.

(in such a way that we do not confuse the natures and do not divide the person).'[1] It is evident from this that Luther did not wish to hold what Zwingli accused him of, and desired to maintain a Chalcedonian understanding. However, when Luther explains exactly how the natures are unconfused and yet one person, a different picture appears.

Congar points out that Luther uses the German word Wesen both to mean 'nature' and 'person'. Thus when he wishes to make the distinction in Christ, he speaks of two Wesen; but when he speaks of Christ as one, he speaks of one Wesen. While this causes some ambiguity, one can nevertheless conclude that 'the "person" is the concrete whole constituted by the union of the divine nature with the human nature. He conceives it as a complete and concrete whole, an integral whole in the same way as the body and soul in man constitute a single person.'[2]

For Luther then the person is the historical Jesus as a whole; the result or consequent of the union of the natures. Christ, as a being, is a composite of human and divine natures as man is a composite of body and soul. The person, the being, the whole existential reality of Christ is a divine/human person, being, existential reality. Thus Christ is not the person of the Logos existing as man, but rather the concrete existential/historical being composed from and out of a divine and a human nature. It is because Christ is the coming together of both natures that he at one time speaks and acts as God, and at other times speaks and acts as man. Dorner summarizes Luther's Christology well:

> 'It is therefore characteristic of Luther, that even at a later period, in speaking of the Person of Christ, he should have always said, not, "the person of the Son united within itself the two natures;" but, "the divine and the human natures were so united with each other, that Christ was but one single person." The "Unio" he regarded principally as a "Unio" of natures, the result of which is the "Unio personalis".....' 3

Luther does not wish to imply, however, that the two natures form a terium quid nature as Zwingli accused him of doing. While the union of natures forms the one reality and being of Jesus, they remain distinct. Jesus as a whole is a divine/human reality: a God-Man.

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1. As quoted by Congar, pp. 393-394.
2. Congar, pp. 394-395. Cf. Siggins, pp. 221-228.
3. J.A. Dorner, The Person of Christ, II, ii, (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1839), p. 79. Cf. p. 99. Also Siggins, p. 224.

What must be remembered is, and this is where confusion arises, that while Luther uses 'nature' as an ontological category to express the distinct reality and non-confusion of God and man in Christ, in the concrete historical Jesus 'nature' takes on a functional or dynamic aspect as well. Thus 'divine nature' in the historical Jesus not only denotes the reality of God, but also has the added note of the reality of God working and acting to bring about salvation: divine nature equals God pro me. This is only in keeping with Luther's soteriological framework from which he views Christology. Thus while the natures are distinct, in the historical concrete whole Jesus they nevertheless dynamically interact with one another.

This is well illustrated by Luther's use of the communication of idioms. Because the Incarnation is seen as the coming together of two natures to form the one reality of Christ the communication of idioms for Luther is not divine and human attributes predicated of the one person of the Logos, but rather the mutual interchange and communication of divine and human properties from one nature to the other. Luther can say 'Mary makes broth for God,' 'Mary suckles God with her breasts, bathes God, rocks and carries him; moreover, Pilate and Herod crucified and killed God.'[1] Likewise, he can say that the man is omniscient, omnipotent, and creator.[2] However, Luther does not mean that God as man is killed by Pilate, nor that man is creator in so far as the Person who is man is God, but rather because the natures form the one whole Jesus what one nature does or undergoes is directly communicated to the other. In Luther's words: 'quae uni naturae conveniunt, toti personae conveniunt in concreto'; 'communicatio naturarum adducit etiam communicationem idiomatum'; propter unitam coniunctionem et unitatem duarum naturarum fit communicatio idiomatum.'[3]

Without contradicting the above, the formulas would seem to be reversable for Luther as well. The union of natures, the Incarnation, is brought about by the communication and interchange of properties. Dorner states:

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1. As quoted by Siggins, p. 232.
2. Cf. Congar, p. 396.
3. As quoted by Siggins, p. 232. Cf. p. 231.

'The sense he [Luther] tries to put on the formula,-- a sense it is true, different from its scholastic one,-- is the following:-- that the natures themselves, in their actuality, are so united, that the deity possessed humanity as a proper determination of its own being, and the humanity was omnipotent. In one word, he used the formula to denote a real mutual communication, not merely of attributes, but with the attributes, of the substance of the natures.' [writer's italics]

In a following footnote Dorner points out texts in Luther where 'communication of attributes' is equivalent to 'union of natures.'[1]

Whatever one thinks of Luther's Christology, one thing is evident: It is not 'an unexceptionable statement of Chalcedonian orthodoxy.'[2] This is easily brought out by enunciating the problems contained in it pertinent to this study and which Chalcedon eliminated.

The basic error in Luther's Christology resides precisely in his notion of the 'incarnational becoming.' For Luther the Incarnation takes place because of a union of natures forming the divine/human reality of Christ. The 'becoming' is once more compositional, the coming together of natures, rather than existential and personal, the coming to be, the coming to exist of the person of the Logos as man. Like Nestorius and Eutyches before him, Luther conceives in his mind the natures as distinct and separate prior to the union and the 'becoming' as the union of the two. Because the 'becoming' is seen as a union of natures, of bringing them together to form one whole, Luther must either tend to Nestorianism if he does not see a substantial union between them or to Monophysitism if he does. Like Nestorius Luther's Christ is a divine/human person, but unlike Nestorius and like Eutyches and the Monophysites Christ is not just the union or interchange of appearances, but a substantial union of the natures with an actual intercommunion of properties. Luther's notion of 'become,' though he would deny this as he did against Zwingli, always seems to be verging on meaning the natures mutually 'changing into' one another. Thus there is an irreconcilable tension in Luther's Christology. While he wishes to maintain the integrity of both natures, he nevertheless wishes them to form the whole existential reality of the historical Jesus. He wants Jesus to be a divine/human reality, a God-Man.

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1. Dorner, p. 104 and fn. 1.
2. Siggins, p. 232. Althaus believes Luther to be completely orthodox as well. Cf. p. 191. Likewise Gustaf Aulén, Reformation and Catholicity (Edinburgh: Oliver and Boyd, 1961), p. 69-69.

What is evident is that the Incarnation is not the Logos coming to be man and existing as man as Chalcedon proclaimed. Jesus is a divine/human being, but not a being who is the divine Logos existing as man. For Luther the existential reality of Jesus is God as God in a substantial and dynamic union with a man as man, but God never is man nor does he exist as man. This tension demands resolution. Either the substantial union or the integrity of the natures must go. Luther opts for the substantial union and the integrity of the humanity is sacrificed giving his Christology a definite monophysite flavour. This gives the appearance of protecting God's immutable and impassible nature, but only if one is willing to deny the reality of the humanity and human experience. None of which Luther wished to do.

The tension and monophysitism is very easily seen and exemplified in Luther's understanding of the communication of idioms. If the attributes of each nature interact and interchange, then logic demands that, depending on which nature is acting or dominating at the time, one or the other of the natures must lose its integrity. For example, if Jesus is prophesying the destruction of Jerusalem, or revealing the mind of God, it is the nature of God which is acting in his omniscience, and thus overriding and compromising the human intellect. If Jesus is suffering or asking questions, it is the nature of man overriding and compromising the impassibility and omniscience of God. Because of Luther's soteriological Christology the tension always has a monophysite flavour since it is only God who saves, and thus it is God who dominates the humanity.

This impossible tension with regard to the attributes is what will lead to Kenoticism especially when the notion of personhood changes from an ontological construct to a psychological construct concerning consciousness and knowledge, and the theological climate favours the humanity of Christ over the divinity.

One further aspect must be noted. Because Christ for Luther is not the Logos existing as man, and because the attributes interact and interchange between the natures and are not of the person of the Logos as he exists as God and man, it is never really God who is acting and experiencing as man nor is it really as man that he is acting and experiencing. For the attributes and properties of the natures to be exchanged means that God is acting as God and man as man with each affecting the other. When God acts in Jesus, it is always as God, but never as man. God acts in

the humanity or in the man through the communication of his attributes, and since it is through God's attributes, it is always God as God acting, and never God as man, which a true incarnation demands. The manhood is but the sign, the expression, the exemplar of God acting as God. To put it another way, when the man Jesus acts in a salvatory or pro me manner, it is really God acting as God through the communication of his properties and attributes, but never God acting as man. The human expression is purely symbolic of what God is doing transcendently as God.[1] This is precisely because Luther's notion of the 'incarnational becoming' and union is the divine nature in a compositional and juxtaposed union with a human nature, and not the coming to be and existence of God the Logos as man. This is ultimately why Luther's Christology has a monophysite bent or as Congar more precisely states: 'There is monoenergism or monopraxis, or if one will, "economic" monophysitism in this contention that God alone acts in the economy of salvation....'[2]

Luther's Christology contains too many irreconcilable tensions based on his false understanding of the incarnational notion of 'become' to

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1. This is totally in keeping with Luther's understanding of justification and sacramentalism. God never acts within and through finite reality, but finite reality is purely symbolic of what God is doing transcendently as God for us. Cf. Congar, pp. 390-392. Aulén completely misses the point of Congar's criticism concerning this. Cf. pp. 68-70. Salvation for Luther is a divine/human action as Aulen says, but it is never an action of God as man, but an action of God as God in a man. This is clearly seen in Luther's hook/worm analogy for the crucifixion. God as God hooks the devil and overcomes him as God. The humanity plays no causal role other than that of bait. It is not God as man who conquers sin, death, and the devil, but God acting in the man Jesus. Cf. Congar. p. 383.

   In passing, it would seem that Luther has a modalistic understanding of the Trinity. The Son is but the pro me expression of the Godhead. Cf. Congar, p. 397 and fn. 96.

2. The basic problem is that Luther tried to forget 1500 years of Christology and return to pure biblical Christology. He tried unsuccessfully to avoid ontological speculations on the person of Christ. The Christological problems which forced him into a untenable Christology were precisely the ones that traditional Christology dealt with. Congar quoting Aristotle very aptly sums up the affair: 'Rarely, perhaps, has Aristotle's saying in the Protreptius been more apposite: "If you are obliged to philosophize then you must do so, and even if you are not obliged you will still have to philosophize."' Congar, p. 400.

remain unresolved for long. But, as the following will show, the reconciliation will always be attempted within Luther's false understanding of 'become,' and thus no real and true solution will be forthcoming.

The first major controversy over coming to some sort of consistent understanding of Luther's Christology was that between the theologians of Giessen and those of Tubingen (1616-1624).

The Giessen theologians maintained that the simultaneous juxtaposed dualism of the God-Man in Christ ultimately destroyed the unity of person, and the doctrine of ubiquity the full integrity of the earthly manhood. They proposed a two state theory of the Incarnation. In the earthly Jesus the divine attributes such as omnipotence, omniscience were held in abeyance by God in order that the humanity would be real with real human attributes of growth and knowledge. However, in the resurrected Jesus the divine attributes are once more activated and the humanity becomes fully divinized. In so proposing this theory the Giessen theologians believed they maintained the oneness of person since the divine attributes, which were incompatible with the human personality, are inactive and thus no dual personality arises; and that the humanity thus remains truly human while on earth, and yet divinized and ubiquitous through the ressurection.[1]

The Tubingen school believed that such a notion of the Incarnation denied the full divinity of Christ, and thus that <u>God</u> did not really become man. Contrary to the Giessen school, they proposed that the divinity was not restrained, but only hidden. Jesus contained the fullness of divine nature with the fullness of attributes, but that the earthly humanity concealed them. Giessen believed this to be truly Docetic and Monophysite. Even though hidden, the divine nature nevertheless <u>in reality</u> destroys the humanity even while on earth.[2]

What is important to note at this point is only that the respective

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1. The early Lutheran Christological controversies are always tied up with their Eucharistic doctrine of the ubiquity of Christ: How Christ is present in many places through the Eucharist.
2. For the history of the controversy and the respective teachings see Dorner, pp. 281-307; Herman Bauke, 'The History of Christological Doctrine,' <u>Twentieth Century Theology in the Making</u>, Vol. II, ed. Jaroslav Pelikan, (London: Collins--Fontana Library, 1970), pp. 127-129; Francis J. Hall, <u>The Kenotic Theory</u>, (New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1898), pp. 13-15. Hall is excellent not only for his critique of the Kenotic theory, but also for his precise and clear statement of the Catholic tradition within the context of the questions raised by Kenotic Christology.

criticisms of each school by the other are correct. Giessen compromised the immutability of God and in so doing the fact that it is truly God who is man. Tubingen, on the other hand, is truly Docetic, destroying the integrity of the humanity, and thus the fact that it is truly man that God is. What both schools failed to realize is that they were both wrong for precisely the same reason. Both conceived the incarnational notion of 'become' as implying change and mutation due to the fact that they saw the Incarnation as a substantial compositional union of natures. The problems on the second Christological level concerning the communication of idioms arises solely from a false understanding on the first Christological level concerning the union--'the becoming.' This will be the case through-out.

The controversy was obviously never resolved, but a modified form of the Giessen theory became the most popular. This modified form is exemplified by the nineteenth century Hegelian theologian, Dorner. Dorner's Christology can be seen as a gradual or progressive incarnation. The union between God and man is such in Christ that only gradually and progressively does the divinity exercise a complete possession of the humanity. This progressive take-over allows for human growth and only in the end culminates in a full-blown God-Man reality--a complete Incarnation.[1]

While one sees in the above controversy a very marked tendency towards a Kenotic Christology due to Luther's understanding of the union, it was not until the nineteenth century that Kenoticism flowered both in Germany and England. In the meantime new factors and questions had entered the theological milieu. The rise of the nineteenth century historical movement caused renewed interest in critical biblical exegesis especially in trying to get back to the historical Jesus and his teaching. Thus the true humanity of Christ came to be stressed. Moreover, and more importantly for Christological speculation, the Kantian revolution turned philosophy away from the study of the ontological structures of reality to questions of the psychology of personal and subjective consciousness and thought processes. Thus the consciousness and knowledge of Jesus came under close scrutiny. These new influences added to the Lutheran

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1. Cf. Dorner, pp. 97-101, 298. Also Hall, p. 14. Also J.M. Creed, The Divinity of Jesus Christ, (London: Collins--Fontana Library, 1964), pp. 84-85.

Christological framework (thought by many to be Chalcedonian and traditional) coalesced into a Christological question whose only possible answer could be Kenotic. Dawe proposes the Christological questions of the time:

> 'How could a limited human consciousness coexist in a single person with the full actuality of the divine consciousness? Would not the presence of the infinite and impassible Logos vitiate the uniquely human personality which is limited and changeable?.... [How could a limited human person] be conceived if the integrative or personalising centre of Jesus' person was the Logos which by definition is omnipotent, omniscient and omnipresent?' 1

All of these questions take on the appearance of the divine vs. the human, and for the theologians of the nineteenth century in Germany and England these questions were real questions. In actual fact they are basically pseudo-questions, questions that arise only because of false presuppositions concerning the nature of the Incarnation.

In Germany two schools of Kenotic Christology are evident. The most radical Kenotic theory is that proposed by such men as Gess and Godet. The main line of their thought consists in the fact that the Logos ceased existing in the form of God and took the form (changed into) a human soul. Unlike Apollinaris who held that the Logos took the place of the soul, these men saw a complete metamorphosis. Hall quoting one of them states, 'The Logos "remains Who he was, though he ceased to be what he was."'[2] During the incarnational period the Father takes over the Logos' divine functions of preserving and governing creation.

Thomasius and others, on the other hand, are less radical. Thomasius wished to distinguish between the absolute and relative or economic attributes of God. The relative attributes of God are those which do not pertain to God as God, but to his relation with the world such as omnipotence, omniscience, and omnipresence. The absolute attributes of God as God are truth, holiness, and love. It was God as God with these absolute attributes who became incarnate in Christ. The Logos

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1. Donald Dawe, 'A Fresh Look at the Kenotic Christologies,' Scottish Journal of Theology, 15 (1962), 342. For an excellent and thorough study of the theological milieu of the time see John Stewart Lawton, Conflict in Christology, (London: SPCK, 1947), pp. 1-110.
2. Hall, p. 15.

emptied himself of his relative attributes in becoming man. In making this distinction Thomasius believed that he had isolated those attributes which were incompatible with a true human personality and intellect, and yet guaranteed that it was truly God in his love and holiness who really was man.[1]

Criticism of these theories will be delayed until after Gore's and Weston's Christology has been given. What should be noted, however, is that Kenotic Christology directly confronts the subject studied here. How can God remain immutably himself as God, and yet really become man without change or mutation, and moreover, without destroying the integrity of the humanity, and thus the fact that it is really man that he is? Gess and Godet seem to hold that it is impossible, and Thomasius tries to find a way out. Gore and Weston will also, but whether any succeed is the question.

B. English Kenotic Christology: Charles Gore and Frank Weston

The theological atmosphere in England was basically the same as that already stipulated above. The catalyst of Kenotic Christology for Gore and for the subsequent movement in England was the question of Christ's knowledge.[2] Gospel evidence showed Christ to be lacking in knowledge. For example, as to the authorship of Old Testament books, Christ thought that Moses was the sole author of the Pentateuch; but biblical scholarship has shown this to be false. Also Christ admits that he does not know when the end of the world will come. The question then arises how can Christ be truly God with omniscience, and yet be truly man with limited knowledge? Gore and Weston try to maintain both the true divinity and humanity of Christ, yet allow for the fact that Christ did have limited knowledge as the Gospels seem to demand.

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1. For these respective theories and others see Hall, pp. 15-20; Dawe, pp. 343-344; Creed, pp. 80-81; Fredrich Loofs, 'Kenosis,' Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics, (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1914), ed. J. Hastings, 7:680-687; A.M. Ramsey, From Gore to Temple, (London: Longmans, 1960), pp. 32-33. The last was published in the U.S.A. under the title, An Era in Anglican Theology.
2. Other examples of English Kenoticists are: A.M. Fairbairn, The Place of Christ in Modern Theology, (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1894). P.T. Forsyth, The Person and Place of Jesus Christ, (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1909). In America, William Newton Clarke, An Outline of Christian Theology, (New York, 1899).

It is not surprising then that Gore first proposed his Kenotic Christology in his Lux Mundi essay 'The Holy Spirit and Inspiration' for it is in trying to guarantee that what God reveals is true, and yet subject to worldly and cultural conditions that the problem of Christ's knowledge and ignorance arises.[1] It is in reaction to criticism that Gore formulates his mature Kenotic theory.

In his Bampton Lectures of 1891 Gore fully argues that there is in Christ 'real growth in mental apprehension and spiritual capacity, as in bodily stature.'[2] Nevertheless, the Gospels also show that Jesus is conscious of his pre-existence and union with the Father, yet 'he does not appear to teach out of an absolute divine omniscience, but rather as conditioned by human nature.'[3] The conclusion that Gore consistently comes to from his exegesis is 'Unmistakenly is our Lord there put before us as the eternal Son of the Father incarnate, but it also appears that the Son of the Father is living and teaching under human conditions.'[4]

One would not wish to argue with the basic tenor of Gore's exegesis on these points. The historical Jesus as portrayed in the Gospels is obviously conscious of and reveals his divine nature and filial relation to the Father. Likewise it is obvious that, if he is man as the Gospels also demand, his consciousness and knowledge be human and thus subject to human conditions. The problem arises when one tries to answer: How can this be?

'For this purpose,' writes Gore concerning the above problem, 'it was necessary that He should be without the exercise of such divine prerogatives as would have made human experience or progress impossible.'[5] How is this done? Following St. Paul in Phil. 2:5-11, while Jesus in his pre-existent state and form as God contained all perfection and divine prerogatives, nevertheless

> 'For love of us He adjured the prerogatives of equality with God. By an act of deliberate self-abnegation, He so emptied Himself as to assume the permanent characteristics of the human and servile life: He took the form of a servant....Thus, remaining in unchanged personality, He abandoned certain prerogatives of the divine mode of existence in order to assume the human.' 6

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1. Cf. Charles Gore, ed. Lux Mundi, (London: John Murray, 1889), pp. 315-362, especially pp. 359-360.
2. Charles Gore, The Incarnation of the Son of God: The Bampton Lectures, 1891, (London: John Murray, 1898), p. 145. Hereafter referred to as B.L..
3. Ibid., p. 147. Cf. pp. 147-150.
4. Ibid., p. 149.
5. Ibid., p. 157.
6. Ibid., pp. 157-158. Since this is a dogmatic study, the exegesis of Phil. 2:5-11 will not be studied. Suffice it to say that Kenotic

The Incarnation for Gore is a two-fold process: 1) the real self-emptying of divine prerogatives or attributes; 2) and the taking on of a human nature with its attributes. Gore stresses this when he states:

> 'In a certain aspect indeed the Incarnation is the folding round the Godhead of the veil of the humanity, to hide its glory, but it is much more than this. It is a ceasing to exercise certain natural prerogatives of the divine existence; it is a coming to exist for love of us under conditions of being not natural to the Son of God.' 1

What should be noted in the above is that Gore in no way wants to deny that it is God who is man. As a matter of fact the whole theory is constructed to uphold the fact that it really is God who is man. In speaking of the Logos' 'self-emptying,' and 'abandonment of certain divine prerogatives' Gore does not wish to say that the Logos ceased being God. Such expressions for Gore only imply that the Logos gave up those attributes which would vis-à-vis against it really being God who is really man, and in so giving them up guaranteeing that it is really man that God is.[2]

This is clearly seen in Gore's more scholarly treatment in Dissertations. There he states: It will not

> 'suffice to say that the Son was limited in knowledge, &c., in respect of His manhood, so long as we so juxta-posit the omniscient Godhead with the limited manhood as to destroy the impression that He, the Christ, the Son of God, was personally living, praying, thinking, speaking, and acting--even working miracles--under the limitations of manhood....The real Incarnation involves a real self-impoverishment, a real self-emptying, a real self-limitation on the part of the eternal Word of God.' 3

Christology primarily sprang from dogmatic issues, and the use of Phil. 2:5-11 is more an isegesis than an exegesis. It seemed to back-up an already pre-conceived Christology.

1. Ibid., p. 158
2. Lawton seems a little unfair on this point. Cf. pp. 38-39. He seems to think that Gore is only concerned with the true humanity of Christ. Gore obviously was concerned, but for incarnational reasons. He wanted God to really be man. For a response to Lawton see James Carpenter, Gore: A Study in Liberal Catholic Thought, (London: Faith Press, 1960), pp. 181-182.
3. Charles Gore, Dissertation of Subjects Connected with the Incarnation, (London: John Murray, 1907), pp. 203-204. Hereafter referred to as Diss..

For Gore no juxtaposition of natures, consciousnesses or intellects will do, for such a juxtaposition denies that God really is man. However, to overcome such a juxtaposition, to make it possible for the Logos to really be man, demands a self-limitation of his divinity. It is the self-limitation that guarantees that it is really the Son who is man, that the Son really is man, and that it is really man that the Son is.[1]

The fact that Gore wishes to maintain the true divinity of the Logos can also be seen in that, unlike the Germans Gess and Godet, he does not see the Logos losing his cosmic functions during the Incarnation. As creator and sustainer of the universe he remains omnipotent and omniscient.[2]

Weston, while sympathetic to Gore's theory, is uneasy about the real self-emptying on the part of the Logos that Gore sees as a necessary pre-condition for the Incarnation.[3] Weston has good reason to be doubtful about this as will be seen shortly.

Weston himself maintains that no self-emptying is necessary, but only self-restraint. In becoming man God wished to reveal himself fully, but in becoming man he must reveal himself within the limits that manhood allows. 'Taking then,' writes Weston, 'these opposite truths into consideration we can see that the Incarnate Son must at every moment live under the law of self-restraint as to all His divine powers, in some measure. The measure of self-restraint is the capacity of the perfect manhood to receive, assimilate, and manifest divine power.' The Logos does not abandon any divine prerogatives or attributes, but rather he restrains 'whatever measure of divine power that manhood cannot mediate.' The whole restraining process is dependent on the humanity. As Weston states: 'It would appear that the measure of His self-restraint was not one and the same at every period of His development. It varied as the capacity of his manhood varied.'[4] If the Logos becomes man, he can never violate the capacity of the manhood, and thus the controlling principle of the restraining process is the capacity of the humanity. 'He it is who imposed upon Himself the perpetual law of self-restraint according to the measure of the capacity of the manhood that he should assume.'[5]

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1. Cf. ibid., pp. 93, 206.
2. For a good summary of Gore's Christology see ibid., pp. 94-95.
3. Cf. Frank Weston, The One Christ, (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1914, revised edition), pp. 124-127.
4. Ibid., pp. 152-154.
5. Ibid., p. 163.

Weston believes that, unlike Gore's real self-emptying, his notion of self-restraint helps one to grasp better how the Logos can maintain his cosmic functions while incarnate and also his immutability as God.[1] The Logos in no way abandons his divine attributes, but merely restrains them in his incarnational relation with the humanity. He is then better able to guarantee that it is really God who is man. Likewise the 'law of self-restraint' guarantees that God is truly and really man with all that that implies.[2]

C. The Failure of Kenotic Christology

Gore admits that his Christology has little or no support in Christian antiquity. He very honestly shows this to be the case in his essay in Dissertations.[3] Nevertheless, he has 'no hesitation in claiming that the theological conclusion we have arrived at is wholly consistent with the actual dogmatic decisions of ecumenical councils....'[4] Is Gore as consistent with the councils as he thinks?

All of the above Kenoticists from the early German Lutherans to Weston make the possibility of a true Incarnation dependent upon some type of limitation of God as God. Depending on whose Christology it is the Logos either has to 'abandon,' 'empty,' 'limit,' or 'restrain,' some aspect of his nature in order for him to truly become man. In other words, the Logos as he exists in himself as God cannot become incarnate. Thus as incarnate, Jesus is not the Logos as he exists personally as God who is man, and exists as man; but the Logos in some lesser degree or expression. Some sort of change is demanded. While most Kenoticists, and this is especially evident in Gore and Weston, want it to be God the Logos who is man, they nevertheless feel that it cannot be the Logos as he fully exists as God without destroying the manhood. The Logos in some manner has to gear himself down to a human level if he is to become man.

The basic concept used by the Kenoticists, whatever it may be, be it Gore's 'real self-emptying' and 'abandonment' of certain divine prerogatives, or Weston's 'self-restraint,' destroys the immutability of God.

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1. Cf. ibid., pp. 149-150.
2. For a good summary of Weston's Christology see ibid., p. 325.
3. Cf. Gore, Diss., pp. 98-207; especially p. 202.
4. Ibid., p. 207. Cf. p. 212.

The Logos must cease in some way being as he is in himself as God and thus change. The change required is not only impossible since God is immutable, but even impossible to conceive. How can an omnipotent being give-up or restrain his omnipotence? How does an omniscient being give up or restrain his omniscience? Likewise hard to conceive is how a being who is said to be God because he is omnipotent and omniscient give them up or restrain them, and yet remain God? Even on a human level this is ontologically impossible. How can a man remain man if he gives up or restrains his rationality; and how could he possibly do it? Rationality is an essential element of what it means to be a man.[1] Even harder to conceive is the distinction between relative and absolute attributes. Is it not because God is omnipotent, omniscient, omnipresent that he is all-loving and all-holy, and vice-versa? The attributes of God are not accidental parts or diverse elements of a complex substance that can be lost without his ceasing to be God. They signify what it means for God <u>to be</u> God, what he is in himself as God in the simplicity of his absolute being. Hall sums it all up:

> 'To lose Divine attributes is to cease to be God, for that is not God which does not possess the Divine nature, and the Divine nature is that and that only which possesses all Divine attributes. Kenoticists undoubtedly sacrifice the truth of Divine immutability.' 2

However, this study is not just interested in the immutability of God for God's sake, but also for the sake of the Incarnation. God must be immutable not only because he is God, but also because the Incarnation demands that it really be <u>God</u> who is man. Any change in the Logos as God in the incarnational process, i.e., if the 'becoming' implies or demands that the Logos as God change, then it is no longer really God who becomes and is man. The Kenoticists, while trying to maintain that the Logos, despite his kenotic state, is nevertheless Son of God, cannot maintain, because of his kenotic state, that he is <u>homoousion</u> with the Father as incarnate. In Kenotic Christology the Logos as he is in himself as God is not man, but always some reduced 'species' or expression, and therefore one cannot truly say that it really is God who is man, nor then that it is man that God is. The Kenoticists completely miss the incarnational aspect

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1. Cf. Lawton, pp. 149-150.
2. Hall, p. 234. Cf. pp. 97-105.

of the Logos' immutability. This is clearly seen in Gore.

Gore argues that 'the fathers of the Council [Nicea] had only moral alterability in view in their ecclesiastical decision....'[1] In other words Nicea was not concerned with the Logos' metaphysical immutability in condemning Arius, but only with God's 'unchanging redemptive purpose.'[2] Gore's ignorance of the doctrinal questions and implications raised by Arius and answered by Nicea is surprising, but his ignorance forces him to miss the whole point of Nicea. Even though Nicea only spoke of moral alterability, Gore continues, 'even in regard to metaphysical alteration, it must be remembered that in the view here presented the limitation of which the incarnate Son is the subject is regarded 1) as not affecting His essential being or operation in the universe, 2) as not imposed from without but an act of His own power....'[3] Comment has already been made on the possibility of Gore's second point, but what is important is that he maintains that the Logos must be immutable, no metaphysical alteration, for the sake of God, in 'His essential being or operation in the universe.' But that is not the point nor the question Nicea answered. Nicea was not primarily concerned with the fact that the Logos is <u>homoousion</u> with the Father for the sake of his being God <u>apart from the Incarnation</u>, in his cosmic functions. The whole point of Nicea was to proclaim that the Logos <u>as man</u> is <u>homoousion</u> with the Father. The <u>homoousion</u> is to guarantee that the Logos as incarnate is nevertheless, fully God as the Father is God, and not just God as the Father is God apart from the Incarnation. The apologetic for the immutability guaranteed by the <u>homoousion</u> was motivated not solely for the sake of God as God, but mainly for the Incarnation, to guarantee that it is really <u>God</u> who is <u>man</u>. It is precisely here as incarnate that Gore and Weston (with his concept of 'self-restraint') and all Kenoticists deny the <u>homoousion</u>. They always and only maintain that the Logos is immutably and perfectly God, <u>homoousion</u> with the Father, outside the Incarnation, but not within the Incarnation. It is within the Incarnation that Nicea proclaims its <u>homoousion</u>. Arguing again Gore

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1. Gore, <u>Diss.</u>, p. 208.
2. <u>Ibid.</u>, p. 209. Gore maintains that 'self-accommodation' of the Logos is 'not mutability,' but 'self-adaptiveness.' Cf. p. 209. This seems to be a perfect example of a distinction without a difference. Actually for Gore if God is completely metaphysically immutable, the Incarnation could not take place. Cf. <u>Diss.</u>, pp. 131, 173.
3. <u>Ibid.</u>, pp. 208-209.

states: 'The view expressed above involves no limitation of the divine activity of the Word absolutely in Himself or in the world, but only within a certain area.'[1] It is precisely within that 'certain area' as man that Nicea's homoousion doctrine falls, and where Kenotic Christology fails. The Logos must be immutable in becoming man for he must be homoousion with the Father as man. The Logos as incarnate in Kenotic Christology is never homoousion with the Father, for in Kenotic Christology the Logos as incarnate is always 'self-emptied,' abandoning his 'divine prerogatives,' or 'restraining' his divinity.[2]

It may be good to mention that one should not get the impression that because the above criticisms were made that sanction has been given to the opposite extremes feared by the Kenoticists. Apollinarianism or Monophysitism is not the answer to Kenoticism. As was stated in the beginning, the questions that the Kenoticists tried to answer were pseudo-questions. Thus the possible answers open to them were pseudo-answers: Kenoticism or Monophysitism. This will be evident in the end.

For the Kenoticists the self-emptying or restraining of the Logos was necessary in order to guarantee both that it is really God who is man and really man that God is. While the above shows that the self-emptying renders it impossible to say that it is really God who is man, the irony is that it also renders it impossible for it to be really man that God is.

The whole Christological problem for the Kenoticists revolved around the problem of Christ's consciousness and knowledge. In order to guarantee that Christ had a human consciousness and intellect, the Kenoticists thought it necessary for the Logos to empty or restrain his omniscience. However, what one ends up with in the Kenotic Christ is not a real human consciousness or knowledge, nor a real humanity, but rather an adapted divine consciousness and knowledge tailored to a human level. Lawton sees this clearly.

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1. Ibid., p. 210.
2. Cf. Hall, pp. 147-148. Mascall's observation is very pertinent here: 'The real source of objection would seem to be an assumption that the divine nature, considered as distinct from the divine Person, can be excluded from the sphere of the Incarnation altogether, as if in the Incarnate Lord there were simply a divine Person united to a human nature. Thus there seems to be an implicit denial of the truth that the divine Person and the divine nature are really identical and only logically distinct;....' E.L. Mascall, Christ, The Christian and the Church, (London: Longmans, 1946), p. 24.

'According to Gore, it is the Logos himself who constitutes Christ's human consciousness; it is his will which is restricted, it is his mind which is limited. Surely this is nothing less than a modern Apollinarianism; for all that is left is a truly human body; the portions of the Lord's psychic make-up which in olden times were regarded as elements in human nature are not regarded as constituents of individual personality, and hence in Christ's case belong to the Deity.' 1

This can be clearly exemplified in two ways.

In his later work Belief in Christ, Gore rejects the fact that Christ has two consciousnesses, two intellects, and two wills, believing that such a theory demands the destruction of the human consciousness, intellect and will. He maintains instead that the Logos emptied his divine consciousness, intellect, and will in such a manner so as to be the consciousness, intellect, and will of the humanity.[2] The upshot is that in doing this Gore ends up being what he feared the most--Apollinarian or Monophysite. The consciousness, etc. of Christ is not really human, but merely the divine consciousness, etc. brought down to a human level. Christ has no real human psychological functions, but truncated divine psychological functions taking the place of the human.

The second way the problem is exemplified is in the resurrection. Because the earthly Jesus is a retarded Apollinarian Christ at the resurrection logic demands that Jesus become a full fledged Apollinarian Christ. The only other alternative is to hold that the Logos is still self-emptied after the resurrection, and thus still not fully God.[3]

Gore, while wishing to maintain that Christ is both God and man after the resurrection, nevertheless has to refer to the affects of the resurrection in Apollinarian or Monophysite terms.

> 'Before His resurrection, He, very God, is acting under conditions of manhood; since His glorification He, very man, is living under conditions of Godhead. First the Godhead exhibits itself under conditions of manhood, and then the manhood is glorified under conditions of Godhead. 4

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1. Lawton, p. 154. Cf. Mascall, p. 12. Also Dawe, p. 341.
2. Charles Gore, Belief in Christ, (London: John Murray, 1922), p. 227. Hereafter referred to as Belief.
3. Cf. Hall, p. 153. Also D.M. Baillie, God was in Christ, (London: Faber & Faber Ltd., 1961), p. 97.
4. Gore, B.L., p. 163. Cf. Diss., p. 95; Belief, p. 227.

This is even more evident in the German Kenoticists who univocally predicate divine omnipotence, etc. to the glorified Christ. Weston, however, sees in the post-resurrected Christ the Logos as 'yet still in some sense limited.'[1]

It is because the Logos takes the place of a real human consciousness, intellect, and will that Kenotic Christology always gives the impression that the Incarnation is a pure pagan mythological metamorphosis. God turns into a man.[2]

From the above one must conclude with Hall that no Kenoticist

> 'can acknowledge consistently that our Lord, during His earthly life was, as the Council of Chalcedon defines, "perfect in Godhead and also perfect in Manhood....the distinction of natures being by no means taken away by the union, but rather the propriety of each nature being preserved, and concurring in one Person and one subsistence."' 3

The question is why were the Kenotic theologians forced into a Kenotic position? Why did they feel it necessary to limit in some way the divinity of the Logos in order that it might really be the Logos who is man and man that he is? Above all why were they doomed to failure, necessarily undermining everything they wished to guarantee and profess? There are two basic reasons both of which should be evident.

The first reason is that the Kenoticists presume that the nature of the incarnational union -- 'the becoming' -- is compositional. The divine and human natures are distinct and separate before the union and come together in a substantial and compositional manner. Whenever the union is conceived in this manner, the union always implies and demands change in the natures, compromising either or both the divinity or humanity. If one wishes to guarantee the immutable divinity and the integrity of the humanity, the only alternative is to deny the substantial union, which is of no real help since that means that God is not man. The basic problem is one of conceptuality. The Kenoticists, under the influence of Luther who himself has affinities with Nestorius in conceiving the natures as separate prior to the union, and with Eutyches

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1. Weston, p. 195.
2. Cf. Baillie, pp. 96-97; Creed, p. 82; Hall, p. 232; Loffs, p. 687.
3. Hall, pp. 228-229. Cf. Lawton, p. 148.

in conceiving them as substantially united after the union, conceived the 'incarnational becoming' as the bringing together of two incompatible modes of being and making them one.

It is because the Kenoticists conceive the 'becoming' as compositional that the questions they try to answer are pseudo-questions. The questions always take the form of the divine vs. the human. Would not infinite consciousness and knowledge obliterate the limited and finite consciousness and knowledge? Of course it would, if one sees the union as compositional. The more powerful being always devours the weaker being if they are fused together. The only way out, if one sees the union as compositional, is to lessen or restrain the more powerful being. This is precisely what the Kenoticists did. The point is that the problem -- divine vs. human consciousness and knowledge -- is a false problem based on a false notion of the incarnational union -- 'the becoming.'

As soon as one sees the incarnational act, the 'becoming,' not as the substantial compositional union of natures forming a new being, but as the person of the Logos taking on a new manner or mode of existence, of <u>coming to be</u>, <u>coming to exist</u> as man, the question and problem as asked and understood by the Kenoticists disappears. The 'becoming' no longer threatens the immutable divinity of the Logos, nor the integrity of the manhood; but just the opposite. It establishes and guarantees that it is the Logos, in his <u>unqualified</u> divinity, who now is and exists <u>as man</u>. Thus <u>as man</u> the Logos, without any change in his divine nature, possesses a human intellect and will, and thus human consciousness and knowledge. It is only because the Kenoticists understood the union as compositional that they believed the duality of wills and intellects, as sanctioned by the Councils, demanded the obliteration of one or the other. It is only in a compositional framework that they become mutually exclusive.

However, there is another false presupposition in Kenotic Christology which is both an example and precipitating cause of the above. The tension in Luther's Christology was felt primarily in his use of the communication of idioms. The union of the natures which gave rise to the one person/reality of the God-Man demanded that the attributes of each nature were directly communicated to the other. In itself this is an impossible situation, but tolerable because of the ontological framework from which Luther worked. The attributes ontologically resided in each nature and are communicated to the other. However, once a psychological framework

is put in its place and the attributes no longer reside ontologically in the nature, but are seen as what constitutes a person as such, the situation becomes intolerable as well. To define personhood as psychological self-consciousness makes Luther's use of the communication of idioms impossible to conceive. How can one person, who is defined by his self-consciousness, have two self-consciousnesses, two intellects, two wills without destroying the person? Only a negative answer can be given. A person can have only one self-consciousness etc. since that is how he is so defined. This is precisely what happened in Kenotic Christology. Seeing the incarnational act as compositional, plus the nature of personhood as psychological self-consciousness demanded that, if the Logos was man, then the Logos as man must lose his divine self-consciousness and knowledge. The result of the compositional union of natures demanded that the person of Christ have only one set of psychological attributes for that is what defines a person as a person. Lawton clearly states this:

> 'A being who possessed two sets of psychological functions, two wills, for example, would to these thinkers have been not simply one person, but two. Person was no longer a principle of individualization, an ego, but a set of psychological functions....nothing but a monophysitism in modern dress was intelligible; for the two natures even if separated in but the slightest degree as regards psychical operation would have dissipated the unity of Christ's person.' 1

The upshot is that in men like Gore and Weston in denying the Logos his divine 'psychological' functions <u>as incarnate</u>, and yet wishing to maintain them for the Logos <u>as divine</u> in his cosmic functions end up proposing a dual Logos. In defining 'person' in terms of what Christian tradition and early Councils defined as 'nature' the Kenoticists were forced to hold some sort of duality of person rather than a duality of natures. Lawton again states this well.

> 'Perhaps the chief intrinsic objection to the theory is the fact that on the given psychological presupposition of the age, it is difficult to see how one can avoid speaking of the Logos having become by the Incarnation two persons.'
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> 'In the ancient system there is a duality of a sort: two natures are believed to be possessed by a single substantial Person; what

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1. Lawton, p. 117. Cf. pp. 114-117, 255. Cf. Mascall, pp. 41-42.

> has here happened is that the duality has been pushed back a stage--instead of a duality of natures we have a duality of Logos consciousness....' 1

Once one ceases to define personhood in purely psychological constructs of self-consciousness and knowledge and gives to it the status of ontological individuality, the problems and questions as conceived and understood by the Kenoticists disappear. It is no longer a question of divine self-consciousness vs. human self-consciousness, but the one person of the Logos ontologically existing as God coming to be and existing as man and as man conscious of himself and knowing. The Logos does not lose his divine consciousness, intellect, or will; but in becoming man possesses all that pertains to man because he is man. The question is no longer divinity vs. humanity, but one of how the divine Logos acts and functions as man, as incarnate.

This is not the place to give a thorough discussion of the topic of Christ's human consciousness and knowledge. Let it suffice to say that since the Logos, remaining immutably himself as God, exists as man, then as man, in a totally and truly human way, he becomes conscious of and knows himself to be God and man; and in a human ways knows, wills, experiences, and interacts with reality. It is God the Logos as man who can say in a human manner 'I am God,' and likewise 'I am man.' The 'I' is always that of the divine Logos, but it is the 'I' of the divine Logos conscious of and knowing himself as man. As man the Logos knows himself to be God and man, and not just as God.

This is wholly in keeping with the main principles of this study, as well as with all the Conciliar statements. If God truly is man, if it is truly God who is man, and truly man that God is, then it must be truly God who is conscious of himself and knows himself as man. This is but a further and contemporary application of the communication of idioms. The attributes of human consciousness and knowledge are not predicated of God as God, but to the divine person of the Logos who exists as man.

As for the problem of divine omniscience obliterating the human intellect, again this ceases to be an impossible dilemma. If the incarnational act -- 'the becoming' -- is the Logos coming to be and existing as man, if the 'becoming' guarantees not only the substantial

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1. Lawton, pp. 153 and 155.

union 'without division and separation,' but also the distinction and full integrity of the natures 'without confusion and change,' then as man the Logos cannot be omniscient in any univocal sense of God being omniscient. It is an impossibility both from God's side and man's side. However, the effect in the humanity, of its coming to be and being related to the Logos as the Logos is in himself as God so that the Logos as God subsists in it and is man, demands that the humanity be perfect, that the Logos as man be a perfect man. Such an effect in the humanity would imply a literally unimaginable and unspeakable mystical union and knowledge, but one that does not compromise the humanity, but perfects it. Even in the resurrection the humanity of Christ does not cease to be truly human, and thus neither does his consciousness and knowledge. The resurrection is the everlasting glorification of Jesus -- the Logos as incarnate -- and thus it is the quintessence of the Incarnation, and with it the fruition and effulgence of God's love for man as a man.

The Kenoticists can be said to be the first modern Christologists since the questions they dealt with are still those of contemporary theologians: Christ's consciousness and knowledge. Their failure to arrive at a suitable solution resided not in their good will, but in their uncritical and unknowing acceptance of Luther's understanding of the incarnational union -- 'the becoming' --, and their reducing the Incarnation to psychological concepts. Whether contemporary theologians have learned from their mistakes and have given up their false presuppositions and notions is another question.

CHAPTER 5

PROCESS CHRISTOLOGY: 'BECOME' AS PREHENSION

When one approaches Process Christology with the questions treated in this study, one immediately becomes aware that the questions vanish. To confront a process theologian with the question how God can remain immutable in becoming man and be passible as man is to ask him a non-question. In denying that God is immutable and proposing that God's nature is one of change Process Christology completely and utterly dissolves the questions.

It should be noted then in the very beginning that because the questions treated in this study vanish in Process Christology much of the discussion in this chapter may seem unrelated to the questions at hand. This chapter will bear little resemblance to discussions in previous chapters. However, what must be kept in mind is that much of the discussion will be the analysis of the reprecussions due to the absence of the questions studied here. Moreover, unlike previous challenges to traditional Christology, Process Christology denies the very premises on which traditional Christology is based. In its complete denial of God's immutability Process Christology is the ultimate challenge to the Christological position proposed by traditional Christology and maintained here. For these reasons this chapter is of the utmost importance.

In order to do justice to Process Christology this chapter will be divided into three sections. The first will deal with the process theologians' critique of traditional theism since much of what they say is in reaction to it. Secondly, an exposition of the main features of Process Theology and Christology will be given. The third section will examine the philosophical and theological viability of that position.

Because Process Theology and Christology has accumulated such a prodigious bibliography it is impossible to treat all of the literature here. This chapter will emphasize the thought of three men: Norman Pittenger, David Griffin, and Schubert Ogden.[1] They have been chosen

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1. The primary works of these men used in this chapter are: Norman Pittenger, The Word Incarnate, (London: James Nisbet and Co., 1959). Hereafter referred to as W.I.; God in Process, (G.P.), (London: SCM Press, 1967); Process-Thought and Christian Faith, (P.T.C.F.), (New York: Macmillan Comp., 1968); Christology Reconsidered, (C.R.), (London: SCM Press, 1970). David Griffin, A Process Christology, (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1973). Schubert M. Ogden, The Reality of God, (London: SCM Press, 1967).

primarily because of their substantial contributions to Process Christology. Nevertheless, reference to other process theologians will be made, especially when they make a point more clearly than the above. However, it is safe to sanction Pailin's comment:

> 'Process theologians such as John Cobb, Schubert Ogden, Norman Pittenger, P.N. Hamilton, J.E. Barnhart, and Danial Day Williams [add D. Griffin, T.W. Ogletree, R.E. James, J.A.T. Robinson, and Pailin himself] seem basically agreed in their way of interpreting the mode of God's incarnation in Jesus. 1

A. The Critique of Classical Theism

The religious motivation behind Process Theology is to make belief in God and Christ viable for secular man. However, it is the old classical supernatural theistic notion of God and Christ which makes it impossible for secular man to take Christianity seriously. Ogden explains why this is the case.

> 'For one thing commitment to secularity entails acceptance of logical self-consistency as one of the necessary conditions for the truth of any assertion. And yet, as some three hundred years of careful criticism have shown, the main assertions of classical theists are utterly incapable of satisfying this condition.' 2

Because classical theism understands God 'as actus purus, and thus as statically complete perfection incapable in every respect of further self-realization, God can be neither increased nor diminished by what we do and our action, like our suffering, must be in the strict sence wholly indifferent to him.'[3] Implied in the metaphysics of classical theism is the false Platonic presupposition that to change is bad. For God to be actus purus, and thus immutably and impassibly perfect, means that he is a static and inert substance. He is so unlike creatures that he can have no concern for them.

The reason the God of classical theism can have no concern for

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1. David A. Pailin, 'The Incarnation as a Continuing Reality,' Religious Studies, 6 (1970), pp. 318-319. For Christological references to the above mentioned see the bibliography.
2. Ogden, p. 17.
3. Ibid., pp. 17-18.

creation is because, as actus purus, he can have no relation to creation.

> 'He is said to be a reality which is in every respect absolute and whose only relations to the world are purely nominal or external relations of the world to him...: Accordingly, the attributes or perfections by which the nature of God is classically defined--pure actuality, immutability, impassivity, aseity, immateriality, etc.--all entail an unqualified negation of real internal relationship to anything beyond his own wholly absolute being.' 1

While traditional theism tries to speak of God knowing and loving the world 'the cash value of such speaking....is that God is the metaphysical absolute, nothing more. The fully justified assertion that God is not literally related to the world (if by "literal" is meant in the same way as we are related to it) proves on examination to mean that he is literally not related to the world.'[2]

The heart of the problem lies in the fact that classical theism is supernaturalistic. Christianity in becoming supernaturalistic was not true to the Biblical notion of God, but fell into the snare of Greek philosophical concepts of 'substance' and 'beings-in-them-selves,' thus forcing God to be unrelated to the finite world.[3] To say that he is related highlights the fact that 'supernaturalism, at best, is a maze of inconsistencies' unacceptable to the rationality of secular man.[4] The cry that there is a mystery present 'has been unmasked as logical confusion.'[5] The supernaturalistic and wholly transcendent conception of God forces God to be 'as Camus has charged, the eternal bystander whose back in turned to the woe of the world.'[6]

Ogden states well the main objections to classical theism which process theologians as a group hold.[7] Only one further criticism needs

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1. Ogden, pp. 48-49.
2. Ibid., p. 50.
3. Cf. ibid., pp. 57 and 118.
4. Ibid., p. 50.
5. Ibid., p. 51.
6. Ibid.
7. Cf. Norman Pittenger, 'Process Thought: A Contemporary Trend in Theology,' Process Theology, ed. Ewert H. Cousins, (New York: Newman Press, 1971), pp. 26-28. Also W.I., pp. 147-149, 176-180. Also C.R., pp. 15-17, 136-137. Also G.P., pp. 14, 18. See also Ewert H. Cousins, 'Process Models in Culture, Philosophy, and Theology,' Process Theology, pp. 14-15. See also Griffin, pp. 161, 163-164, 186-188, 224-225. See also Charles Hartshorne, The Divine Relativity, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964), pp. 15-17. See also Ralph James, The Concrete God, (New York: Bobbs-Merrill Comp., 1967), pp. 83-86.

to be made which is common among them.

Pittenger makes this criticism well when he states that because classical theism sees God as all-powerful, almightly and all-perfect, etc. 'the usual picture has been of an external ruler who pushes, thrusts, twists, moves his subjects at will, with little or no regard for their own capacities and little or no concern for their own self-realization. God is a dictator.'[1] The God of classical theism is an 'aloof and distant deity....[the] static Absolute and the all-powerful monarch....'[2] Classical theism and 'the Church gave unto God the attributes which belonged exclusively to Caesar.'[3]

This is indeed a devastating array of criticisms. The only problem is finding someone or some position to whom or which they refer. One knows to who they are meant to refer--the Fathers and scholastic theologians, especially Aquinas--but as Gilkey states: 'What process philosophers of religion call "classical theism" is a strange hodgepodge that bears little historical scrutiny....'[4] The first three chapters of this study bear out Gilkey's comment. However, a few brief remarks seem in order.

The desire for logical self-consistency may be an admirable trait in secular man, but it is dubious whether he is the first one to see its importance, or that it is any more a part of his make-up than it was in the cave man of pre-history, the early Christian, the medieval scholar, or the nineteenth century historian. Truth, and not secularity, demands logical self-consistent arguments, and everyman of every age, be he secular or not, has understood this.

What the argument of logical self-consistency on behalf of secular man comes to is that certain men in contemporary society find it hard to logically reconcile their world-view with the traditional notion of God and Christianity. This is not an uncommon occurrence in any age. Christ himself seems to have met such people. To presume however that unlike the non-believers of previous generations, secular man's world-view

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1. Pittenger, C.R., p. 137.
2. Cousins, p. 15.
3. Albert North Whitehead, Process and Reality (New York: Free Press, 1969), p. 404.
4. Langdon Gilkey, 'A Theology in Process: Schubert Ogden's Developing Theology,' Interpretation, 21 (1967), p. 449.

is correct is to beg the question. Traditional theism and Christian doctrine may be illogical within secular man's world-view, but then his world-view may not be as self-consistent as he thinks. Moreover, to accept willynilly secular man's world-view as true may be doing him a disservice by letting him persist in his ignorance. Such a disservice when it pertains to the knowledge of God and Christ is great indeed.

To answer fully the criticism that classical metaphysics deals in static 'substances' and 'natures' would carry one far afield. Suffice it to say that Aquinas did not understand 'substance' and 'nature' to be some kind of material stuff. There is no such thing as a block of human 'substance' in every human being. Substance for Aquinas usually denotes a being of a certain nature or kind. To have the substance of human nature is to be a rational animal. Moreover, as was seen, Aquinas himself says that strictly speaking God is not a substance. It is difficult to see where the process theologians received this notion. It would seem to be close to Berkley's or Locke's notion of substance.[1]

As for the criticism that the scholastics and the Greeks considered things as 'beings-in-themselves,' one only needs to ask if it is possible to metaphysically consider reality in any other way without denying its existence. As will be seen, Process Philosophy itself speaks of beings-in-themselves -- actual occasions. The only difference between actual occasions and such 'beings' as men and elephants is that actual occasions are smaller. The real question then is whether it is more true to speak of men and elephants existing in themselves, or of actual occasions?

The core criticism is that classical theism in making God supernatural, immutably perfect and impassible, has made him static, inert and totally unrelated to the world and man. The first three chapters of this study show this to be a totally false understanding of the Christian tradition. For the Fathers, and even more so for Aquinas, to say that God is immutable and impassible is to predicate of God complete perfection, which perfection does not make him static or inert, but supremely active and dynamic. Process theologians, when criticising classical theism, always equate perfection with being static and inert, as if the more perfect a being is, the more static it becomes. Such a notion is a contradiction of terms,

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1. It is interesting to note that Ogden (p. 57) and Griffin (p. 170) quote Descartes as a case in point. Descartes' understanding of 'substance' is hardly Aquinas'.

and the most common of human experiences bears this out. A man who is the most free from psychological problems, and even more so from sin, who actualizes his talents and becomes more perfect does not become static on inert, but the most dynamic and creative of men. As will be seen, in spite of their criticism of classical theism, process theologians maintain this common sense view of perfection in their own notion of God.

One feels that process theologians when speaking of the static perfection of God are thinking of something like the static and immutable perfection exemplified in Michaelangelo's 'David.' Michaelangelo freezes in marble the perfection of David. However, the perfection of David is immutable and static precisely because it is expressed in a statue made of marble. If David had the perfection portrayed in Michaelangelo's statue, he was anything but static. Process theologians seem to be reading into classical theism their materialistic notion of substance: that to be a 'substance' is comparable to being a hunk of marble.

Classical theism then, unlike Plato, does not see change as bad, but for what it really is: part and parcel of being finite. Change as change is neither good nor bad, but it can be good or bad depending on whether it increases or decreases the perfection of the creature. Not to predicate 'change' of God in no way degrades changes in creatures; but rather posits that, unlike creatures, God is wholly perfect and actual. God does not change because it is bad, but because it is impossible. The real problem lies in the fact that process thought equates change <u>ipso facto</u> with good, and thus has a problem grounding that belief since it is obvious that not all change is good.

Moreover, the criticism that the theistic notion of God means that God as transcendent and supernatural is not 'literally' related to the world, but only nominally or externally related does not hold up. Process theologians attribute to classical theism the Platonic notion of transcendence where God is not only other than the finite world, but apart from it. While the early Fathers did have trouble with this, Nicea broke this understanding of transcendence. Also while there may be some ambiguity in Aquinas' use of the concept 'logical term' when applied to God as related to the world, it is fairly easy to see that he does not mean that there is no relation as Ogden maintains. Ogden's remark that God is not literally related to the world 'if by "literal" is meant in the same way we are related to it,' is true. However, it does not follow

that God is then 'literally not related to the world.' As was noted, Aquinas' understanding of God's logical relation to the world means that he is in a real sense more intimately related to the world and man than a man is related to the world and other men. Men must relate themselves by mediating acts, by real relations, but for God to be logically related to the world means that he is related, not by a mediating act, but by the very act that he is in himself.

Ogden's distinction between external and internal relations is very revealing. It is fairly easy to grasp what an internal relation is. It is one where two 'things' are constitutively related to form a being, such as body and soul. (This will be looked at more closely later.) However, it is difficult to conceive exactly what an external relation is. It seems to mean that one thing is related to the outside of another thing but not to the inside, as a TV antenna is related to the outside roof of a house. This seems to be a rather narrow scheme for classifying relations. Beyond that no classical theist would ever think of conceiving of an outside and inside of God much less that the world is related only to the outside of him. What the distinction reveals is that for process thought only internal relations are possible, and to speak of any other type must mean that they are external or non-existent. Such a conclusion is highly dubious, or at least not applicable in criticising classical theism's view of the relationship between God and the world.

It is true that classical theism and Christianity are super-naturalistic. God and the world are in different ontological orders. Philosophically this distinction is based on classical theism's notion of creation. Theologically it is rooted in the traditional notion of revelation. Whether Process Philosophy can maintain a viable understanding of reality without such a notion of creation, and thus a supernatural God; and whether Process Theology can remain in any real sense Christian without such a notion of revelation will be judged later.

In concluding this section the question must be asked: How can the God of traditional theism, at one and the same time, have no relation to the world and man, since he is the 'eternal bystander'; and yet be a dictator, monarch, and Caesar who 'pushes, thrusts, and twists' etc. all his subjects? In criticising classical theism the process theologians have given to the theistic notion of God a 'mystery' far greater than any proposed by its defenders.

B. Process Theology and Christology

While process theologians do not have a good grasp of classical theism and scholastic philosophy, this in no way implies that they do not have something better to offer of their own. Whether they do or not must be judged on its own merits. Thus their basic position must be given.

Philosophically process theologians follow the lead of A.N. Whitehead and C. Hartshorne. Their philosophy grew out of the basic principle that change is the universal element of reality. Thus, as a philosophy, elements of process thought can be traced all the way back to Heraclitus through such men as Hegel, Leibnitz, Spinoza, and even Plato.[1] There is also an affinity between Process Philosophy and the Eastern Philosophies, especially Buddhism. From a scientific perspective, Process Philosophy leans heavily on the theory of biological evolution for moral support.

The fundamental units of reality in Process Philosophy are what Whitehead calls 'actual entities' or 'actual occasions.' They are atomic not only in space, but in time. Each actual occasion lasts but a moment. The essence of an actual occasion is to experience, and thus it can also be called an 'occasion of experience.' This does not mean that each actual occasion is conscious. Rather as Griffin states:

> 'Every entity is a pulse of experience which is "something individual for its own sake." It is a throb of emotion, a brief moment of self-enjoyment. This means that every occasion is a subject, something for itself, not merely an object, something for others.' 2

What it means for an actual entity to experience is summarized in the concept 'prehend.' This is a key concept for understanding the process notion of God and the Incarnation. 'To prehend' is for one actual occasion to take into itself previous actual occasions. Thus each successive actual occasion prehends a multiplicity of past actual occasions. However, it prehends them only as objective since each occasion adds its own subjective novelty in the prehension. In turn this subjective actual

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1. Cf. Larry Azar, 'Whitehead: Challenging a Challenge,' The Thomist, 30 (1966) pp. 80-87. Also Edward Farley, The Transcendence of God, (London: Epworth Press, 1962), pp. 140-142.
2. Griffin, p. 168.

occasion passes away becoming an object to be prehended by successive actual occasions.[1]

What should be noted here is that prehension is a relational concept, the relation of actual occasions to one another. It is an internal or constitutive relation in that the prehension of past occasions are constitutive of the reality of the present occasion. Thus 'to prehend' is not an epistemological concept, but primarily an ontological concept. 'To prehend' is not primarily a present occasion coming to know a past occasion and taking it into account, but rather the present occasion in prehending is at least partially constituted in its ontological reality by the past. It is because the past occasion is ontologically constitutive of the present occasion that, as will be seen, the past in some conscious complex society of present occasions comes to be known. Furthermore, what must always be kept in mind is that this relation is always, by its very nature, one of past to present. No two actual occasions are simultaneously present to one another. If they were simultaneously present, each would lose its subjective reality since each occasion is a subject only because it is a moment of experience in itself. Prehension then is the dynamic basis of all becoming, and why the whole of reality is in process.

A whole myriad or society of actual occasions whose prehensions follow a pattern discernible in experience is an 'enduring object.' Thus, for example, 'things' like trees and rocks are not things-in-themselves, but millions or billions of actual occasions successively prehending each other in a 'tree-like' or 'rock-like' way. The term 'tree' is applied to the enduring pattern of this prehending series and not to something that endures over a period of time.

Some societies of actual occasions are complex enough to be called 'living persons.' This is due to the fact that they have a soul or mind which is a society of dominant enduring occasions that are conscious and which centralize, control, and order all other occasions of experience (the body). It is not that something is 'living,' but that the society of occasions are such as to be said 'to live,' and this is due to the 'soul' which is not one entity or principle of life, but a dominant series of occasions complex enough to be said to be 'conscious'. A human person then is not some one who has experiences, rather it is the special type

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1. Cf. ibid., pp. 168-169.

of experiences that give rise to the person.[1]

Thus a person's self-identity is not that one and the same being called John exists over a period of time, but rather that 'John' is an enduring society or pattern of occasions which are able to remember through successive prehensions the past actual occasions that make him an enduring pattern or society. It is not 'I' in the present who remembers 'me' in the past, but rather it is the present prehending occasions which remember the 'me' of the past and in so doing give rise to the 'I' of the present.[2]

An actual occasion in prehending a past actual occasion does not just prehend it solely as it is, but in making it a part of itself conforms it to its own subjective aim -- that is, makes it conform to the present occasion's end.[3] An actual occasion receives its subjective aim, which is a value or good to be actualized, from God. For Process Philosophy then God is necessary in that without his ideal aim or lure present to and active in each prehending occasion the world would be chaotic and lacking in novelty. This does not mean that an occasion loses its freedom, since God gives a multiplicity of values (some better than others) to each prehending occasion from which the occasion can choose.[4] Now each actual occasion in prehending the past occasion, along with the divine lure and making them its own in the subjective prehending immediacy of its subjective aim is also, in that one act, giving a lure to the future. It is determining in some way the content of the future prehending occasion which will prehend it as past.[5]

With this basic structure of reality in mind, it is necessary to take a closer look at the process notion of God. The motto behind the process notion of God is Whitehead's remark that 'God is not to be treated as an exception to all metaphysical principles, invoked to save their collapse. He is their chief exemplification.'[6]

While Whitehead maintained that God was one actual occasion or entity, such men as Ogden, Griffin, and Cobb follow Hartshorne. They

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1. Cf. Pittenger, P.T.C.F., pp. 59 and 60.
2. Cf. John B. Cobb, A Christian Natural Theology, (London: Lutterworth Press, 1966), pp. 71-79.
3. Cf. Griffin, pp. 171-172.
4. Cf. Pittenger, C.R., p. 141.
5. Cf. Griffin, p. 177.
6. Whitehead, p. 405.

see God as a society of actual occasions comparable to the society of actual occasions which form a man. In doing this they believe that it is more in keeping with the basic structure of Whitehead's thought and more easy to see why God can be called a person or personal.[1]

Within process thought God is dipolar in that he has a primordial or abstract pole or nature and a consequent or concrete pole or nature. The abstract pole of God is God in his pure potential. It defines and grounds what God is and could be. Thus God as primordial has for all time the potentiality to relate himself to all actual occasions, to prehend all that occurs. Also as primordial God contains in abstract all the possibilities of what may occur in reality, and as such then God is related to all that happens as the source and ground of good. As Pittenger states: 'As "primordial"--abstract and in this sense "eternal"--God may be said to "contain" all that might ever be.'[2] God is absolute then in his supreme relativity. It is this potential which establishes God as God, and thus in his potential he is unchangeable, immutable and absolute. It is with regard to God's abstract pole that one can call God omniscient, omnipotent, infinite, and transcendent. These attributes refer not to God as he exists, but to his absolute potential, i.e., his ability to be related to, influence and prehend all that occurs.[3] As will be seen shortly, in the concrete pole the above attributes cannot be attributed to God.

Because God in his abstract pole contains all the possibilities for good and value his subjective aim or lure is to have these actualized in reality by actual occasions. In so doing he is able to take them into himself through prehension, and thus establish himself as concrete. In turn he can plough them back into reality opening up new possibilities for the actualization of further goods and values which his abstract pole potentially encompasses.[4] God is creator then not in the sense of bringing beings into existence in the traditional sense. Rather, containing in the abstract the potential of all good and value, God through his subjective

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1. Cf. Hartshorne, p. 31. Cf. Griffin, p. 181. Cobb, pp. 176-192. Ogden, pp. 141-142.
2. Pittenger, P.T.C.F., p. 28.
3. Cf. Griffin, pp. 182-188. Griffin maintains that God cannot be omnipotent in the strict sense for 'if God had all the power, he would be the only actual being', (pp. 186-187). For response see *p. 181 fn. 3.*
4. Cf. Pittenger, P.T.C.F., p. 29.

aim or lure is 'the necessary ground of whatever exists or is even possible.'[1] Thus while it is impossible for God to exist without the world, he nevertheless is the source of all creative advance since each occasion in some way actualizes the abstract potential of God by prehending his subjective aim and making it its own.

God in his concrete pole is God as he actually exists at any given time in the process. 'Therefore time--or succession as the world exemplifies it--is real to God.' God constantly changes with each successive prehension of all actual occasions. He ever increases and actualizes his abstract potential in the concrete. Thus literally '<u>What happens matters to God</u>.' He is dependent on other actual occasions for providing him both with 'material' out of which to actualize his potential and also for future novelty in the world. 'History, historical occurance in time, are real to him, for him, and in him.'[2]

God then in his concrete pole 'is more important' or has 'a priority' over his abstract or primordial pole since it is God <u>as he exists</u> in reality. While the abstract pole defines his nature, he exists as so defined only in the concrete.[3] Thus process thought terms itself Panentheistic. While God is always potentially more, yet, as concrete, the world is in God, not in its subjective immediacy, but in its objective past. 'The world is in God, but only in his experience, not in his essence. Hence God includes everything, but everything is not God.'[4] God's essence is not exhausted by the world or his prehension of it.

While God as dipolar exemplifies the basic structure of reality nevertheless being the chief exemplification he is 'categorically unique.' Unlike other actual occasions which prehend only a partial number of previous occasions, 'God prehends completely; i.e., he fully prehends all the actual entities there are.'[5] Being absolutely relative both in his subjective aim, which all occasions in some way prehend, and in his own prehension of all occasions God can be said to be the most personal of all beings. Persons are constituted and defined by their relations (the complexity of their prehending society). Thus God, since he is prehended

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1. Ogden, p. 62.
2. Pittenger, <u>P.T.C.F.</u>, pp. 29 and 30.
3. <u>Ibid.</u>, p. 31.
4. Griffin, p. 188.
5. <u>Ibid.</u>, p. 184.

by all and prehends all, is the most related, and thus the most fully personal.

Likewise, in prehending all occasions in the full value and good which they express God prehends them with the subjective form of love. To love is to share in and be affected by the joys and sorrows etc. of another. God in prehending absolutely each occasion takes into himself, internally as constitutive of his nature, all the joys and sorrows etc. of every occasion.

Moreover, unlike other occasions which only influence a part of all future occasions, God's influence through his subjective aim 'extends over all areas equally.' Also, unlike other occasions and enduring objects, which cease to exist, God because of his absolute potential of being related to all occasions through prehension 'has always existed and always will.'[1] The dipolar notion of God shows him to be, in Hartshorne's words, 'supreme, yet indebted to all; absolute, yet related to all.'[2] It is precisely his ability and potential to be indebted and related to all that makes him supreme and absolute.

Now it may seem that all of the above has little to do with Christology, but just the opposite is the case. Everything said in the above is literally Christological. How God becomes man is no problem. There is only one possible way for him to do so -- prehension. Again Griffin states it clearly:

> 'Hence the problem for Christology based on Whitehead's philosophy will be understood, not how God could be present in Jesus, but how God could be present in him in a special way, so that Jesus would be especially revelatory of God's nature.'[3]

God does not make himself present in Jesus in a way different from the way he is present in any other actual occasion. The presence of God in Jesus may be to such a degree that it highlights in what way he is present in every other occasion, but it is metaphysically impossible for him to be present in an altogether new way. Jesus is 'the chief exemplification.... of those "principles" which are required to explain, make sense of, and give the proper setting for whatever goes on in the entire process of God

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1. Ibid., p. 185.
2. Hartshorne, titles of chapters One and Two.
3. Griffin, p. 180.

in relationship to man and man in relation to God.'[1] If Jesus is the chief exemplification, then 'the Incarnation is not confined only to the historical person of Jesus Christ, but is also the manner and mode of all of God's work in the world. That is to say, God is ever incarnating himself in his creation.'[2] How then is Jesus special?

Working from within Process Philosophy Pittenger identifies the Logos with the self-expressive activity of God in the world. 'The whole cosmic system is informed by a Divine Activity (the Logos) who is realizing the increasing adequate expression of God in his creation.'[3] Following the pattern of Panentheism, he also writes:

> 'Through the Word (the Logos) God informs every grade and level of being; but he is not identified with the universe, which is created and derivative. And he is never exhausted therein, but is present and active in widely differing degrees of intensity and significance.' 4

It must be remembered then that the term 'Logos' does not signify a divine person who exists as Son and personifies the whole divine nature as such, but rather it is that expression of God which is the purpose, order and aim that he wishes to incarnate and actualize in the world.[5] The Logos as God's self-expression in the world is not something new added to Process Philosophy. The Logos is just God's 'subjective aim,' 'initial aim,' 'divine lure,' and 'persuasion' for each actual occasion to prehend.

It is in the historical Jesus that the Logos is the most fully present. 'He is the classic instance of the Divine Activity in manhood.'[6]

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1. Pittenger, C.R., p. 68.
2. Pittenger, G.P., p. 19.
3. Pittenger, W.I., p. 263. That Jesus does not have a human nature, but is a 'rooting of occasions' like all other men see C.R., p. 57. Pittenger states that 'God's activity in Christ [is] through initial aim, divine lure, and mutual prehension' just as it is in every other creature (C.R., p. 145). Cf. pp. 139-141.
4. Pittenger, W.I., p. 166. Cf. p. 180. Also C.R., pp. 88-91.
5. Cf. Pittenger, W.I., pp. 215-235. Pittenger denies that the Logos can be properly called 'Son,' but only the man Jesus (W.I., p. 186). Griffin's notion of the Logos is basically the same as Pittenger's: Cf. pp. 231-232, 190-192. Griffin does have the novel idea that 'whereas before revelation God was present in man as Holy Spirit, afterwards God can begin to be in him as Logos' (p. 242). This does not seem to be in keeping with how Jesus understood their respective activity, but one would imagine that this is another case where what Jesus thought and said was not in keeping with what Process Philosophy really knows to be the case. Cf. p. 225.
6. Pittenger, G.P., p. 29.

The Incarnation then is not an intrusion of God by some supernatural miracle, but 'Jesus Christ, seen as the focal self-expression of God the Word in human terms, in a world which is itself also the Word's self-expression in varying manner and degree, ...[is] the "emergence," within a continuity of God-man relationships, of a new fullness which is a real novelty.'[1] In the man Jesus then

> 'the Word who is present and active in the lives of men in their historical situation, is actualized or "en-manned" in such a decisive and distinctive fashion that we are enabled to say here, as nowhere else, we are in the presence of the Word "made flesh".'[2]

Ogden and Griffin are in substantial agreement with Pittenger on the nature of the Incarnation. However, they use as an analogy the relation between the mind and the body to explain and clarify how God acts in the world and especially in Christ.

For Griffin a person's acts 'in the primary sense are the psyche's acts of self-constitution in each moment' while the acts of the body are 'the acts of the person in a secondary sense.'[3] The action of the hand, for example, is a secondary expression of the mind's primary action of wanting it moved. Now while 'the mind's action in relation to the body is formally always the same,' some external actions express the personality of the person more than others.[4] Acts of charity or selfishness are

> 'Those external acts which express a person's character and purpose to an especially high degree can be called his special acts. For they are really "his" acts in a way that most of his bodily acts are not, for they especially express that character and purpose which constitutes his deepest selfhood....'[5]

thus special acts for they reveal one's character more than tieing one's shoes. Moreover, 'the intention behind it [the action] must be such that the act really does ex-press....the person's character and purpose.'[6]

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1. Pittenger, W.I., p. 242.
2. Ibid., p. 180. One should not be confused by Pittenger speaking of the 'enmanned Logos' or 'Love enmanned' (C.R., p. 153, and G.P., p. 24). It is the same incarnational principle at work: the prehension of God's subjective aim.
3. Griffin, pp. 208-209.
4. Ibid., p. 210.
5. Ibid., p. 212.
6. Ibid.

An action may be seen externally as charitable, but the person's sole intention may be selfish. Finally, the body must conform to the mind's aim. Since 'the mind's causal control over the body is only persuasive,' the body may not do what the mind desires because it is 'weary, drugged, or injured,' and thus the body would not express the person's true self.[1]

The above can be applied analogically to God in relation to man, especially in Christ. God like the mind acts in both a primary and secondary sense.

> 'God's acts in the primary sense are those in which he responds to the world, receiving its experience and making decisions for the next stage of the creative advance on the basis of his characteristic response to these experiences and his eternal subjective aim....Hence, <u>God's acts in the primary sense are formally all the same</u>.' 2

The events in the world (analogous to the body) are '<u>God's acts in the secondary sense</u>.'[3] The relation between God and the world is not what Ogden would call an external relation, but internal. God and the world are constitutively related to one another through prehension, each bringing about and expressing the other's being like the body and soul.[4]

Following then the mind/body analogy Griffin states:

> 'A special act of God would be a human act (1) in which a new vision of reality is expressed, (2) for which God's aim was a direct reflection of his eternal character and purpose, and (3) in which God's aim was actualized to a high degree.' 5

In other words, a special act would involve the revealing and exemplifying of the God/world relationship due to the fact that God had given a certain event a special aim which would highlight his general aim or way of acting, and that such a special aim was actualized in a supreme way. Because all three points were actualised in an 'unsurpassable degree' in Jesus 'he was God's supreme act.'[6]

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1. <u>Ibid.</u>, p. 213.
2. <u>Ibid.</u>, p. 214.
3. <u>Ibid.</u>, p. 215.
4. Cf. Ogden, p. 178.
5. Griffin, p. 216.
6. <u>Ibid.</u>

'Jesus was not only one who had a special insight into the nature of things; his special activity was based on the impulses given him by God. He was not merely a teacher about God, he was a special act of God. And he was a special act of God not merely in the sense of having actualized possibilities which were open to all men, so that Jesus' specialness would have been rooted only in his own decisions. Rather, Jesus' specialness can be understood as rooted first of all in God's aim for him, the content of which was different for Jesus than for all other men.' 1

On the one hand, Pittenger believes that his Process Christology is close to that of the classical Antiochene position. Following Theodore of Mopsuastia and Nestorius, Pittenger sees Process Christology as God dwelling in Jesus 'as in a son.' What takes place in Jesus

> 'is the crowning and completing of all that is implicit in humanity from its very beginning....God dwells in Jesus as in a Son, as the Antiochenes said: His indwelling in the rest of us is of a sporadic and spasmodic nature, a partial self-expression, a broken relationship.' 2

Using an Antiochene analogy Pittenger sees the union as a 'personal union such as we know in, say, human marriage or love of a lover and his beloved.'[3]

Griffin, on the other hand, believes that within the classical Christological categories his Christology 'would most likely to be considered Ebionite since it does not identify Jesus' self-hood with a pre-existent divine person.'[4]

While Griffin does not treat the issue, Pittenger nevertheless believes that while his Christology may not be traditional or 'orthodox' it is in keeping with 'the doctrinal aims' of Nicea and Chalcedon.[5] Seeing Jesus'

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1. Ibid., pp. 217-218. Ogden's Christology is basically the same as Griffin's and Pittenger's. Cf. Ogden, pp. 164-187; 199-205. However, it should be noted that Griffin believes he has taken the 'Pelagian quality' out of their Christologies by maintaining that Christ did not just actualize God's general aim in reality, but that God gave to Christ a special aim. Cf. Griffin, pp. 218-220. Also fn. 3, 6, 7 (pp. 262-263). Griffen may be a little unfair to Pittenger since he does speak of God's special vocational lure or aim for Jesus. Cf. C.R., p. 143.
2. Pittenger, W.I., p. 131.
3. Pittenger, C.R., p. 12. Cf. p. 143.
4. Griffin, p. 143.
5. Cf. Pittenger, C.R., pp. 1-21.

divinity 'as God's act in manhood,' means that like Nicea's homoousion 'what we know of God in Jesus Christ is of a piece with, of the "same substance," as whatever there is of the divine operation anywhere else in creation....'[1] Nicea in proclaiming the Logos homoousion with the Father against Arius meant that "in Jesus "very God," the true deity himself, had been met in this historic event. No created deity was involved; this was nothing less than God himself.'[2] However, it should not be supposed that Jesus incarnated God absolutely for 'there is "something of God left over" after incarnation; a deity exhausted in "incarnation" would not be God, transcendent and ultimate.'[3] Likewise, Pittenger believes that his notion of the union of God and man in Jesus is true to what Chalcedon proclaimed.

> 'The union which we are seeking here to define is a union in which the organon of the Word (Jesus) is so integrally one with the Word who thus energizes in it, through it, by it, with it, that the two are indeed (as Chalcedon rightly insists) inseparable and indivisible, even while they are also unconfused and unchanged in essential nature which is proper to each.' 4

While the above shows that Jesus as divine and as he is related to God differs only in degree from how all men are divine and related to God, Pittenger, Griffin and Ogden nevertheless believe that he is unique, diffinitive, and decisive with respect to God's self-expression and relation to man.[5] Pittenger uses Whitehead's notion of 'importance' to elaborate this.

> 'An occasion may be called "important" when it occurs within the continuing process of events, provides illumination of what has gone before, speaks to us now with a special impressiveness, and offers new ways of understanding what is happening in consequent history.' 6

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1. Ibid., p. 2.
2. Ibid., p. 8.
3. Pittenger, W.I., p. 226. He believes that Nicea upholds his view: Cf. C.R., p. 42; W.I., p. 237.
4. Pittenger, W.I., p. 188.
5. Pittenger seems confused over what 'difference in kind' means. He seems to think that difference in kind means that Jesus would be a different kind of man, or some different kind of being, sui generis. Cf. W.I., pp. 236-244; C.R., pp. 111-113. In traditional Christology 'difference in kind' refers to the fact that Jesus, as the Logos incarnate, is Son absolutely and not by adoption. He is not some tertium quid being, but man like us in everything but sin.
6. Pittenger, C.R., p. 100.

Jesus as the supreme revelatory event is of supreme 'importance' because he gives to man 'the clue' to what 'God is up to in this world.'[1]

Likewise for Griffin because Jesus is God's fullest act he 'is the decisive factor in their [men's] cognitive approach to reality. In terms used here, this means that their basic model or vision of reality is ultimately derived from Jesus.'[2] For a person to accept Jesus in faith means that he 'takes that which was revealed in him as the Logos of reality, as the clue to what the truly divine reality is, and what it is leading us toward.'[3]

Griffin and Ogden see the revelation brought by Jesus as 'pre-conceptual' or 'mythical.'[4] Thus, while the vision of reality revealed by Jesus is cognitive, it is not self-verifiable, but can only be verified 'in terms of the philosophical criteria of consistency, adequacy to the facts, and illuminating power.'[5] A Christian philosophy would be one which makes explicit and embodies the Christian vision of reality revealed in Jesus, and at the same time, verified it by purely philosophical criteria. This is precisely what Process Philosophy has done. Unlike earlier and traditional theology, which tried to reconcile a foreign Greek philosophy with the Christian faith, process thought explicates and delineates its philosophy from within the Christian vision of reality.[6]

> 'It is the formal thesis of this present essay that Whitehead's metaphysics provides us with a conceptuality never before equaled in its combination of appropriateness to the Christian faith and intrinsic excellence as measured by the normal rational and empirical criteria.' 7

Griffin points out that while Jesus is God's supreme revelation and established God's kingdom, nevertheless he 'probably conceived the final arrival of the Kingdom of God in completely supernaturalistic terms....'[8] While Jesus thought and believed the above, Griffin maintains that the actual vision of reality he revealed through his ministry presupposes

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1. Ibid., p. 84. Cf. W.I., pp. 251 and 263.
2. Griffin, p. 220. Cf. pp. 199-205.
3. Ibid., p. 238.
4. Cf. Ibid., pp. 152-156. Ogden, pp. 185-186.
5. Griffin, p. 157.
6. Ibid., pp. 157-165.
7. Ibid., p. 165. Cf. Ogden, pp. 185-187. Also Ogden, Christ Without Myth, (London: Collins, 1962), pp. 170-192.
8. Griffin, p. 203.

that God is present and active in a way that is more in keeping with Process Philosophy.[1]

Pittenger, Griffin and Ogden are also in basic agreement concerning soteriology. Christ does not establish an entirely new relation between God and man, but makes it possible for the God/man relation which already and always existed to become more fully actualized. 'The only change in the God-man relation is man's attitude. Through revelation he comes to know things about God that were already true, and this knowledge affects the subjective form of his experience.'[2] Since Jesus gives the clue to the God/man relation, he 'provides new occasions for creative advance--for it is in terms of that which is taken as 'important' that action in the direction of fulfilment of subjective aim or purpose will be undertaken.'[3] Because of Jesus God can strengthen his subjective aim. He can act in ways more in keeping with his eternal purpose and this 'increases the possibility that the aims proffered will be actualized to a high degree.'[4] Because Christ is the past active in the present, through prehension, man can follow more easily his example and fulfil God's purpose and aim. Pittenger summarizes process soteriology well when he states that it is 'exemplarism....with an ontological grounding.'[5]

In concluding this section it should be noted that since process thought makes miracles, in the strict sense, impossible, such events as the resurrection of the body are 'absurd and incredible.'[6] The resurrection simply means that the goods and values actualized by man are completely prehended by God and 'live on' forever in his concrete nature. Knowing that God prehends all of one's actualized values is one's ultimate peace.[7]

C. The Viability of Process Theology and Christology

It is hoped that the above exposition of process thought is fair, clear, and sufficiently complete. The following critique will first

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1. Cf. Ibid., p. 225.
2. Ibid., p. 236.
3. Pittenger, G.P., p. 21. Cf. Griffin, p. 241.
4. Griffin, p. 242.
5. Pittenger, G.P., p. 62.
6. Pittenger, C.R., pp. 23-24. Cf. pp. 123-126.
7. Cf. Pittenger, G.P., pp. 18-19. Also Griffin, p. 234. Also Ogden, pp. 206-230. Pittenger does seem to think that there may be some personal survival after death even though this would contradict his above stated views: Cf. P.T.C.F., pp. 75-84; G.P., pp. 86-95.

treat the philosophical viability of process thought, and secondly its theological and Christological relevance. It should be noted that since Process Christology is nothing other than Process Philosophy applied to a unique and particular instance, all criticisms of process thought in general apply equally as well to its Christology.

The most obvious philosophical defect of the whole system is that it is impossible for Process Philosophy to account for why anything exists including God. It may account for why God is the way he is and how he works, and why the world is the way it is and how it works, but why God or the world exist at all is completely unaccounted for. Neither can account for its own existence, and neither can account for the other's existence. It is impossible for God to give 'being' since his being as an actual concrete reality is totally dependent on the world; and thus, if anything, the world exists chronologically and logically prior to God. God in his abstract pole does not help since that is God as pure un-actualized potency, and as such obviously has no power to bring something into existence. Even to say that God and the world were never without one another does not help. Since neither can account for why the other exists this question would be left unanswered even if the process never had a beginning.[1] God's creativity in process thought is his ability to give order and influence reality, and not his ability to bring it into existence and conserve it. There is no need to belabour this criticism since it has been made so often.[2] The basic reason why process thought cannot answer this question is because God is not immutable. Only if God is wholly perfect, i.e., ipsum esse, and thus immutable in his dynamic actual perfection, can he establish others as existing.[3]

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1. This is Aquinas' whole point on the fact that the world can be 'eternal,' and yet must necessarily be created: Cf. S.T., I, 46,1.
2. Cf. H.P. Owen, Concepts of Deity, (London: Macmillan, 1071), pp. 52-53. E.L. Mascall, He Who Is, (London: Libra Books, 1966), pp. 157-159. James Collins, God in Modern Philosophy, (Chicago: Gateway Edition, 1967), p. 323. Robert Neville, God the Creator, (London: University of Chicago Press, 1968), p. 78. Robert Neville, 'Whitehead on the One and Many,' The Southern Journal of Philosophy, 7 (1969-1970), pp. 388-389. P. Dresch, 'The Transcendence of God in Whitehead's Philosophy,' Philosophical Studies, 11 (1961-1962), p. 14. John Wild, 'The Divine Existence: An Answer to Mr. Hartshorne,' Review of Metaphysics, 4 (1950), p. 62. What is surprising is that process men seem oblivious to this criticism or completely miss the point of it. Cf. Gene Reeves and Delwin Brown, 'The Development of Process Thought,' Process Philosophy and Christian Thought, Eds. Brown, James, and Reeves, (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1971), p. 47.
3. Griffin's belief that for God to be all-powerful means that he would have all the power and thus nothing else would exist is to think in

While God is defined as potentially containing all perfection, it is interesting to note here that it is better for God to exist in a less perfect state as concrete than not to exist at all in his absolute potential. In other words, there is in process thought an ontological priority of the concrete pole of God over the potential pole. This betrays the fact that process theologians, despite their criticism, have the same notion of perfection and dynamism, based on esse, as classical theism. What is hard to understand is why they do not follow that notion through and say that a God, who is ipsum esse, containing all perfection, is supremely dynamic instead of continually concluding that he would be static and inert.

The fact that God is not creator leads to a second philosophical defect within process thought. It is evident that Process Philosophy wishes to solve the problem of the One and the Many. However, since God is as much a part of the ontological process of becoming as any other being, he is not ontologically ultimate; and thus the problem of grounding the oneness is still present. Being one of the many beings in the process, he is neither the source nor the end, but merely the recorder of the universal and ultimate principles of reality. Thus there is no existing being who establishes the universal principles operative in the process--whether it be the process itself, prehension, creativity, etc..[1] Thus the whole system hangs in an ontological vacuum. Since God is only the supreme prehender of all past occasions, 'the conclusion to draw is that the category of the ultimate [in Process Philosophy] does not genuinely address the ontological question, but only records the ontological situation....'[2] For God to ground the universal principles and the ontological oneness would demand that he transcend the world, in so far as he would be ontologically other than the finite world; and thus he would contain the principles in the pure and perfect immutable actuality of himself as ipsum esse. To do that however would shatter the whole of Process Philosophy.

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purely materialistic concepts. Being, power, and perfection are not limited material commodities (such as oil) that must be in some way shared if more than one being is to have some. It is because God is all-powerful, and not in spite of it, that he is able to establish others as existing, containing within themselves not some of his power or perfection, but their own. Cf. E.L. Mascall, He Who Is, pp. 102-103.

1. Cf. James Richard, 'God, Time, and Process Philosophy,' Theology, 68 (1965), p. 240.
2. Robert Neville, 'Whitehead on the One and Many,' The Southern Journal of Philosophy, 7 (1969-1970), p. 391.

This raises another philosophical defect. Because God does not establish the existential reality of beings, and thus does not ground the universal principles contained in reality, there is likewise then no ground for good and value. For Whitehead the eternal ideas or ideals were in a sort of Platonic heaven to which God had access through his primordial nature. That is problematic in itself, but to make the ideals part of the potential pole of what it means to be God, as abstractly defined, as Hartshorne, Cobb, Ogden, and Griffin do is to compound the problem. In Whitehead one could conceive of good and value as 'existing' in some sense, but as the pure potential of God they have no ontological ground at all. If no one contains them <u>per se</u> in actuality, who establishes them either in God's potential, or in his concrete pole, or in the world? It is impossible to ontologically ground such things as justice, good, love, etc.; rather than hate, jealousy, evil, etc.. Thus when process men say that God contains in his pure potential all goods and values, and that he is ever luring and persuading others to actualize them, they are making pure gratuitous statements with no ontological basis. What process men have done is to take the obvious fact that it is better to be good than evil and added to it the old classic theistic notion that this is due to the fact that God grounds the good. However, since God is not ontologically ultimate within process thought, containing all good and perfection in his immutable actualized self, there is no reason to presume that either of the above is obviously or necessarily the case.[1]

In the end, the God of Process Philosophy is an imitation of Plato's demiurge, God's role is purely functional in that he is to bring order to finite reality. Moreover, he is a <u>poor</u> imitation. While Plato's demiurge could use the One or the Good to guide and bring order into finite reality, the demiurge of Process Philosophy can be grounded by no set of values. Likewise, he is unable to do his job properly since he is always one step behind in the process, forever condemned to trying to catch up in his ordering role.

Thus another difficulty raises its head. To read Process Philosophy and Theology one would think that its notion of God was the most dynamic ever conceived. However, moving behind the words one finds that action pertains to God in two ways.

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1. In Process Philosophy, God, if even in a small way, is directly involved in evil actions. Cf. Griffin, p. 216.

Action first pertains to God as the prehender of all past actual occasions. This is a self-constituting action. It is the coming to be of God in each successive state of the process. It has nothing to do with his action within the world. The only relationship is that in prehending one's past one necessarily prehends God since he is partially constituted by one's past. Thus while God is always changing, it does not imply any dynamic action in the world on his part, but the lack of action since every change in him is one of actualizing some potential within himself.

Secondly, he acts as the divine lure or influence on reality. He 'persuades' all other actual occasions to actualize further good or value. However, one should not think that this is God acting in some dynamic way, or for that matter that it is God acting at all. All that 'lure,' 'influence,' and 'persuade' means is that further potential goods are available for actualization because previous goods were actualized in the past. His lure and influence is not a dynamic action on his part, but the mere presence of his pure potential, that 'part' of him which is undynamic, unactualized, and non-existent.[1]

While the motto of process thought concerning God has been that 'God is not to be treated as an exception to all metaphysical principles, invoked to save their collapse, but their chief exemplification,' it is interesting to note that the only reason God is relevant to Process Philosophy is precisely to save the collapse of the metaphysical principles, and he does this by being an exception.[2] Functioning in the role of demiurge God saves the principles of 'creativity,' 'becoming,' etc., from chaos by being the only 'being' who prehends all occasions in his consequent nature, and the only one who influences all occasions through his absolute potential, and thus is the only one who is guaranteed everlasting existence.[3]

Because God is an exception to the principles in that he prehends and influences all worldly occasions, he loses his freedom. He does not choose what he will prehend or what he will influence, but must do so by necessity, and his nature is defined, or better, constituted, by that necessity. Both from a philosophical and theological perspective the

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1. Cf. Colin Gunton, 'Process Theology's Concept of God,' The Expository Times, 84 (1973), pp. 294-295.
2. Cf. Griffin, p. 174.
3. Cf. Collins, p. 321. Mascall, p. 155. Robert Jensen, God After God (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1969), p. 150.

whole process is wrapped in necessitarianism as Neville and Gunton have aptly pointed out.

> 'God's action relative to the world, for neoclassical metaphysics, is necessitated; there is metaphysical necessity that God prehend everything perfectly (necessary redemption), and that everything prehend his influence (necessary creation)....Neoclassical metaphysics cannot escape necessitarianism.' 1

Prehension is the heart of process thought in that it makes the process truly a process. As was seen it is a relational/ontological concept. Each actual occasion is constituted in its ontological subjective present by being internally related to the past which in turn is a lure to the future. Prehension is the philosophical basis not only for creativity and novelty, but also for personhood, and for interpersonal relations involving love, knowledge, freedom, foregiveness, etc.. From a theological point of view it is incarnational as well.

What must be realized and realized in all its fullness is that no two actual occasions or society of occasions are ever related to one another in each of their respective 'presents.' At the moment of subjective-present-actuality, i.e., when an actual occasion actually exists in reality as an entity, it is <u>literally</u> (to use Ogden's word) <u>not related to anything at all</u>.

Hartshorne is aware of the problem, but does not seem to realize the full implications.

> 'This brings us to the very difficult problem, for me <u>the</u> problem, of relations between contemporaries:...Two men could readily know each other, for a man is not one particular but a stream or system of actual and potential experiences [What Hartshorne means is that knowledge is always the past as present in a stream of prehensions, and thus prehensions can include data of the past experience of another in one's present conscious prehensions.] But two experiences, two momentary or irrudicible "subjects" could not, according to our principles--unless some subtle qualifications of them is possible--each know the other.' 2

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1. Robert Neville, 'Neoclassical Metaphysics and Christianity: A Critical Study of Ogden's <u>Reality of God</u>,' <u>International Philosophical Quarterly</u>, 9 (1969), p. 620. Cf. p. 623. Also see Gunton, p. 293.
2. Hartshorne, p. 98.

Hartshorne attempts a solution, which is more a restatement of the problem, and in the end admits that 'the topic of contemporary relations bristles with difficulties, and I shall only say that if I could find a consistent analysis of it, I should be able to die content, so far as philosophical achievements are concerned.'[1] Until Hartshorne realizes that all finite reality is founded on an ever present contemporary relation--creation--which establishes beingsas existent, and thus capable of relating to others as contemporaries since all exist in the present, he will not 'die content.'

The repercussions of this position are pertinent to this study and the viability of Process Theology in general.

Firstly, while process men continually emphasize how closely God and man are related within their system, they are never related in their respective subjective presents, when they are 'I's.' God is only related to a person as the past in the person's present with a lure to the future. Man is related to God as the past in his present with a lure to the future. They are never related as 'the present' in 'the present.' God and man are never contemporaries![2]

Secondly, because God and man are never present to one another in their respective subjectivityas 'I's,' 'this is a disastrous consequence for the religious applicability of the neoclassical concept of God, since it means in effect that God knows only ideas of things, not things themselves.'[3] God and man never know each other as subjects, but only the objective past idea of the other. Thus man worships, adores, and prays to a past idea of God, but is never in communion with God as he is in himself.[4]

Moreover, since prehension is a relation of the past in some way

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1. Ibid., p. 99.
2. Cobb proposes that it may be possible for God and man to prehend one another as contemporary. However, that is not the problem. God may be contemporary in each present, but he is present only as the past with a lure to the future. Cf. Cobb, pp. 162-163. One should realize that this is not only the case between God and man, but with every relation: husband and wife, parent and child.
3. Neville, 'Neoclassical Metaphysics....,' I.P.Q., 9 (1969), p. 618. Cf. John Wild, 'Review of Charles Hartshorne's The Divine Relativity,' Review of Metaphysics, 2 (1948) pp. 75-76.
4. Bernard Loomer, himself a process theologian, realizes that the God of Process Philosophy is not worshipful. Cf. Loomer, 'Empirical Theology within Process Thought,' The Future of Empirical Theology, ed. Bernard E. Meland, (Chicago: University Press, 1969), pp. 168-169.

ontologically constituting the present, it is difficult to see how such a relation is personal involving such notions as love, persuasion, mutual sympathy, suffering and joy. For God to prehend all actual occasions means that he is constituted in his consequent pole by them, but such a relation is not a relation between two persons involving love, etc.. This is very clearly seen from process thought's analogy between the relation of the body and soul, and God and man. If one takes their understanding of the relation between the body and soul literally, the most radical of dualisms is conceived. To say, as Griffin does, that the mind 'persuades' the body to act implies that the body has a mind of its own, that some how a person and 'his' body have a personal relation involving mutual love, sympathy and joy. Obviously, that is not how process thought conceives the relation. The mind and body are not two distinct existing entities related to one another in their distinctness. The mind does not 'persuade' the body in any normal sense of the word, nor do they have a personal relation involving love etc.. The relation between the mind and body is one of prehension, that of constituting one another through prehending each other's past which in turn will be data for each other's future. The same is true of the relation between God and man. Because God prehends all actual occasions, it does not follow that he is <u>therefore</u> absolutely personal and loving. For God to prehend all actual occasions means only that he is necessarily constituted ontologically as an actual reality by everything that takes place in the world. It cannot be a personal relation since God and man are never related in their subjective immediacy as 'I's.' Moreover, there is no relation of love, joy, etc. since the relation is totally an <u>internal</u> and <u>self-constituting</u> affair.[1]

Thus to speak of God suffering with man or sharing man's joys is at best a euphemism. All that that means is that God records in his present consequent nature that a man suffer<u>ed</u> or that a man <u>was</u> happy, but when God prehends it, it is not present to him as the contemporary pain or joy of a man. It is merely the objective past idea. God then literally <u>lives</u> in the past. As Gunton states: 'He plays the essentially passive role as a cosmic memory.'[2]

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1. Cf. John Wild, 'Review of Charles Hartshorne's....,' <u>Rev. of Meta</u>., 2 (1948) 64. Also 'The Divine Existence:...,' <u>Rev. of Meta</u>., 4 (1950), 68.
2. Gunton, p. 294.

Since trees, persons, God etc. are not beings-in-themselves, but only enduring societies and patterns of actual occasions which give rise to trees, persons, God, all of these are purely phenomenological abstractions. What is really real as existing are only actual occasions.[1] This has two important repercussions.

Firstly, while process thought continually speaks of the creativity and novelty which their understanding implies, there is none whatsoever. Creativity and novelty is only on a phenomenological or abstract level. If one looks beyond the appearance of a tree, a person, or God, one finds that it is not a tree, or a person, or God at all, but only actual occasions prehending one another in a 'tree-like,' 'person-like,' or 'God-like' way. Reality appears to be creative and novel in process thought, but actually there has never been anything really new nor will there ever be.[2]

Secondly, any use of language which implies beings-in-themselves and as related to one another as selves, such as 'love,' 'persuade,' is a mis-use of language. For example, to say that 'God prehends' or that 'man prehends,' as process thought continually does, and as has been done throughout this study, is completely misleading. Only actual occasions prehend. Beings as subject themselves, such as God and man, do not prehend since they do not exist. With regard to such statements as 'God prehends' Neville is correct when he states:

> 'My suspicion is that a sense of Aristotelian substantiality has been smuggled into the conception of God so that the particular actual occasions of his experience and his abstract necessities are taken to be parts of a more concrete transtemporal reality.'[3]

It is only because process theologians are unaware of their own 'smuggling' that they continually see the union between God and man, especially in Christ as moral. The union can only be moral if God and man are beings-in-

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1. Ibid., pp. 293-294.
2. Cf. Dresch, p. 25. Since persons are mere abstractions of enduring objects or patterns of occasions, all personal language must be the same. Thus, to bolster the above argument, since persons are mere abstractions so also is love, suffering, joy, etc.. Like the person they have no ontological content as acts, since the only real acts by real beings are actual occasions prehending one another.
3. Neville, 'Neoclassical Metaphysics...,' I.P.Q., 9 (1969), p. 620, fn. 15.

themselves, which they never are in process thought.

Turning to Process Christology then the above must be kept in mind and the repercussions made evident. Since a person is not a being in himself containing within himself human values and goods, it is difficult to see how process thought can uphold the integrity of the human person.[1] Within process thought, while God and man are not related in their subjective immediacy, nevertheless man's value or worth is due not to the fact that he is a man with his own ontological integrity, but to the fact that he actualizes the goods and values which reside potentially in God. Man glorifies God not by perfecting and actualizing human potential, but by helping God perfect and actualize his divine potential. Because of this the whole of reality, and especially man, takes on an Apollinarian or Monophysite flavour. Man's value and worth is in direct proportion to the extent that God's potential dominates him and which he actualizes. Every man is to a greater or lesser degree a monophysite being and his value increases the more monophysite he becomes. Jesus as the perfect actualizer of God's potential is the most thoroughly monophysite.

When one puts the above in the context of prehension, it becomes even clearer. If one incarnates God by ontologically being constituted by his potential good and value through prehension, then all men are to a greater or lesser degree Apollinarian or Monophysite beings depending to what extent they are ontologically constituted by God's value through prehension. Jesus as the ultimate prehender of God's value is the most fully monophysite. Jesus is the Christ not because he and God are contemporaries to one another and united to each other through love (Pittenger's professed Antiochene position), nor by God adopting Jesus in a special way (Griffin's professed Ebionite position), but because he is ontologically constituted as a being by supremely prehending the divine potential. It is God's potential which dominates Jesus' being and his existence.

Pittenger, without seemingly realizing it, professes the above when he defends his so-called Antiochene position against the charge of being simply a moral union. Remembering that 'love' in process thought is to be internally related to a past actualized good through prehension, and thus being partially constituted ontologically by it, Pittenger states:

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1. Cf. ibid., pp. 611-612, 615.

'If this [his Antiochene position] be said to be a moral union and condemned on this ground, then one can only reply that in this respect the moral is the metaphysical--once we have come to see that love is not simply a matter of desirable human behavior but is the very basis of the universe and the grounding of reality in all creative advance [one could add "through prehension']. I myself should say this is the Christianization of ontology.' 1

To ontologize the Antiochene position, to make God's love or potential a constitutive metaphysical principle of man's being is to make one's Christology Apollinarian or Monophysite. As Pittenger states on a number of occasions, for Jesus to be 'the Incarnate Word of God' means that God 'energizes [him] in a degree unparallelled elsewhere, with an intensity that is unique.'[2] Apollinaris would feel very much at home with that concept of 'energize' even though he may have difficulties with Pittenger on other grounds.

The basic problem is that when process theologians treat and classify the union between Jesus and God they forget three basic elements of Process Philosophy which they nevertheless profess are the most important for Christology. Firstly, they forget that within process thought Jesus and God are not beings in themselves, and thus cannot be united in their respective distinctness. Secondly, they forget that prehension is not primarily an epistemological concept expressing a moral union, but an ontological concept expressing an internal constitutive relation. Thirdly, they forget that the value of man does not reside in his self-possessed integrity as an ontological being in himself, but in actualizing the goods and values which are part and parcel of God's potential. If process theologians would recognize the true nature of their Christology and the full repercussions of their Christological principles, they could not help but see that Process Christology is highly Apollinarian or Monophysite in nature, and is such by necessity.

What process theologians mean then by the Logos being present in Jesus in a supreme way becomes evident. Jesus supremely constitutes within his being the divine potential which is ever present in and to reality and which is the sole value, purpose or reason (Nous or Logos) of reality. What is divine in Jesus is the divine potential, the Logos of reality, by

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1. Pittenger, C.R., p. 143.
2. Pittenger, G.P., p. 24. Cf. W.I., pp. 188, 202, 240.

and through which he is ontologically constituted. This is hardly what Nicea meant when it proclaimed that the Logos is homoousion with the Father. Process Theology's notion of the Logos is more akin to Platonism than to Nicea.[1]

Likewise to speak of God giving Jesus a 'vocational lure' or 'special aim' is misleading. What that means is that God is always, by his nature, present as the best possible good to be actualized given the circumstances.[2] When it comes to Jesus, God is present to him as the greatest possible good to be actualized, not because he actually acted differently in a new kind of way, but because the past and present circumstances which make up Jesus' life are unique. Because of his biblical ancestory, his family background, the present apocalyptic milieu, his own personality, etc., God by necessity was present as the greatest possible good to be actualized. The aim differs not by an act of God, but by a change of circumstances. Thus Griffin does not escape Pelagianism. While God may be present to Jesus in a way not before experienced by man, God was only able to be so present because of prior and present circumstances. In process thought God always does the best he can, but the best he can is always dependent on man.

Turning briefly to process soteriology and the decisiveness of Jesus

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1. It is rather fascinating that while Pittenger continually criticizes the Fathers for being Platonic, he quotes some of the most Platonic of them (Justin Martyr, Clement of Alexandria, Origen) to back-up his own position. He quotes them on precisely the points where they are the most influenced by Platonic thought. Cf. W.I., pp. 166-167, 216; C.R., p. 91.

   The argument is sometimes advanced: 'Allowing for the different metaphysical systems....process christology can be considered faithful in intent to the Christian tradition regarding the person of Christ as divine....Within the limits offered by the metaphysical system involved, it can be held that the divinity of Christ was dealt with in the maximum manner open to process categories of thought', Mary T. Rattigan, Christology and Process Thought: The Decisiveness of Jesus Christ in the Thought of Bernard E. Meland, W. Norman Pittenger, Daniel Day Williams, (Unpublished Doctoral Thesis, New York, Fordham University, 1973), p. 265. Such an argument begs the question. Arius, Nestorius, Eutyches, etc., within their metaphysical systems, expressed the reality of the Incarnation in the maximum manner open to the categories of their thought. However, their systems did not allow them to express the Incarnation as it really is. One may try to express the Incarnation the best as one can, but the best one can may not be good enough, and may even be wrong.

2. Cf. Griffin, p. 218.

one finds that the function which Jesus fulfills in process thought is that of being a revelation in act. Through word and deed he gives the clue to what reality is all about. He is the mythical expression of what Process Philosophy knows to be the case. He changes the God/man relation not by establishing an entirely new and different kind of relation, but by making the old relation more workable. He does this by making it known, at last mythically. Thus Jesus is a mythical gnostic redeemer and Christianity is gnosticism. Reality is not ontologically changed or made different by the salvation Jesus brings, but only gnosologically. One is not saved by faith but by knowledge. The gnosological change makes it possible for the already established ontological constitutive relation between God and man, through prehension, to be more fully actualized. Jesus as a person then loses all existential and contemporary importance. Having fulfilled his task of imparting the 'secret' or 'clue' of reality he is relegated to being the mere historical founder of a philosophical sect.

The basic problem here is that Christianity's understanding of salvation, of the establishment of God's Kingdom, has always been understood as God establishing a radically new and different kind of relation between himself and man based on the Incarnation, effected through Christ's death and resurrection, and continued through the living personal presence of Christ in his Church and sacraments. God's mode of action and relation to man after Christ differs in kind and not just in degree. God is present and active in a new and different kind of way. Reality itself has been changed and made new.

In the end one wonders why process theologians concern themselves with Jesus and Christianity to begin with. Even by their own criteria Jesus cannot possibly be God's supreme act. He is supposed to be the most divine manifestation of God, yet his revelation is merely a clue, a myth. He is the revealer of a vision of reality that only comes to be fully known and clearly systematized through Process Philosophy. Griffin maintains that Jesus gives the supreme cognitive relevation of God, yet he says that Jesus had a faulty understanding of how God acts. How can Jesus be God's supreme cognitive revelation when he himself did not have a full and complete understanding?

If one follows the logic inherent in process thought, the full and supreme revelation would only come about when soneone would combine in himself the moral goodness of Jesus and the philosophical knowledge of

Whitehead, Hartshorne, or any number of process theologians. Cognitively Plato, Spinoza, Leibnitz, and even Buddha are much closer to giving the clue to process thought than Jesus ever was.[1]

This chapter is in a sense very negative and critical. However, the negativity and criticism is for very positive reasons: The desire to maintain the truth that God is supremely dynamic and intimately related to the world and man, and that in the Incarnation God really does become man and act as man in time and history. While Process Theology and Christology desires the above also, it completely fails in its attempt.

As stated in the beginning, this chapter bears little resemblance to previous chapters and the topic of this study may seem to have been lost. However, the topic of this study has always been present, but its presence is one of seeing and grasping what happens when it becomes absent. The denial of God's immutability and proposing instead that his nature is one of change may dissolve the question of how God can remain immutable and yet become man, but its dissolution, as this chapter hopefully shows, brings nothing but philosophical and theological chaos.

In closing, credit should be given to the process theologians for bringing to the fore many important questions. They have forced traditional theism and Christology to stress and elaborate truths which have laid dormant over the years. This study would not have been made if it were not for their challenge. It is only sad that while they have asked the important questions, they are unable to answer them satisfactorily. One feels that they could have done better if they would have followed Pittenger's advice, which he himself has not done: 'All I am saying is that we should not let ourselves be so enamoured with words, that we become exponents or defenders of a simply verbal orthodoxy.'[2]

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1. Hartshorne very clearly sees the relationship between Buddhism and Process Philosophy. Cf. Hartshorne, 'The Development of Process Philosophy,' Process Theology, ed. Ewert Cousins, pp. 47-64.
2. Pittenger, W.I., p. 18.

CHAPTER 6

CONTEMPORARY CATHOLIC CHRISTOLOGY: 'BECOME' AS DYNAMICALLY PRESENT

The adjective 'Catholic' in the title is ambiguous. It could denote Christology proposed by theologians who profess to belong to the Catholic Church, or it could specify Christological thinking that is in conformity with the Catholic tradition and teaching. Unfortunately these two understandings are not necessarily one and the same. The primary meaning of 'Catholic' here is to specify Christological studies proposed by theologians who profess to be Catholic. Whether 'Catholic' can also be used descriptively of their Christology as well will be judged in due course.

The number of possible Catholic theologians who could be treated in this chapter is too great for the space allowed. Thus this chapter will concentrate on three: Piet Schoonenberg, Karl Rahner, and Jean Galot.[1]

A. Piet Schoonenberg

Although Schoonenberg's The Christ is a comparatively small work, it nevertheless expresses, along with Process Christology which Schoonenberg endorses, the tenor and direction of much contemporary Catholic Christology in theological circles.[2] For this reason a short study is necessary.

The chief overriding principle of Schoonenberg's thought is: 'God does not compete, God does not alienate.'[3] By this he means that while

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1. Some other possible authors are: A. Hulsbosh, 'Jesus Christus, gekend als mens, beleden als Zoon Gods,' Tijdshrift voor Theologie, 6 (1966), pp. 250-272. This article is followed by critical comments by E. Schillebeeckx and P. Schoonenberg. For a rather complete English summary see R. North, 'Soul-Body Unity and God-Man Unity,' Theological Studies, 30 (1969), pp. 27-60. Also R. North, 'Recent Christology and Theological Method,' Continuum, 7 (1969), pp. 63-77. Also Robert C. Ware, 'Christology in Historical Perspective,' Heythrop Journal, 15 (1974), pp. 53-69. Also Hans Küng, Menschwerdung Gottes, (Freiburg: Herder, 1970). J. Alfaro, A. Grillmeier, R. Schulte, Ch. Schütz, D. Wiederkehr, Mysterium Salutis 11--Dogmatique de L'Histoire de Salut: Christologie et Vie du Christ. (Paris: Les Éditions du Cerf, 1975). The Christology of Teilhard de Chardin could also be treated.
2. Piet Schoonenberg, The Christ, (New York: Herder and Herder, 1971). For Schoonenberg's endorsement of Process Christology see pp. 8, 83-86, fn. 16.
3. Ibid., p. 7.

the world and man are dependent on God for their being and fulfilment ('His providence says precisely that he leads the world for us to the best advantage....'), God nevertheless, 'realizes nature according to its own course and laws, but he does not intervene in it, he does not intercede, he does not take over the work of a worldly cause, he supersedes nothing, he eliminates nothing.'[1] Thus with regard to nature, evolution, and history God never acts contrary to the inherent principles and laws contained in them, but gives 'to each being the being and doing proper to that being as its own. God does not compete; on the contrary, everything he does he gives us to do.'[2]

What Schoonenberg wishes to point out, and rightly so, is that creation with its own inherent laws contains within itself its own dignity and worth. The human race through the individual free decisions of its members likewise is responsible for the course and destiny of human history. ^God never acts in such a manner as to destroy either. This would be both unbecoming of God and denigrating to the whole created order.

However, there is in Schoonenberg's analysis of the God/world relationship not only the above, but also the added notion that any and all direct and radically new 'intervention,' and 'interceding' by God must of necessity be of such a kind as to denigrate the created order, to rob it of its dignity, to override man's freedom. He sees any new and direct action of God in the world as an action which 'supersedes' and 'eliminates' some created value or good. For God to act in a radically different way in time and history other than through the normal created laws of nature and evolution, or through the free decisions of men would of necessity make God an unbecoming intruder and competitor of man. While he castigates the Molinists and Banezians Thomists in the freedom/grace controversy for setting up a false dilemma ('The supposition common to both [is] that God and world, God and man "compete"....'), he nevertheless holds the same presupposition in the very elimination of the dilemma by denying all intervention of God.[3] The Molinists, Banezians, and Schoonenberg presuppose that if God breaks into time and history in new ways he must of necessity compete with man. The only difference

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1. Ibid., p. 25.
2. Ibid., p. 26.
3. Ibid., p. 31. Cf. pp. 13-15.

among the three is that while the former theologians see God as nevertheless acting, Schoonenberg denies such action.

The upshot of this whole presupposition is not just that it limits God's ability to act, but also that it undermines the very thing it wishes to protect--the inherent worth and value of man and the created order. By denying that God can act in new and special ways in creation without 'eliminating' some good or value of creation ultimately means that one of the goods and values of the created order and especially man is not that of being possible mediators of God's special actions. Men do not contain within their inherent and selfpossessed dignity as creatures the ability to mediate and express God's revelation. Instead of creation and man being the prologomena and presupposition for God's new revelation in word and act, which is their greatest dignity not in spite of their creaturehood, nor by way of addition to their creaturehood, but precisely because of it, they become an impediment against it. In traditional terminology man for Schoonenberg does not contain within his very creaturehood the good of obediental potency. This means not only that he is unable to receive God's special acts without destroying his dignity as a creature, but also that he is unable to mediate and express God's special action without God in some way eliminating his creaturehood. While Schoonenberg wishes to defend man against unbecoming intrusions by God, the basic problem is that man only needs such a defence if one underestimates man's dignity and worth as a man to begin with. Once one sees man, in his self-possessed freedom and worth as a man, as the possible receiver and mediator of God's special acts, then man needs no such defence. God's direct intrusion in time and history is not the elimination or degradation of man's inherent worth, but the actualization of man's greatest inherent potential.

This false presupposition is common in contemporary theology. The implications of such a presupposition not only affect one's understanding of grace, sacraments, and the Church, but also and rudimentarily one's understanding of the Incarnation.

Using this principle as the basis of his Christology it is not surprising that Schoonenberg has difficulties with the traditional understanding of Christ. In a sense this false presupposition turns the topic discussed in this present study up-side-down. Instead of asking how God can remain immutably himself and yet become man, Schoonenberg must ask:

how can a man be God without ceasing to be a man? This is easily seen in the following.

Firstly it must be noted that Schoonenberg understands the Christology of the New Testament and the Councils as being expressed in 'patterns of thought.'[1] Schoonenberg's use of this concept is rather ambiguous. On the one hand it seems to mean man's ability to objectively grasp and express the way reality is, but not to the fullest extent. Reality is always more than one's conceptual and linguistic expression of it. On the other hand Schoonenberg also sees 'patterns of thought' as man's ability to subjectively read into and impose on reality intelligible patterns which more or less approximate reality but never really grasp it. In other words for Schoonenberg 'patterns of thought' has both a realistic and idealistic epistemological sense. With regard to interpreting biblical and conciliar Christology this ambiguity is of enormous help to Schoonenberg for it allows him to hold as really the case that which is in conformity with his primary presupposition, using 'patterns of thought' in its realistic sense; and also to deny what is not in conformity with the presupposition claiming that what is said is a 'pattern of thought' imposed on and read into the reality of Christ in the idealistic sense. In short, Schoonenberg uses the ambiguity of the concept 'pattern of thought' as a methodological/epistemological construct to affirm and deny what is and is not in conformity with his false presupposition that God cannot directly act in time and history without degrading man.

Schoonenberg has one major criticism of traditional Christology as expressed by Chalcedon. The crux of the Christological problem today is the pre-existence of the Logos as a distinct person and ultimate subject of Christ. Nicea was not so much influenced by John as by the thought pattern of Middle Platonism brought into Christology via Origen.[2] After Nicea 'the pre-existence of the Son came to control christological belief and thought.'[3] It is because of the pre-existence of the Logos that Alexandrian Christology always tended to undermine the full humanity, and Antiochene Christology always tended to sacrifice the union. While Chalcedon brought the two Christologies together, it 'did not reconcile

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1. Cf. ibid., pp. 51 ff.
2. Cf. ibid., pp. 54-55.
3. Ibid., p. 56.

them.'[1]

> 'This pattern [Chalcedonian] absorbs all the divine and human that is acknowledged by scripture to Jesus, but adds something unknown to scripture: the distinction of natures. This has become necessary precisely because the pre-existent person was posited and came into Antiochian thought to stand beside the man Jesus.'[2]

While Schoonenberg does not believe that Chalcedon makes explicit mention of the pre-existent Logos and holds that Chalcedon sees the historical person/reality of Jesus as the result and consequence of the union of natures, the pre-existent Logos actually does enter 'the Chalcedonian pattern through later theological exposition, especially that under Alexandrian influence.'[3]

Schoonenberg's lack of understanding concerning the questions and answers surrounding Patristic and Conciliar Christology is surprising, but it leads him to conclude that traditional Christology of the Chalcedonian and neo-Chalcedonian pattern brings into question the full humanity of Christ precisely because the person of Christ is the Logos.[4] This is Schoonenberg's major criticism and for the most part the subsequent criticisms are elaborations of this.[5]

Returning to the New Testament picture of Christ Schoonenberg concludes that 'Jesus Christ is one person. He is a human person.'[6] By this he means not only that Jesus has full human psychological and intellectual functions, but also that he is a being in himself ontologically

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1. Ibid.
2. Ibid., p. 57.
3. Ibid. For the fact that Schoonenberg sees the person as a consequence and result of the union of natures see pp. 62-63, 75.
4. Cf. Ibid., pp. 61-62.
5. It should be noted that three of the objections are totally irrelevant and unfair. To criticize Chalcedon for speaking only of the Person of Christ in himself and therefore that it 'detaches Christology from soteriology,' and that it 'says nothing on Jesus' place in the history of salvation,' and that it makes no distinction between 'Jesus' earthly and glorified life' is completely uncalled for. Granted Chalcedon did not write a soteriology, nor a history of salvation, nor a history of Christ's life, but then they were not the questions at hand. However, if Christ is not the Word become man as Chalcedon proclaimed there would be no need of the above. Cf. pp. 63-64. For a good critique of Schoonenberg on this point see Jean Galot, Vers un Nouvelle Christologie (Glembloux: Duculot-Lethielleux, 1971), pp. 41-46.
6. Schoonenberg, p. 74. Cf. 66-74.

distinct, containing his own human personal identity. What then of the divinity and the pre-existence of the Logos?

As a hermeneutical principle to get behind and to the true meaning of the Greek thought pattern of the pre-existence of the Logos Schoonenberg formulates the principle: 'What is said of the pre-existent divine person can never nullify this one and human person.'[1] From this Schoonenberg holds that since man only knows God to be a Trinity at a certain time in history, it is impossible to conclude that God pre-existed as a Trinity before he came to be known as such. While he does not deny that the Trinity could eternally pre-exist, Schoonenberg favours the view that God becomes a Trinity through and because of revelation. Thus the Word becomes the outward and historical expression of the Father, and that with Christ 'whoever thinks that we can affirm nothing over the pre-existence of the Word will say that this Word is person in Jesus through its being man, that it is divine person through being a human person.'[2] What Schoonenberg is saying is that the Word, as the outward expression of the Father, is personified in the human person of Jesus.

> 'Our concept could now be called the theory of the enhypostasia of the Word. Or in other words: of the presence of God's Word, or God through his Word, in Jesus Christ, and indeed in such a way that this Word enters him wholly, that it becomes in him a historical person, that it becomes flesh.' 3

Where before in prophets and saints God only partially dwelled as Word, in Christ the 'Fullness of the Godhead....dwells wholly in him' to such an extent that the human person of Jesus personifies, makes personal, God's Word as Son.[4]

Schoonenberg feels that his Christology overcomes the difficulties inherent in the Chalcedonian pattern and actually states, and states better, what Chalcedon wished to say but could not because it was trying to impose the Greek thought pattern of the pre-existent Logos as a distinct person over against the human reality of Christ. He feels that he has overcome the competitive duality in Christ due to the two nature pattern without destroying the distinction between God and man 'for now it is not

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1. Ibid., p. 82.
2. Ibid., p. 87.
3. Ibid., p. 89. Cf. p. 93.
4. Ibid., p. 90.

the fullness of his own person, but that of his God and Father, who dwells in Christ. It is then a matter of superseding the two natures in the person by a paramount presence of God in this human person.'[1]

From Schoonenberg's Christology it is evident that his false presupposition is at work: if God acts in time and history in new ways in and through man, he must denigrate man. The whole of his criticism against the person of Christ being the pre-existent Logos revolves around this point. It is also evident from the fact that he conceives Chalcedon's use of 'two natures' in Christ as demanding a competition and/or a supremacy and degradation of one or the other. Schoonenberg, as many before him, has not grasped the fact that for the Person of the Logos to become man is for the Logos to be man, and precisely because of this it really and truly is man that the Logos is. Nothing in the man Jesus is eliminated, superseded, or lost. What is affirmed is only that who it is who is this man is the Logos. As Lonergan states in criticism of Schoonenberg: 'There is in Christ, God and man, only one identity; that one identity is the identity of the Word; the man, Jesus, has an identity but not in himself but in the Word.'[2]

Part of the difficulty throughout resides in Schoonenberg's basic confusion over Chalcedon's ontological notion of personhood and the modern psychological understanding of personhood. He thinks that the pre-existent Logos eliminates the human intellect and will. As should be evident from this study such is not the case. The traditional Christology demands only that he who humanly knows and wills be the Logos.

Likewise one can easily see Schoonenberg's ambiguous use of the concept 'patterns of thought.' He never sees the New Testament and Conciliar statements on Christ being one person and truly man as thought patterns imposed on and read into the reality of Christ, but really expressing the way he is. However, he consistently sees statements concerning the divinity of Christ and the pre-existent Logos as the ultimate subject in Christ as Greek thought patterns read into and imposed on the Christological data. While he sees such statements as approximating the truth and reality of Christ, he never grants that they really grasp and

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1. Ibid., p. 92.
2. Bernard Lonergan, 'The Origins of Christian Realism,' A Second Collection, (London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 1974), p. 259. Cf. pp. 251-260.

express who Christ is in himself.

As for Schoonenberg's own Christological reconstruction, anyone acquainted with Patristic Christology gets the distinct impression of déjà vu. Kelly quoting a sixth-century author writes:

> '"Paul did not say that it was the self-subsistent Word who was in Christ, but applied the title 'Word' to God's commandment or ordinance, i.e. God ordered what He willed through the man, and so did it....He did not say that Father, Son and Holy Spirit are one and same, but gave the name God to the Father,...that of Son to the mere man, and that of Spirit to the grace which indwelt the apostles." What this amounts to is that he was prepared to use the officially accepted Trinitarian formula, but only as a veil to cover a theology which is markedly unitarian.' 1

The author is not referring to Paul *the* Apostle, but to the Bishop of Samosata; and the Trinitarianism and Christology described is that of dynamic monarchianism or adoptionism. It is a very apt and accurate description of Schoonenberg's Christology as well.

As with Paul, the Logos for Schoonenberg is not a pre-existent subsistent divine Person but the expression of God in the world which so fully resides in the man Jesus that he is said to personify it and thus become God's Son. It is pure adoptionism. The only difference is that while the motivation behind Paul's adoptionism is to protect the immutable transcendence of God, Schoonenberg wishes to uphold the integrity of the man Jesus. However, both motivations spring from the same source: a true Incarnation must destroy either God or man. One should not think then that Schoonenberg's 'enhypostasis of the Word' to the man Jesus is something new. It is merely a new way of saying that God adopted the man Jesus to such a degree that he personifies God's Word to such an extent that he can be said to be Son.

While Schoonenberg differs from Paul in that he sees God as changing and becoming in relation to the world and through his expression being fully personified by Jesus, this is no way alters the adoptionism, but clarifies how and why God's 'Word' is more fully present in Christ than in anyone else. God changes in that he 'pronounces his Word totally in order to comprise and bear Jesus in all his dimensions.'[2] However, like

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1. Kelly, Early Christian Doctrines, p. 118. Cf. pp. 158-159. Cf. Grillmeier, pp. 177 f.
2. Schoonenberg, p. 85, fn. 16.

Paul then, God is unitarian and the Word and Spirit are but his impersonal manifestations in the world.

Schoonenberg above all else wished to maintain the full and real human Jesus, but what he forgot to take into account is the most important reason why this must be so. Jesus must be man because that is what the Logos has become and is. If Jesus is not the Logos existing as man, then the whole point of Jesus being a man is lost. The same is true of Jesus' human freedom, knowledge, suffering, etc.. One must agree with Schoonenberg that these must be real, but the true importance of their being real lies in the fact that it is the Logos as man who really is free, knows, suffers, etc..

B. Karl Rahner

When one comes to Rahner, one finds the topic of this study in the forefront of his Christology. The basic problem however, as is so often the case with Rahner, is not to discern the problem treated, but the answer given. Rahner's answer to the present question is open to differing interpretations. Nevertheless, the following will try to clarify and explicate his true position and show that it is in complete conformity with the Catholic tradition. Before proceeding to the heart of the matter one preliminary point must be made.

Unlike Schoonenberg, Rahner sees man's greatest value and good (he even terms it the mystery of man), as the capacity to receive and express God's revelation of himself outside of himself. This is the case not only with regards to God's pre- and post-incarnational action through prophets, faith, grace, and the Church, but also the central mystery of God's gift of himself--the gift of himself as he is in himself--the Incarnation. Man is what comes to be when God wishes to express and reveal himself as he is in himself. This does not mean that each and every man is an incarnation of God, but rather being created in the image of God man is the 'grammar' by which God is able to reveal and express himself to the point of expressing and revealing himself as he is. Man and God then are never competitors nor is there any fear of God eliminating or degrading man's value and worth as a man. Man's reception and expression of God's special action in time and history even to the point of a man being hypostatically united to the Logos is not the destruction of man,

but the fulfilment of man's greatest inherent potential. The obediential potency in man is not then in contradiction to nor 'one potentiality along with other possibilities in the constituent elements of human nature: it is objectively identical with the essence of man.'[1]

Rahner admits that to define man as such is to argue for an anthropology in light of Christology, but to do so is not illegitimate 'now that this has been revealed to us.'[2] This is totally in keeping with Rahner's Transcendental Method: given the fact that God really became man what is the a priori presupposition contained in the very nature of man as man for him to do so? The presupposition is that man is what comes to be when God wishes to reveal and express himself as he is in himself in time and history.[3]

What should be noted in the above is that since Rahner argues for his understanding of man from a Christological basis, the whole argument is incarnational in motivation, i.e. defining man as he does he wishes to stress and maintain both the full divinity and humanity in Christ. Both incarnational stresses spring from the fact that man is defined as that which God becomes when he reveals himself as he is in himself in time and history. For Rahner only if both are maintained can one say that 'What Jesus is and does as man, is the self-revealing existence of the Logos as our salvation among us. But then we can [also] really say, in the full sense of the words; here the Logos with God and the Logos with us, the Logos in the immanent Trinity and the Logos of the economy of salvation, is one and the same.'[4] This dual stress that Christ is

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1. Karl Rahner, 'On the Theology of the Incarnation,' Theological Investigations, 4, (London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 1966), p. 110. Cf. pp. 109-116. (Hereafter Theological Investigations will be referred to as T.I. plus volume number.) Rahner makes this point many times. For example, Cf. 'Theology and Anthropology,' T.I., 9, (London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 1972), pp. 28-45. All subsequent footnotes are to Rahner in this section unless otherwise stated.
2. 'Current Problems in Christology,' T.I., 1, (London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 1961), p. 184.
3. Rahner uses this same type of argumentation in proposing that only the Logos could become man and not the Father or Holy Spirit. Cf. 'Remarks on the Dogmatic Treatise "De Trinitate",' T.I., 4, pp. 77-102. Also The Trinity (New York: Herder and Herder, 1970).
4. 'Remarks on the Dogmatic Treatise "De Trinitate",' T.I., 4, p. 94. Cf. 'Observations on the Doctrine of God in Catholic Dogmatics,' T.I., 9, p. 130.

really the Logos as he exists as God who truly exists as man is evident throughout Rahner's Christology as the following will show.

What follows from this is that the incarnational act, the 'becoming,' must be such as to preserve the immutability of God if it really is to be God who is man, and also the real and true manhood if it is really to be man that he is. If the 'becoming' undermines either for Rahner, Christology becomes mythology.

> 'If we say "God is made man" in the ready-made patterns of our everyday speech, we either think automatically of God being changed into a man or else we understand the content of the word "man" in this context as an outer garment....But both interpretations of this statement are nonsensical and contrary to what Christian dogma really intends to say. For God remains God and does not change, and Jesus is a real genuine, and finite man with his own experiences....' 1

What is also evident in all the above is the fact that while the 'becoming' must uphold both the full unchanged divinity and true humanity, it must nevertheless terminate in the fact that God is man. Without a true ontological union of the whole point of Christ being fully God and man is lost.

> 'God is man: this does not mean that he has ceased to be God in the unconfined fullness of his divine majesty. God is man: this does not mean that the "human" in him is something which does not really concern him at all....God is man, this really tells us something about God himself. Because the human itself, affirmed by the fact that he pledges himself to us, is really and truly affirmed of him himself,...This human nature is thus his very own reality in which he himself and not merely a human nature different from him comes out to meet us, so that, when one grasps this humanity, one has in very truth understood and grasped something of God himself....When God manifests his humanity, then....it always meets us in such a way that he himself is there....' 2

For Rahner when one meets the man Jesus one is truly encountering the Person of God in himself for that is the manner of his existence, what he has come to be, what he is.

'Become' for Rahner then has the meaning ascertained long ago by Cyril, approved by Chalcedon, clarified by Aquinas, and emphasized in this

1. '"I believe in Jesus Christ",' T.I., 9, p. 166. Cf. p. 169. Also 'On the Theology of the Incarnation,' T.I., 4, pp. 117-118.
2. 'Thoughts on the Theology of Christmas,' T.I., 3, (London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 1967), pp. 29-30.

study. It is a personal/existential notion. For the Logos to become man means that he acquires a new personal mode of existence. He comes to be man, comes to exist as man. Thus, as before, 'become' does not threaten or destroy either the immutable divinity through change and mutation or the complete and true humanity.

Rahner himself echoes the main points of this study concerning the unity and diversity in Christ in relation to the incarnational act. The distinction of natures or modes of existence must not be made prior to the union (either temporally or logically) for any subsequent ontological union would destroy either or both the humanity or divinity. Rather the distinction must be made within the one reality of Christ precisely because the very act which establishes the ontological oneness is the same act which establishes and guarantees the distinction. For Rahner 'the ground by which the diverse term is constituted [humanity] and the ground by which the unity with the diverse term is constituted must as such be strictly the same.'[1]

With the above in mind reference must now be made to Rahner's footnote accompanying the last passage concerning God's immutability and true existence as man for it is here that problems arise. He writes:

> '....the assertion of God's "immutability," of the lack of any real relation between God and the world, is in a true sense a dialectical statement. One may and indeed must say this, without for that reason being Hegelian.' [Since it is a dogma of faith that] 'God himself has become man,' [then one must] 'grant that while God remains immutable "in himself," he can come to be "in the other," and that both assertions must really and truly be made of the same God as God.' 2

At first sight this statement may seem to be in complete contradiction to the above exposition of Rahner's notion of 'become.' The footnote seems to imply, due to the word 'dialectical,' that the phrase while 'God remains immutable in himself, he can come to be "in the other"' means that somehow God remains immutable and yet changes in the incarnational act, that dialectically God does not change and does change in becoming man. This, as will be seen, is the common interpretation among theologians.

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1. 'Current Problems in Christology,' T.I., 1, p. 181. Cf. pp. 180-182.
2. Ibid., p. 181, fn. 3.

In a later article Rahner expands his statement. Granting that the immutability of God is a dogma of faith,

> 'It is the question of how to understand the truth that the immutability of God may not distort our view of the fact that what happened to Jesus on earth is precisely the history of the Word of God himself, and a process which he underwent.
> If we face squarely the fact of the incaration,....we must simply say: God can become something, he who is unchangeable in himself can <u>himself</u> become subjectto change in something else.' 1

This statement seems to concern itself not so much with God somehow remaining immutable and yet changing in becoming man, but rather since God actually is man, then as man all that pertains to such an existence can rightly be predicated of God himself. It is a statement concerning the communication of idioms. The human history of Jesus is the human history of God since <u>God</u> actually is man. While God as God cannot change, he actually is the subject of change <u>as man</u> ('in something else') since that is his manner of existence.

However, in a footnote to this passage Rahner again states that it is actually <u>God himself</u> who becomes man. While one does not wish to predicate change in God,

> 'If we do call it a change, then since God is unchangeable, we must say that God who is unchangeable in himself can change in another (can in fact become man). But this "change <u>in</u> another" must neither be taken as denying the immutability of God in himself nor simply be reduced to a changement <u>of</u> the other....We must maintain methodologically the immutability of God, and yet it would be basically a denial of the Incarnation if we used it alone to determine what this mystery could be....The mystery of the Incarnation must lie in God himself: in the fact that he, though unchangeable "in himself," can become something "in another." The immutability of God is a dialectical truth like the unity of God. [From revelation one leans that God is a Trinity without loosing his oneness.] In the same way we learn from the Incarnation that immutability (which is not eliminated) is not simply and uniquely a characteristic of God, but that in and in spite of his immutability <u>he</u> can truly <u>become</u> something. He himself, he, in time. And this possibility is not a sign of deficiency, but the height of his perfection, which would be less if in addition to being infinite, he could not become less than he (always) is.' 2

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1. 'On the Theology of the Incarnation,' <u>T.I.</u>, 4, p. 113. Cf. p. 112.
2. <u>Ibid.</u>, pp. 113-114, fn. 3.

Again this footnote in some ways seems to be in opposition to the previous text. At times it seems Rahner is saying that the height of God's perfection is his ability to change and not change in becoming man. Again the term 'dialectical' seems to imply that Rahner sees the 'immutability' and the 'becoming' as contrary concepts which nevertheless must in some way be held together in their contrariness.

What is one to make of all of this? What is Rahner trying to get at?

Schoonenberg believes that Rahner is saying, contrary to the traditional Thomistic notion, that God has real relations with creatures and thus is changed by them. The Incarnation is the supreme example of this. Such is Schoonenberg's interpretation of Rahner's 'God changes in the other.'[1]

Donceel believes that Rahner is saying both that God is immutable and yet changes in becoming man. 'When God became man, he himself changed. The changement did not simply occur in the human nature of Christ. God himself changed.' Donceel stresses Rahner's use of the word 'dialectical,' and maintains that one must say both that 'God is immutable and yet he changes.' Accordingly, 'Rahner seems to distinguish two aspects in God: God as he is in himself and God as he is in the otherness of world history. He is immutable in the first aspect, he really changes in the other one.'[2]

Trethowan is the most consistent commentator and critic of Rahner. As the above two he also concludes that Rahner is asking one 'to accept a God who is partly mutable and partly immutable....' However, he

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1. Schoonenberg, The Christ, pp. 83-86, fn. 16. Also Man and Sin, (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1965), p. 50.
2. Joseph Donceel, 'Second Thoughts on the Nature of God,' Thought, 46, (1971), p. 351. Donceel's article is surprising in many ways. His main concern is to try to show how God really loves, cares, and is concerned with the world. He gives a very unsympathetic and in many ways facile rendition of the Scholastic (Thomistic) understanding of the God/man relationship, and concludes that it is impossible to see how God can really love the world if he is not affected and changed by it. God's immutability and love are mutually exclusive and such a contradiction can no longer be accepted. He seems to opt for a mitigated form of Process Theology. 'According to this modified form of theism God is Pure Act, yet he contains potency. He is Being itself, yet he becomes; he is immutable, although he changes. He is eternal, but in time; he is omniscent, but he finds out from man what man freely decides.' (p. 365.) If God's love and immutability are mutually exclusive, one wonders what Donceel's answer is?

concludes that Rahner's notion of the Incarnation is 'indefensible,' 'unthinkable,' and 'unintelligible.'[1]

If Rahner means what the above theologians say, one would have to agree with Trethowan that Rahner has strayed from traditional theism and Chalcedonian Christology. However, if they understand Rahner correctly, then he must also be contradicting himself if he also maintains the Christology as first outlined and explained above.

If one looks back at the previous quotations, one finds that most of the quotations from the body of the article are in context where the main concern is the communication of idioms.[2] Rahner wishes to say that the Logos is the true subject of all that pertains to the humanity. 'What happened to Jesus on earth is precisely the history of the Word himself, and a process which he underwent.' It is within this context that one must understand Rahner's contention that 'He who is unchangeable in himself can himself become subject to change in something else.' This is not a statement concerning the incarnational act itself. Rahner is not saying that the Logos changes in becoming man. Nor is he saying that God in his divinity undergoes change. Rahner is trying to emphasize and radically bring home the full import of the Incarnation, that because God became man, he (God himself) as man is in history and time. The human history of Jesus is the human history of God. That this is the case can clearly be seen in the discussion following the original delivery of 'On the Theology of the Incarnation.' When asked what he meant by God being mutable in the other, he said: 'Let us take an example: Jesus Christ sat here, then there. I can affirm that of God himself: before God was here, now he is there....This is what I mean by mutability.'[3] All that Rahner is pointing out is that Jesus is God actually existing as man,

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1. Illtyd Trethowan, 'A Changing God,' Downside Review, 84, (1966), p. 258. Cf. pp. 247-261. 'Antimetaphysical Theology,' Downside Review, 80, (1962), p. 329, fn. 12. The Absolute and the Atonement, (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1971), pp. 152-166. Mysticism and Theology: An Essay in Christian Metaphysics, (London: Geoffrey Chapman, 1975), pp. 62-69.
   Wolhart Pannenberg also interprets Rahner in the same fashion as the above three theologians. Cf. Jesus: God and Man, (London: SCM, 1968), p. 320.
2. Cf. 'Current Problems in Christology,' T.I., 1, pp. 176-181. Also 'On the Theology of the Incarnation,' T.I., 4, pp. 112-113.
3. This lecture was first given in French as 'Considérations Générales sur la Christologie,' and was published in Problèmes Actuels de Christologie, ed. H. Bouessé et J.-J. Latour (Desclée de Brouwer, 1965), pp. 15-33. Quotation from subsequent discussion on p. 408. Cf. pp. 401-409. Trans. Trethowan, The Absolute and The Atonement, p.157.

and when Jesus moves God moves. While Nestorius would bristle at the thought, the Fathers of Ephesus would applaud.[1]

Thus there is really nothing ultimately new here other than Rahner's emphasis and wording. The only criticism that could be made is that it may be better to say God is subject to change 'as something else' rather than 'in something else,' since God is not existing in man as if man were a container in which God dwelt, but God actually exists as man -- God is man.

It is at this point that the footnotes enter in, and with some confusion and ambiguity. Rahner realizes that in order to maintain that it is actually the Logos who is the subject of the human experiences, then it must be the Logos who actually and truly becomes and is in reality man. It is mainly in the footnotes that Rahner takes up the incarnational question.[2] If one does not realize that Rahner has moved from a discussion concerning the communication of idioms to a discussion concerning the Incarnation itself confusion is bound to arise for one could easily end up thinking that because Rahner says that it is actually God who changes as man that he also is saying that God changes in becoming man or vice versa. It is because Rahner does not explicitly state that the questions have changed that the answers he gives at one time in the text and another time in the footnotes seem to be fused and confused.

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1. Trethowan is critical of Rahner even on this point. He believes Rahner means that God suffers as divine. Rahner does wish to say, as Ephesus demands, that it is actually God who suffers, not as divine, but as man. Trethowan's arguments against Rahner are basically those of Nestorius, and like Nestorius he does not grasp that for God to become man terminates with the fact that God is man. Trethowan proposes a Christology where the will of the man Jesus is completely under the control of the Logos. Thus he is the true 'owner' and 'appropriator' of the human actions. Such an understanding imples only a moral union and that the Logos himself is not actually acting as man. The actions of the man Jesus are not literally the actions of the Logos, but only the external acting out of the Logos' wishes. The man Jesus loses then his human freedom and becomes a puppet of the Logos. In traditional Christology it is the Logos himself who has real human freedom, since he is man. It should be noted that while Trethowan misunderstands Rahner, his criticisms of Shoonenberg are valid. See the above cited articles.
2. Cf. 'Current Problems in Christology,' T.I., 1, p. 181, fn. 3. Also 'On the Theology of the Incarnation,' T.I., 4, pp. 113-114, fn. 3.

Concerning the incarnational act then Rahner wishes to say that God himself actually and truly became man in the fullness of his immutable transcendence. In the finite world of change and history the transcendent God exists as a man. This is what Rahner is getting at when he states that even though God's immutability demands that God be the logical term of the incarnational relation, he must nevertheless be really and truly man in reality. This is what Rahner believes must be held dialectically. This is also what Rahner means when he says that 'the mystery of the Incarnation must lie in God himself.' The mystery is that God remaining immutable is also in reality actually man.

The reason Rahner sees the above as dialectical is because he thinks that God's actual existence in reality as man is something different from his being the logical term of the incarnational relationship, as if in spite of God being the logical term, he must yet actually in reality be man. He is misreading Aquinas' notion of a mixed relation as if for God to be the logical term means that in reality he is not actually related. For Aquinas (though ambiguously as seen) God in the fullness of his divinity actually in reality is man precisely because the humanity is really related to him as he is in his esse personale. God himself actually in reality exists as man, not in spite of his being a logical term, but precisely because of it.[1]

It is because Rahner wishes to emphasize that it is God himself who is actually in reality man that he rather ambiguously says that to call the Incarnation 'a change' does not really matter: It is a reality (namely, that God himself has become flesh....), even though one fights shy of the term 'change.' The point he is making is not that God changes, but rather it is God's new mode of existence that is a change in reality. The term 'change' does not refer to a change in God, but to God's new manner of existence. What is new, what has changed is not God, but the fact that he himself now exists as a man and previously did not. That God is man is 'a reality,' 'a change' in reality, something new in reality. It is a new event that as Rahner says concerns God himself, but not by way of change in him, but rather reality has changed because God unchangeable

1. Cf. supra, pp.131-133. Again Trethowan misses Rahner's point here. In claiming that God in reality is man, Trethowan thinks Rahner is predicating change in God. He is interpreting the word 'real' here to mean a 'real relation' involving change, but that is not what Rahner means by real. He is saying that while God is the logical term and does not change he nevertheless is actually man in reality. Cf. The Absolute and The Atonement, pp. 156-157.

in himself has in reality actually come to exist now and newly as man. The reason Rahner fights shy of the word 'change' is precisely because he does not wish to predicate change in God, and yet does want to say that there is a change, something new -- God exists as man. What he fails to clearly see is that while the change involves God himself, it does not involve a change in God. He sees this distinction as dialectical due to his understanding (misunderstanding) of God being the logical term, and yet being in reality actually man.

Thus to maintain that Rahner sees God remaining immutable in the transcendence of his full divinity and yet somehow changing in the act of becoming man, as if the God in heaven is different from the God on earth, or that there are two aspects or parts of God as Donceel and Trethowan think he holds is to completely miss Rahner's whole point. For Rahner the greatness of the Incarnation, as it is for all Chalcedonian Christians, is the fact that God as God, in all that entails, has actually entered time and history in the very immutable transcendence of his divinity, and has actually come to be man. Rahner uses the term 'dialectical' not to say that God as God at one and the same time is unchangeable and changable in becoming man, but rather that God actually does become man and does not change in so becoming. The two truths for Rahner that must be dialectically upheld are that God remains immutable in becoming man, and yet actually comes to be man, and not that he remains immutable and changes in becoming man.

When Rahner states 'that while God remains immutable "in himself," he can come to be "in the other," and both assertions must really and truly be said of the same God as God,' he is not saying that part of God remains immutable (the 'himself' part) and part of God changes (the part that becomes 'other'), but rather that he who remains immutable in himself is precisely the same one who is actually man: God as God.

Likewise, when Rahner says that 'we learn from the incarnation that immutability (which is not eliminated) is not simply and uniquely a characteristic of God, but that in spite of his immutability he can truly become something. He himself, he, in time,' he is not saying that 'in spite of his immutability' God changes in becoming man; but rather that in spite of the fact that God's immutability is not eliminated he can actually become man. The whole emphasis on 'He himself, he, in time' stresses that the immutable God himself is in time.

This is most clearly seen in a text not previously quoted where Rahner states: 'The basic element, according to our faith, is the self-emptying, the coming to be, the kenosis and genesis of God himself, who can come to be by becoming another thing....without having to change in his own proper reality which is the unoriginated origin.'[1] The kenosis and genesis is not God giving up some apsect of his divinity or changing in becoming man, rather the real kenosis is that God in his full and unchanged unoriginated originality can exist as man. The humility of God is not that he gives up or changes his divinity, but rather the humility lies in the fact that God in the glorious fullness of his being actually exists as a lowly man. For Rahner, to deny God his full immutable divinity when he truly exists as man is to deny the real humility of God.

All of this complexity, confusion, and misunderstanding could easily be eliminated if Rahner had realized that God's actual existence as man is not dialectically opposed to his immutability, and his being a logical term in the incarnational relation. While he states that God's immutability must be dialectically held without becoming Hegelian, he fails to realize with Hegel that there is no dialectic involved in the first place. God himself as he is in himself can actually become man in reality without change, not in spite of his immutability, but precisely because of it. Because he is immutable he is able to relate the manhood to himself as he is so as to subsist in it and be man. God's immutability is the presupposition and guarantee that it is really and truly God in himself who actually is man and not a hindrance to it.

Rahner himself in a later essay seems to begin to realize what has just been said.

> 'In the doctrine of God there is no real difference between the Deus in se and the Deus extra se. At least since Christ....And it is the paradoxical miracle of his love (i.e. of himself "in himself") that he is able to do this without becoming finite and without violating our creatureliness. This process of becoming identical .... is the real content of salvation-history, which is the history of the unchangeable God. He really can become something in this history, precisely because (and in the final analysis not "although") he is finite and unchanging, the absolute power, capable of doing this.' [2]

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1. 'On the Theology of the Incarnation,' T.I., 4, p. 114.
2. 'Observations on the Doctrine of God in Catholic Dogmatics,' T.I., 9, p. 143.

For Rahner, as for Chalcedon, it is God in himself who is man. In Christ Deus in se is Deus extra se. What strikes one immediately now is that Rahner no longer sees the immutability of God as an impediment to God's actual existence as man. He explicitly eliminates the dialectical 'although' and states instead that God in reality can become man precisely because 'he is infinite and unchanging....'

C. Jean Galot

To date Jean Galot is not a very well known theologian in English speaking circles, and one wonders if he is appreciated even on the Continent. Nevertheless, his Christology and Soteriology is one of the most refreshing and clearly rendered statements of the Catholic tradition. His is not just a restatement of the past, but an attempt to truly develop the untapped potential of traditional belief.

While Galot has written three books in Christology, this section will mainly treat Vers une Nouvelle Christologie with closing reference to La Personne du Christ.[1]

For Galot Chalcedon is the legitimate culmination of Patristic Christology. Even though Chalcedon's definition is couched in Greek terms, what it proclaimed has little to do with Greek Philosophy. Greek philsophy did not distinguish between person and nature. 'C'est la théologie de la Révélation qui impose la distinction.'[2] However, because Chalcedon was interested in stating the ontological constitution of Christ, it may appear to be a static affirmation: 'elle est rédigée en terms d'être plutôt que d'événement.'[3] Nevertheless, inherent in Chalcedon's definition is an untapped dynamism that has not been fully developed. In proclaiming Christ to be the Logos existing as man Chalcedon understands that 'L'Incarnation n'est pas seulement la révélation de Dieu dans un homme: elle est l'engagement de la personne divine du verbe qui est devenue homme.'[4] The dynamic element implicit in Chalcedonian Christology must

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1. Jean Galot, Vers Une Nouvelle Christologie (Glembloux: Duculot-Lethielleux, 1971); La Personne du Christ (Glembloux: Duculot-Lethielleux, 1969). Galot's third book, which is undoubtedly one of the best scriptural and dogmatic statements of Christ's consciousness and knowledge is: La Conscience de Jésus (Glembloux: Duculot-Lethielleux, 1971).
2. La Personne du Christ, p. 10. Cf. Vers une Nouvelle Christologie, pp. 41-42.
3. Vers une Nouvelle Christologie, p. 47.
4. Ibid., p. 48. Cf. p. 62.

likewise flow from the very truth it proclaimed.

> 'Pour rendre correctement le dynamisme christologique, it faut y discerner comme principe d'unité....la personne divine. Car c'est elle qui accomplit la démarche en assumant une vie humaine. On ne peut apprécier la valeur de la démarche que si on reconnaît, la transcendance divine de la personne et l'intégrité de la condition humaine dans laquelle elle s'engage....' 1

What should be obvious already is that the dynamic element and greatest aspect of the Incarnation for Galot is the fact that the Logos in his transc endent divinity actually comes to exist and act in time and history as man. 'L'Incarnation est l'engagement d'une personne éternelle qui, avec toute son éternité, entre dans le temps human. L'éternité est ainsi introduite dans l'existence humaine.'[2] With Rahner and this study Galot wishes to maintain that the Logos himself actually exists in reality in a new manner. He likewise realizes that the value of the Logos existing as man lies solely and precisely in the fact that he does not change in so becoming but remains fully God. 'Dans l'Incarnation, celui qui devient ne perd pas ce qu'il est....[Le Verbe] demeure identiquement le Verbe qui 'était' au commencement. S'il n'en était pas ainsi, l'Incarnation n'aurait plus de valeur.' However, the Logos' immutability in becoming man 'n'empêche pas un véritable devenir.'[3] The immutability of God must not reduce the Incarnation to a moral union.

> 'Devenir, c'est être engagé du plus profound de soi-même dans ce que l'on devient. Ce devenir signifie notamment que le Verbe a fait personnellement l'expérience d'une vie humaine, de sa propre vie humaine....Le Verbe a donc connu, en un sens mystérieux, paradoxal, une mode d'être different de celui qu'il avait de toute éternité.' 4

Galot still asks if this brings about a change in the Logos. It is here that Galot, like Rahner, confuses the question of the Logos changing <u>in becoming man</u> with the question of the Logos <u>changing as man</u>, and thus comes up with a somewhat ambiguous answer.

Commenting on John's Proglue Galot states: 'Il [John] ne dit pas

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1. <u>Ibid.</u>, p. 48.
2. <u>Ibid.</u>, p. 65.
3. <u>Ibid.</u>, p. 55.
4. <u>Ibid.</u>, p. 56.

expressément que quelque chose a changé dans le Verbe, mais il décrit la passage de l'éternité à vie temporelle. Si le Verbe n'avait pas été affecté par ce passage, on ne pourrait parler d'un engagement sincère et total dans l'Incarnation.'[1] The above could be interpreted that Galot sees a change in the Logos in becoming man and he probably does mean that as will be seen. However, Galot's main concern here is to uphold with John that with the Incarnation the Logos in reality now exists temporally as man and before did not. With John he wants to say that there is a real change, a real newness, involving the Logos himself. That the Logos is 'effecté par ce passage' is not so much for Galot a statement that the Logos loses his immutability or is changed into man, but rather that he is engaged 'sincère et total dans l'Incarnation.'

For Galot the touchstone for a true understanding of the notion of 'become,' due to his desire for a dynamic Christology, is whether one can truly say that the Logos himself is actually engaged in and experiencing a truly human life.

> 'Nier qu'il ait été affecté par cette vie humaine, ce serait être réduit à admettre qu'il ne l'a assumée que de l'extérieur, sans interêt véritable.' 2

For Galot

> 'L'Incarnation est un engagement où la personne divine du Verbe se place délibérément dans une situation nouvelle, et veut elle-même être affectée par cette nouveauté et tant que sujet véritable et responsable de la démarche.' 3

What Galot is doing, and this is what causes confusion for the reader and Galot himself, is answering a question concerning the 'becoming' with an answer concerning the effects of the 'becoming.' Instead of ontologically defining 'become' he gives an ontological description of its effects. The effect of the incarnational act, the 'becoming,' is that the Logos is in a 'situation nouvelle,' and that he is affected by this new situation as 'sujet véritable.' Because the effect of the 'becoming' places the Logos in a situation where as man he is the subject of change Galot tends to see the 'becoming' itself, the act by which the Logos comes to be the subject of changé, as bringing about a change in the Logos' divinity as well. This

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1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid. p. 58.

becomes even more clear in the following.

As the above exemplifies, the basic problem or confusion in Galot is a tendency on his part to equate the actual changes in reality due to God's real action with an actual change in God himself. This is due to his desire to make it really God who is dynamically active and present in time and history especially in the Incarnation. However, the outcome of this is to conceive God in himself changing in a sequential fashion and not just the actual effects in which he is personally and newly involved.

Galot holds that God reveals himself to be immutable through his action in the world as narrated in the Old and New Testaments. The immutability revealed is not just a moral faithfulness to his promises, but a metaphysical immutability. This is especially true in the Incarnation. 'C'est identiquement ce Verbe éternal....qui entre dans le devenir sans cesser d'être ce qu'il est. Il y a ici une immutabilité qui ne pourrait se ramener à une fidélité; c'est une persistence dans l'order de l'être.'[1] This immutability has been sanctioned by Nicea's homoousion doctrine.

Galot's next move is most important. For Galot God truly acts in time and history and it is truly God who acts. Because of God's action very great changes in reality take place--creation, Incarnation, and these changes reveal God to be immutably all-powerful. However, because he reveals his immutable and all-powerful being through the different and diverse changes in reality Galot concludes that:

> 'l'Écriture nous atteste que cette immutabilité n'exclut pas une certaine mutabilité ou variabilité. On n'a pas le droit de supprimer celle-ci comme si elle portait détriment à celle-là. Bien plus, d'après le témoignage scripturaire, c'est l'immutabilité elle-même qui se révèle comme telle dans la mutabilité: si Dieu prend successivement des attitudes différentes à l'égard de l'homme, c'est parce qu'il est toujours le même, que son dessein essential ne change pas, et qu'il veut en adapter la réalisation aux comportements humains, fort variables.' 2

Galot is not saying that God changes because he is imperfect, but rather that the changes show God to be immutable. Being immutable he can become creator, man, saviour, etc. 'Alors que la mutabilité de la créature présente des aspects négatifs et implique des déficiencies, la mutabilité

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1. Ibid., p. 79. Cf. pp. 75-81.
2. Ibid., p. 82.

n'exprime en Dieu qu'un dynamisme dont toute la valeur est positive.'[1] For Galot the mutable and changing expressions of God's immutable power in time and history demand corresponding mutable and changing expressions of God's immutable power within himself. Why? Because otherwise God would not be really and truly Creator, nor would he really come to be man. The mutations of God's immutability establish and guarantee that it is really God in reality who is acting, who is Creator, who is man.

One would not quarrel with Galot over the fact that God reveals himself to be all-powerful and immutable through the actions he performs and the changes he brings about in reality. Nor would one quarrel over the fact that it is really God acting. He is personally involved. He really is a Creator. He really is man. What one would quarrel with is Galot's thought that God changes himself in such a way as to become Creator, or that he changes himself so as to become man, as if God as God changes when he becomes God as Creator, or that God as God changes when he wishes to become man. For Galot God not only uses his immutable power in different ways at different times, but also in the use of this immutable power God himself changes or changes himself in different ways at different times. Galot predicates, what might be called, sequential mutations in God himself. He sequentially changes himself into God the Creator and God who has become man.

While Galot proposes that God mutably uses his immutability in order to guarantee that it is truly God who is actually acting in time and history, what he has done is to throw into question what he wishes to hold. One can question whether God as Creator is really now God as God, or whether God who exists as man is really God as he is in himself. In proposing creation as God mutably using his immutable power, what man knows is not the immutable God in himself, but the immutable God as manifested in one mutable expression. Likewise with the Incarnation, man does not come to know and meet God himself, but only the mutable expression of himself as man. The immutable God in se is no longer the immutable God pro me.

Galot makes two mistakes, one with regard to God in himself, and one with regard to God's relation to and action in the world.

Firstly, to say that God changes the mode of his immutable and almighty power in the actions he performs is to see God's immutability and almighty power as accidents of God and not part and parcel of what he truly is in

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1. Ibid., p. 83.

himself. God has no need to change the expression of his immutable nature to be active in time and history precisely because his immutable nature enables him to do so without change. God does not have to form or mould the pure act that he is into a Creator type of pure act when he creates, nor does he have to form his divinity into a type of divinity that wishes to and can become man. The immutable pure act that God is, his very divinity in itself, is ipso facto potentially creative and incarnational. If God creates or becomes man he does so by the very act that he is and not by a mutation of it.

Secondly, Galot does not understand how God, remaining fully immutable in himself, can in reality actually be related to and active in time and history. He wishes God to remain immutable, but he can only reconcile God's actual relation to the world with his immutability by proposing that God changes his immutable power from an in se type to a pro me type. However, he is unable to conceive that God in se as in se is God pro me. This is due to the fact that Galot falsely understands that for God to be logically related to the world is a relation 'qui est une vue de notre esprit mais n'existe pas comme telle dans la réalité.'[1] In order to overcome the non-reality of God's relation to the world in creation and the Incarnation Galot feels he must propose that because God is immutable he can change his in se immutability into a pro me immutability, that he can really become a God who is Creator, or who really is man.

However, once one realizes that God is actually Creator because creatures in reality are really related to him as such, then God as God (in se) and God as Creator (pro me) are one and the same. Likewise, the Logos is actually man as he is in himself as God because the humanity in reality is related to him as he is in such a way that the Logos in se subsists as man pro me. For God to be logically related guarantees, specifies, and establishes that it is God himself as he is in himself who is actually related to man and actually is man. This is ultimately what Galot wishes to say and maintain all along.

Galot would not have the above difficulty if he had fully realized all the implications inherent in the Christology he presented in his first work: La Personne du Christ. In this study Galot stresses that the distinguishing mark of personhood, both in God and man, is to be related. Persons are subsistent relations. Thus while a human person is relational

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1. Ibid., p. 89.

in and through his nature, the person as relational is distinct from the nature. Thus the Logos can be fully man without being a human person in that he is the centre and source of all human relations mediated through the human nature. Where normally a human person subsists in relation to others in and through his nature, in Christ the Logos subsists as man establishing human relations in and through his humanity.[1]

Galot works this out very beautifully. However, if he would have turned the whole argument around he would have found the right solution to the problem which arises in his Vers une Nouvelle Christologie. In La Personne du Christ Galot stresses the similarity between being a divine person and being a human person so as to show how the person of Christ can be the Logos without ceasing to be fully human. If he would now stress the dissimilarity between a divine person and a human person, he would discover why the Logos could truly become man without changing.

Where in man the person is relational through and in his nature which is distinct from his personhood, the persons of the Trinity are identical with the one nature of God. Thus while a human person is in potency to become further relational, divine persons are fully relational, fully actualized relations, fully personal since they relationally are the immutable and fully actualized nature of God as actus purus. Human persons then, unlike divine persons, change in every new relation. The relations they establish are through changes in their natures through and in which they relate to others. Thus human persons are never related to one another as they are in themselves, but always by some changeable mediating action of their nature. This is easily seen in human love. A person grows in love and tries to express it, but he soon realizes that no expression of his love captures and makes real the totality of his love. This is because the person cannot relate himself as he is, with all his love, to the other person, but must use mediating and changeable actions.

However, the divine persons, being fully actualized relations, are related to one another as they are, and not by mediating actions. They actually come to be in their very relatedness and are their relatedness. Because of this when God in the Trinity of Persons establishes relations outside himself, he is able to do so not by mediating acts which involve change, but by relating the other person to himself as he is. The

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1. Cf. the whole of La Personne du Christ, but especially pp. 75-97.

Persons of the Trinity being fully actualized relations contain no potency which needs to be actualized or overcome through new actions in order to establish new relations. What needs to be changed and overcome is man's potential to be related. This is done by God relating man to himself as he is in different ways. No intermediating action then lies between or establishes the relation between God and the other. God the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit love man and express their love for man not by an action different from the love that they have for one another, nor by an action that simply expresses the love that they have, but by uniting man to themselves as they are, by uniting man to the very Trinity of their love.

The same is the case in the Incarnation. The Logos being a fully actualized subsistent relation does not have to overcome some potential in order to become man and subsist as man. He does not, as Galot proposes, have to change his immutable being or newly express it as incarnational. The Logos being a fully actualized subsistent relation has no relational potency and thus has no need of new mediating actions on his part in order for him to establish an incarnational relation. The potency lies solely in the humanity. It must be related and united to the Logos in such a way that the effect in the humanity is nothing other than the Logos subsisting in it as man.

The above is but an amplification of what has been said many times before. The immutability of God as expressed in the Person of the Logos as a fully actualized subsistent relation is the prologomenon to and presupposition for the Incarnation and not a stumbling block.

Before closing it should be noted, with little surprise, that Trethowan finds Galot's Christology unacceptable. His disagreement however is not so much over the point discussed above, but over Galot's contention that it is truly the Logos who is the real subject of Christ's human life. Commenting on an article by Galot, Trethowan finds it unthinkable that a divine person should suffer, die, etc., that the Logos 'had personally the experience of human life, of his own human life.'[1] Trethowan's problem here is the same as the one he had with Rahner. Again what Trethowan fails to see, and what Galot glories in, is the reality of the Incarnation. If the Logos in reality actually is man, than as man he

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1. Trethowan, Mysticism and Theology, pp. 160-161. Galot's article is 'Dynamisme de l'Incarnation,' Nouvelle Revue Theologique, 93, (1971), pp. 226-244.

must be the subject of all the human experiences.

In closing it should be emphasized that this study of Galot hardly does him justice and in many ways does him an injustice for it harps on his one fault. This could not be avoided since the fault bears directly on the subject of this study. In reparation it can only be stressed that Galot's Christology is one of the most theologically exciting to appear in recent years.

CONCLUSION

After reading this study, one may be surprised to what extent the immutability of God influenced Christology through the centuries. However, what may be most surprising is not so much <u>that</u> it has influenced Christology, but the <u>ways</u> it has influenced Christology.

In Patristic Christology the immutability of God was seen, for the most part, as a stumbling block to the Incarnation. This was the case both for orthodox and heterodox theologians. The Docetists denied the real humanity for the sake of God's immutability and impassibility. Arius denied the true divinity of the Logos because he believed a real incarnation implied change and thus impossible for a divine being. Nestorius could not conceive of an ontological notion of 'become' which would preserve both the true immutable divinity and the full humanity, and thus had to settle, in the last analysis, for a moral union. On the orthodox side theologians, especially men like Tertullian, Origen, and Athanasius, knew that for God to become man did not mean that he was changed into man, yet they also knew that they must say that Christ was nevertheless ontologically one, that God and man existed in the one reality of Christ. Yet, even they could not fully formulate how that could be.

What interestingly arose at the time of the Nestorian controversy is the realization that God's immutability must be maintained not only for theological reasons, i.e. in order to protect God as God; but also for incarnation*al* reasons, i.e. God must remain immutable in becoming man if it is really and truly to be <u>God</u> who is man. It was at this point that the immutability began to be seen, however slightly, not purely as a stumbling-block, but also as something positively demanded by the Incarnation. Nestorius realized very well that if God changed in becoming man it is no longer <u>God</u> who is man, but that which 'he' changed into. Cyril likewise was aware of this. Moreover both realised that a change in the Logos in becoming man demanded a corresponding change in the manhood, and thus the true humanity itself was destroyed. Apollinarianism and Monophysitism exemplify this tendency very well.

The problem came down to specifying what 'become' really meant incarnationally. It must be such that God remains God, if it is to be <u>God</u> who is man, and the humanity must remain full and real, if it is to

be man that he is. Moreover it must be ontological, if God is to be man. Nestorius and Theodoret of Cyrus could not conceive of such a notion which would preserve all the required prerequisites. This was due to the fact that they conceived the divinity and humanity as distinct and separate to begin with. They rightly knew that any subsequent ontological union would demand change and mutation. What the Monophysites did they knew could not be done. Cyril, however, in upholding Ephesus, gained the insight that the incarnational act and union is not an essentialistic or a compositional union of natures, but a personal/existential act and union. For the Logos to become man meant that he took on a new manner or mode of personal existence. For the Logos to become man meant that he came to be, came to exist as man. Thus Cyril grasped that the distinction of natures is made not prior to the union, but that the act which establishes the union is the very same act which establishes and guarantees the distinction. The act by which the Logos comes to be man is the act which establishes that it is as man that he exists. No longer is the ontological union seen as a threat to the immutability of God or to the full humanity, but rather it is one and the same act which establishes the union and maintains the distinction.

With this personal/existential notion of 'become' the communication of idioms is fully justified. If the Logos personally exists as God and as man then whatever pertains to each mode of existence can really and truly be predicated of the Logos. The communication of idioms is not a word game to stress how close God and man are related as Nestorius would have it, but specifies and articulates the fact that the Logos actually in reality exists as God and as man.

It is Chalcedon which sanctions and proclaims the above. One and the Same Logos exists homoousion with God and man, and as such what pertains to each can truly be said of him.

While Anselm fully justified and explained Chalcedon in his day, it was Aquinas who came up with the next insight into the relationship between the Incarnation and God's immutability. He was probably not fully aware of his insight and he presented it ambiguously, but it is nevertheless there. In seeing God's immutability as due to his supreme and utterly dynamic perfection as ipsum esse and actus purus, Aquinas eliminated all negative potential in God. In so doing he did not place God in complete isolation from the world and man, nor in a situation in which no relation

was possible. Rather he gave to God the positive potential that whatever is related to him is related to him as he is in himself. To be a creature is to be related to God himself as Creator and only if God is immutably actus purus can such a relation be established. That God is the logical term of the relation, that he is not changed by the relation, is not to deny that he is related, nor to say that he is only so conceived to be related in man's mind, but specifies that the relation is one in which the creature is actually related in reality to God as God actually is in himself. God as actus purus has no relational potency and thus is not in need of mediating acts which bring about change in him in order for him to be related. God can relate himself as he is in himself by relating others to himself as he is. The real effect in the other is that he is related in some way to God as God is in himself. Thus the incarnational relation, the 'becoming,' is nothing other than the full and real humanity coming to be and being related to the Logos as he is to such a degree that the effect of the relation in the humanity is nothing less than that the Logos himself as he is in himself, in his divine esse personale, comes to subsist as man.

While Aquinas did not fully realize it, and neither does Rahner and Galot, God's immutability as actus purus is no longer a stumbling-block, but the primary prologomenon for a true Incarnation. It is God's immutability as actus purus that is God's incarnational potential. Only an immutably perfect God can enact a personal/existential 'becoming' which the Incarnation implies as grasped by Cyril and sanctioned by Chalcedon. Only if God is immutably and unchangeably perfect can he establish a relation in which he, in the fullness of his self-possessed divinity, personally come to exist as man.

With Luther and the Kenotic theories that flowed from him, Christology returned to the presuppositions abandoned by Cyril and Chalcedon and to a notion of 'become' that was once more essentialistic and compositional. Like Nestorius and the Monophysites the Kenoticists made the distinction of natures logically prior to the incarnation act and the union. Unlike Nestorius they fused the two, and unlike the Monophysites it was the divinity of Jesus which this time suffered. However as classical Monophysites ended up jeopardizing the divinity of Christ by fusing and confusing it with the humanity, so Kenoticism by reducing the divinity to a human level jeopardized the full humanity. Jesus was no longer a real

man with a real human intellect and will, but a shadow man functioning with a diminished and emptied divine intellect and will. Essentialistic and compositional notions of 'become' always bring forth a tertium quid Christ who is neither fully God nor fully man even though they always are enunciated in order to guarantee one or the other.

Process Christology is an attempt to solve the problem of God's immutability in relation to the Incarnation by denying that God is immutable. In so doing the problem does disappear, but the repercussions are disastrous. While Process Christology wished to show how closely related God is to man in and through the concept of prehension and how Christ is the summit and chief exemplification of this, what one must conclude is that there is no contemporary relations in process thought and thus each being, when it is a being, is not related to anything at all. All relations are constitutive relations of past to present to future and not personal contemporary relations. Thus God and man are never contemporaries and never personally related. Likewise process thought in seeing the value of man as his ability to actualize God's potential has in fact taken from man all his inherent value and worth as a man in himself. Each human being's value is a monophysite value. His worth and value is totally dependent on how much of God's potential he actualizes. Christ in actualizing perfectly God's potential is the most thoroughly monophysite. As a man he has no value in and of himself, but is reduced to the perfect actualizer of God's potential, and thus allowing God to completely absorb and consume this value through prehension.

Contemporary Catholic Christology has two admirable proponents in Rahner and Galot, but Schoonenberg adds little Christological advancement. Both Rahner and Galot take up the personal/existential notion of the Incarnation and stress its dynamic element. The human history of Jesus is the real human history of God. As man God himself is present in time and history experiencing all that it thoroughly human and establishing human relations with man as a man.

Both Rahner and Galot see the immutability of God as an impediment to the reality of the Incarnation, but this is due to their mis-interpretation of what it means for God to be logically related. They believe that this means that God is only conceptually related and not related in reality. Once this misinterpretation is overcome their Christology becomes even more dynamic for it guarantees that it is the Logos himself as he is in

himself, in the fullness of his divinity, who actually exists in reality as man. Being immutable the Logos has no relational potency but can establish relations with others by uniting them to himself as he is even to the point of uniting to himself a real and full human nature so as to subsist as man. Thus it is the Logos himself, in his unqualified divinity, who establishes human relations and encounters the world and man as a man. Paradoxically, but nevertheless true to logic, the Logos' immutability as God guarantees that it is the Logos himself who is passible as man.

As was stated in the Preface the conclusions arrived at here were not preconceived from the beginning, but developed with each successive stage of this study. Hopefully the conclusions arrived at are valid and hopefully they contribute to a better understanding of what role God's immutability plays in the Incarnation. Far from being a negative role it plays a highly positive one. Also while the mystery of the Incarnation ultimately remains in this study, it is hoped that the true glory and grandeur of the mystery has become clearer and with this clarity a further realization and appreciation of God's true and full love for man as a man.

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